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Management of groundwater as a common pool resource relies heavily on an 
institutional design that is fitted to the aquifers to be managed and is scaled to provide 
efficient and effective governance.  Texas has committed to a decentralized system of 
groundwater management through Groundwater Conservation Districts (GCDs) that 
offers a high level of local control and area-specific adaptability.  However, increasing 
pressures on the state’s groundwater resources coupled with a strong local aversion to 
outsider interference has resulted in a proliferation of small single-county GCDs that are 
neither well fitted to the aquifer systems nor sufficiently scaled to be efficient or 
effective.  In recognition of these challenges, the persistent response has been a slow 
transition towards larger-scale management.  Although a full transition to centralization 
via state control is not likely to be politically feasible, it would also be limited in its 
effectiveness, recognizing the wide diversity of climate conditions, water use patterns, 
growth projections, and aquifer characteristics that exist across the state.  Regionalization 
is offered as a policy proposal for an institutional arrangement and scale of groundwater 
 vii 
governance that provides a balance between centralization and decentralization, using 
institutions that are better fitted to the aquifer systems and appropriately scaled to provide 
sufficient funding and resources.   
The merits and logic of regionalized groundwater management have been 
recognized as demonstrated by the establishment of the joint regional-planning process 
within aquifer-based Groundwater Management Areas (GMAs), using GCD 
representatives as the de facto regional groundwater planners.  However, the new 
unfunded mandates for which the already underfunded GCDs are now responsible and 
the extraordinary planning process complexity that has developed may prove to be 
unworkable.  This realization compels consideration of management through regional 
authorities designed using the ready-made framework of the GMAs and principles 
gleaned from successful models of regionalization from other states and within Texas.  
Such regional authorities, if provided with sufficient resources and authority, would 
respect the logic of fit and scale and would be better equipped to address the current and 
future groundwater management challenges in Texas.   
 viii 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction and Background 
Groundwater management in Texas has evolved from a passive non-management 
system under the rule of capture towards a decentralized system of management where 
Groundwater Conservation Districts (GCDs)1 have been designated by the Legislature as 
the state’s ―preferred‖ method of groundwater governance.  This preference for local 
control, however, has resulted in a proliferation of GCDs that have been established 
along county boundaries rather than in accordance with the hydro-geographical 
boundaries of the aquifers for which they were established to manage.  The tendency for 
the creation of county-based GCDs, many of which are single-county in scale, has 
generated a steady drumbeat of criticism related to the inherent limitations of small-scale 
politically-drawn management entities and the associated hindrances to effective 
groundwater management in Texas.  It is apparent that the preference for local control via 
GCDs was perhaps a political necessity in any initial effort to move away from 
unrestricted groundwater use under the rule of capture towards some more restrictive 
form of management.  And while perhaps expedient to the initial foray into groundwater 
governance, the legacy of local control via county-based GCDs coupled with the 
increasing pressures on the state’s groundwater resources will continue to create 
formidable challenges to effective management.  In recognition of these limitations, the 
Texas Legislature has implemented a joint-regional groundwater planning process that 
occurs at a larger aquifer-based scale via Groundwater Management Areas (GMAs) using 
                                                 




local GCDs as the primary participants.   This small step towards regional management 
via GMAs is an apparent attempt by the Texas Legislature to respond to criticism; 
however, a continued evolution with further reforms is needed to reconcile the challenges 
inherent in the legacy of small-scale county-based management entities. 
This thesis presents the evolution of groundwater management in Texas and the 
more recent shifts towards regional scale planning to provide context for the current 
preference for local control and associated challenges.  Building on this context, an 
analysis of potential models for regional-scale resource management is presented and 
concludes with findings, options, and policy recommendations for transitioning to 
effective regional aquifer-scale groundwater management in Texas.      
1.1 GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN TEXAS - FROM EAST TO LOCAL CONTROL 
1.1.1 The Rule of Capture 
Groundwater management in Texas has been slowly evolving since the turn of the 
20
th
 century.  The state’s initial attempt to address competing uses of groundwater began 
in response to a Texas Supreme Court ruling in Houston & T.C. Railway. v. East in 
1904.2 The product of East was the establishment of the common law groundwater 
doctrine of the rule of capture (also commonly referred to as absolute ownership) – a 
doctrine that in essence is a tort rule of non-liability3 that firmed up a landowner’s right to 
virtually unlimited pumpage with impunity.   In East, a resident of Denison, Texas, Mr. 
                                                 
2 Houston & T.C. Railway v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S. W. 279 (Tex. 1904) 
3 M. Jones, “Why the DFC Process is Failing - What Can Be Done to Fix it.”  Paper presented at the Texas 




W. A. East, alleged that pumpage from a much larger and deeper well that was dug by the 
railroad company on the adjacent property had caused his well to go dry.  In judgment of 
the case, the court applied the rule of capture precluding any liability that might be 
assigned to large pumping wells that interfere with neighboring wells provided that the 
action was not wasteful or malicious.4  
Prior to the East case, the provenance and behavior of groundwater was shrouded 
in myth with many, particularly those settling the Texas Panhandle of the Great Plains, 
conveniently believing that groundwater was an inexhaustible underground river.5  The 
East case did little to dispel this mythology.  In fact, the Court famously based its 
decision on the rationale used in a similar Ohio Supreme Court Case in which that court 
pleaded ignorance and described the existence, origin, and movement of groundwater as:  
…so secret, occult, and concealed that any attempt to administer any set of legal 
rules…would be involved in hopeless uncertainty, and would, therefore, be 
practically impossible.6   
 
This ruling marked the beginning of the legal divergence between surface water 
and groundwater in Texas – a decision that would establish the foundation of Texas 
groundwater law with ramifications that are still being felt to this day.7 
                                                 
4 See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 76 (Tex. 1999)  (―Essentially, the [rule of 
capture] provides that, absent malice or waste, landowners may have the right to take all the water they can 
capture under their land and do with it what they please, and they will not be liable to neighbors even if in 
so doing they deprive their neighbors of the water’s use.‖).  See also Friendswood Development Co. v. 
Smith Southwest Industries, 576 S.W. 2d, 22 (Tex. 1978).  (In addition to causing malicious injury and 
being willingly wastewater, the Court in Friendswood, modified the rule of capture by adding subsidense 
caused by pumping as an additional exception to the rule of capture.)  
5 This and other myths were useful in encouraging settlement of the American west and plains.  This 
mythology can be exemplified by the famous notion coined by Charles Dana Wilber that ―rain followed the 
plow.‖  See also Green, D., LAND OF THE UNDERGROUND RAIN: IRRIGATION IN THE TEXAS HIGH PLAINS 
1910-1970, at 165 (1973). 




1.1.2 The Conservation Amendment 
Shortly after the East case was decided, Texas experienced droughts in 1910 and 
1917 that compelled Texas citizens to approve an amendment to the Texas constitution.8 
Article 16, Chapter 59, also known as the Conservation Amendment, was passed in 1917 
and declared that conservation of the state’s natural resources, including water, are public 
rights and duties.  The amendment authorized the legislature to pass all appropriate laws 
necessary to conserve and preserve the natural resources of the state.  More importantly, 
the courts have interpreted the approval of the Conservation Amendment by Texans as 
providing not only the authority, but also the responsibility to preserve and conserve the 
state’s water resources for the benefit of all citizens.9  It would later prove to provide 
frequently used grounds for inaction by courts that emphasized that this authority and 
responsibility is a legislative prerogative and duty rather than a judicial one.10 
1.1.3 The Groundwater Conservation District Act of 1949 
 Although there was relatively minor progress relating to groundwater regulation 
made in the first few decades following the passing of the Conservation Amendment, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 R. Mace, C. Ridgeway, & J. Sharp,  Groundwater is No Longer Secret and Occult - A Historical and 
Hydrogeologic Analysis of the East Case.  In 100 YEARS OF RULE OF CAPTURE: FROM EAST TO 
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT, at 63 (W. F. Mullican, & S. Schwartz ed.,  June, 2004). 
8  H. Potter,  History and Evolution of the Rule of Capture.  In 100 YEARS OF RULE OF CAPTURE: FROM 
EAST TO GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT, at 1 (W. F. Mullican, & S. Schwartz eds.,  June, 2004).  
9 B. Darling,  Texas Groundwater - Rule of Capture and Groundwater Management in Texas: Part 1, THE 
WATER REPORT, at 9.  (D. L. Moon, ed., April 15, 2007).  (citing Barshop v. Medina County UWCD, et al., 
925 S. W. 2d 618 (Tex. 1996)). 
10 See Potter, supra note 8 at 2.  See also Friendswood, 30 (Tex. 1978) (―Providing policy and regulatory 
procedures in this field is a legislative function.‖); Pecos County Water Control and Improvement Dist. No. 
1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954) (―court invited legislative action to 




need for groundwater management was the subject of much debate in response to 
concerns over excessive pumpage of water from the Ogallala Aquifer in the Texas 
Panhandle.11 After extensive groundwater surveys, the Texas Board of Water Engineers 
(predecessor agency to the Texas Water Development Board) in 1934 produced its 
biennial report concluding that "there is no reason why underground water should not be 
subject to the same control as surface water‖ and calling for a law:  
first, to declare the underground water of the State the property of the State; 
second, to guarantee vested rights to those who already have made beneficial use 
of underground water; and third, to exercise proper control over future 
underground-water development.12 
 
Bills reflecting these recommendations that would have placed groundwater under 
the control of the state similar to surface water were filed in each of the legislative 
sessions of 1937, 1941, and 1947.13  All of these bills however, were defeated owing in 
large part to the united and formidable opposition of the high plainsman.14  In 
anticipation of a similar bill to be supported by the Texas Water Conservation 
                                                 
11 M. Booth & R. Richard-Crow,  Regulatory Dance: Rule of Capture and Chapter 36 District Perspective.  
In 100 YEARS OF RULE OF CAPTURE: FROM EAST TO GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT, at 19 (W. F. Mullican, 
& S. Schwartz ed.,  June, 2004).  
12 D. Green,  LAND OF THE UNDERGROUND RAIN: IRRIGATION IN THE TEXAS HIGH PLAINS 1910-1970, at 
172 (1973). 
13 Id. at 172. 
14 Id. at 183 &181.  (Green provides quotes from high plainsman demonstrating the local opposition to 
groundwater regulation including: ―This proposition [of creating a water district] should be met with 30-
30's [rifles] and its sponsors not only driven back to the City of Austin, but on south across the San Jacinto 
battlefield and into the Gulf of Mexico where they can get their fill of water"; ―You can say you prefer 
local control to state control or federal control.  I don’t want any control by anybody but the landowner.  
That's like asking who you'd rather be hanged by.  I don't want to be hanged‖; and ―All the water under my 
land belongs to me… nobody can tell me how to use it…If my neighbor wants to drill wells right next to 
me, that’s all right with me.  If the wells go dry, we will all run out together.  I don't intend to live in a 




Association in the 1949 session, the Texas Farm Bureau prepared a counter bill that 
would create locally controlled groundwater districts similar to soil conservation districts.  
The general sentiment at the time was summed up best by a local high plainsman who 
was quoted as saying, ―I favor no control, but if we must have it, let it be local.‖15   
The Groundwater Conservation District Act of 1949 (GCD Act) that finally 
passed was a political compromise16 that authorized a petition process as an optional 
means for establishing an entity to manage groundwater locally.  The GCD Act allowed 
for a local petition to be filed, initiating a study to delineate the boundaries of 
―underground water reservoirs‖, which was the prerequisite step towards the 
establishment of a GCD within a designated ―reservoir.‖17  Surprisingly, the GCD Act 
contained many of the fundamental elements of authority available to GCDs today.18  
More importantly, the GCD Act: 1) represented a now predominant theme of favoring 
local governance if for no other reason than to avoid centralized control,19 and 2) 
established a precedent of county-centric influence in GCD creation.   The GCD Act also 
served to firmly establish the wedge between Texas groundwater and surface water 
                                                 
15 Id. at 179. 
16 E. Woodruff, Jr. & J. Williams, Jr., Comment, Texas Groundwater District Act of 1949: Analysis and 
Criticism, 30 TEX. L. REV. 862, at 865-866 (1952) (―During the past fifteen years, several attempts have 
been made to provide the state with comprehensive groundwater legislation.  Bills that would have 
accomplished this objective were introduced in 1937, 1939, 1941, and in 1947.  The rejection of each of 
these proposed measures made it apparent that if the state were to have any groundwater legislation, some 
retreat would have to be made from the idea of this comprehensive goal.  As a result of compromises 
between divergent factions of groundwater users, the important and controversial Act of 1949 was 
passed.‖). 
17 The High Plains Underground Water Conservation District No. 1 was the first GCD created in 1951 
under the process authorized by the GCD Act. 
18 M. Booth, & R. Richard-Crow, supra note 11, at 20.  
19 Green, supra note 12, at 182.  (Green quoting the editor of the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal ―The water 




law/management despite the efforts of the Texas Board of Water Engineers to unify the 
two and the growing understanding of their hydrological linkages since the rule of 
capture was established.  
1.1.4 The Empowerment of GCDs 
There was relatively minor progress in the evolution of groundwater management 
between the passage of the GCD Act in 1949 and Senate Bill 1 (SB 1)20 in 1997.  Notable 
actions by the legislation in the interim included the passage of House Bill 2 (HB 2)21 in 
1985, Senate Bill 1212 (SB 1212)22 in 1989, and House Bill 2294 (HB 2294)23 in 1995.  
Most notably, these three bills represented a stepwise evolution towards larger scale 
groundwater management in Texas through regional Groundwater Management Areas 
(further discussion on GMAs in Chapter 3). 
The system of groundwater management via GCDs was later more firmly 
entrenched with the passage of Senate Bill 1 (SB 1) in 1997.  SB 1 was a monumental 
piece of legislation that had a lasting effect on many aspects of water management in 
Texas.  One effect was modifying the ―critical areas‖ program established under HB 2 
into what is now known as the Priority Groundwater Management Area (PGMA) 
program for the purpose of designating areas of the State that were in need of 
                                                 
20 Act of June 2, 1997, 75
th
 Leg., R.S, SB 1 (hereinafter cited as SB1). 
21 Act of May 15, 1985, 69
th
 Leg., R.S., HB 2 (hereinafter cited as HB 2). 
22 Act of May 31, 1989, 71
st
 Leg., R.S., SB 1212 (hereinafter cited as SB 1212). 
23 Act of May 29, 1995, 74
th




groundwater management.24  Further, SB 1 tasked the State agencies to study, identify, 
and delineate these PGMAs to initiate the creation of GCDs that were not subject to local 
confirmation (Figure 1).25  Other provisions of SB 1, such as the ―junior‖ priority date 
assigned to interbasin transfers of surface water rights, created significant regulatory 
obstacles that substantially restricted surface water supply as a statewide water supply 
solution.26   These obstacles coupled with the limited opportunity for new reservoirs 
would have the effect of increasing the pressure on the state’s groundwater resources.27  
                                                 
24 TEX. WATER CODE §35.007(a).  (―The executive director [of the Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality] and the executive administrator [of the Texas Water Development Board] shall meet periodically 
to identify … areas of the state that are experiencing or are expected to experience, within the immediately 
following 50-year period, critical groundwater problems…‖).  The Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality (TCEQ) and the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) are Texas’ primary water agencies.  
The TCEQ is responsible for water quality regulations and surface water allocation whereas the TWDB is 
responsible for water-related research, planning, and project funding.   
25 G. Fipps,  MANAGING TEXAS GROUNDWATER RESOURCES THROUGH GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION 
DISTRICTS, at 3 (2002).  (The PGMA process was refined when SB 2 was passed in 2001.  The process 
required that each PGMA designation order issued by the TCEQ must recommend that an area be covered 
by a GCD through creation of a new GCD or annexation into an existing GCD.  GCD coverage must be 
provided for the designated area within 2 years of the order.).  TCEQ & TWDB, PRIORITY GROUNDWATER 
MANAGEMENT AREAS AND GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICTS, REPORT TO THE 82ND TEXAS 
LEGISLATURE (2011).  (To date, 18 areas covering 118 counties have been evaluated and 8 PGMAs have 
been designated covering all or parts of 35 counties).   
26  TEX. WATER CODE §11.085(s).  (Any proposed transfer of all or a portion of a water right under this 
section is junior in priority to water rights granted before the time application for transfer is accepted for 
filing).  See also M. Gershon, The Recent Evolution of Texas Water Policy and Law, SOUTHWEST 
HYDROLOGY, at 24 (July/August, 2003).  (―… [In Texas] water is managed under a bifurcated system 
which often views groundwater and surface as mutually exclusive resources.  Nowhere is this more 
prevalent than with statute restricting interbasin transfer of surface water, but not groundwater.  While the 
legislative intent was to protect in-basin water users, a significant side effect has been the shift to a reliance 
on groundwater, for which there are no similar restrictions.‖). 
27 J. Foster,  Do Texas Groundwater Conservation Districts Matter? 11 WATER POLICY, at 380 (2009).  
(―Since most of the states surface water is allocated and constructing reservoirs require significant expense 
on less optimal sites along with substantial opposition from local residents and environmental groups, 





Figure 1: Map of Designated PGMAs in Texas. 
But arguably the most notable effect of SB 1 on Texas groundwater management 
was that it statutorily designated and firmly committed to GCDs and local control as the 
preferred method of groundwater management in Texas.28  The provisions of SB 1 appear 
to have been well timed, as they would also provide the court just enough of a rationale to 
                                                 




uphold the rule of capture in Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America.29  In Sipriano, 
the question of whether Texas should continue to follow the rule of capture was taken 
head on.  This case considered a complaint very similar to East, in which Henderson 
County landowners sued Ozarka Spring Water Company alleging that their wells were 
severely depleted due to heavy pumping from the Ozarka wells on nearby land.30  This 
case was taken all the way to the Texas Supreme Court, where the court was specifically 
requested to overturn the rule of capture. 31  The court might otherwise have been 
compelled to consider overturning the rule of capture, but upheld it instead, stating that 
groundwater regulation was a duty of the legislature under the Conservation Amendment 
and by referring to the then-recent passing of SB 1 as evidence of an attempt by the 
legislature to fulfill this duty.  In Justice Nathan Hecht’s opinion, he remarked, ―not much 
groundwater management is going on,‖ sending a clear message to the legislature that 
this issue needed further attention and that it was their responsibility to do so.  The 
court’s message coupled with a convergence of certain events would lead to a 
proliferation of GCDs beginning in the subsequent legislative sessions in 1999 and 2001 
(Figures 2 and 3).  
                                                 
29 See Sipriano, supra note 4, at 80.  (―It is more prudent to wait and see if Senate Bill 1 will have its 
desired effect, and to save for another day the determination of whether further revising the common law is 
an appropriate prerequisite to preserve Texas's natural resources and protect property owners' interests.‖). 
30 Potter, supra note 8, at 7. 





Figure 2: Chart of GCDs sorted by creation date.  Chart shows the relatively slow 
pace of GCD creation beginning in 1951 after the GCD Act that was passed 
in 1949 and then the rapid proliferation of GCDs coming out of the 
legislative sessions in 1999 and 2001. (See also Appendix 2) 
GCDs were further empowered as the preferred method of groundwater 
management with the passing of SB 2 in 2001.  Although SB 2 was not as broad in scope 
as SB 1, it addressed many GCD-related issues, including: groundwater exports, certain 
authority of GCDs, and joint planning among GCDs within newly defined Groundwater 
Management Areas (further discussion on joint groundwater planning in Chapter 3).  The 
authority of GCDs was clarified and substantially increased under SB 2 by 1) allowing a 






















authority to regulate well spacing and production, 3) removing certain exemptions from 
permitting, and 4) allowing GCDs to impose a fee on groundwater exports.32 
 
Figure 3: Map of GCDs sorted by creation date.  Early GCDs in the panhandle region 
(indicated in yellow) were large scale and configured along aquifer 
boundaries.  Conversely, GCDs created since 1997 (indicated in blue) are 
predominantly smaller scale single-county districts. (See also Appendix 2) 
 
                                                 




1.1.5 GCDs Today   
As mentioned, the Texas Legislature has indicated a clear commitment to local 
control and a decentralized form of groundwater management by designating GCDs as 
the preferred and the only method of groundwater management in Texas.33  GCDs have 
evolved substantially since the passing of the Groundwater Conservation District Act in 
1949.  In its present form, a GCD can be best described as a local unit of government 
generally created by the Texas legislature and confirmed at the local level to manage and 
protect groundwater.  More specifically, a GCD is a political subdivision of the State that 
is established to: 
…provide for the conservation, preservation, protection, recharging, and 
prevention of waste of groundwater, and of groundwater reservoirs or their 
subdivisions, and to control subsidence caused by withdrawal of water from those 
groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions.34   
 
The authority and the regulatory tools to accomplish this objective are provided 
generally in Chapter 36 of the Texas Water Code and oftentimes more specifically in 
enabling legislation if the GCD is created by the legislature.35  GCDs are governed by a 
Board of Directors and are responsible for developing a comprehensive management plan 
and adopting rules to implement this plan.  The plan and associated rules must be 
consistent with the respective regional water plan and must address the following goals: 36 
1) providing for the most efficient use of water;  
                                                 
33 See Sipriano, supra note 4, at 81.  (Hecht, J., concurring) (―… [GCDs] are not only the preferred method 
of groundwater management; they are the only method presently available.‖). 
34 TEX. WATER CODE §36.0015 
35 TEX. WATER CODE §36.102 




2) controlling and preventing waste of groundwater;  
3) controlling and preventing subsidence (if applicable);  
4) addressing conjunctive surface water management issues;  
5) addressing natural resource issues;  
6) addressing drought conditions; 
7) addressing conservation, recharge enhancement, rainwater harvesting, 
precipitation enhancement, or brush control, where appropriate and cost effective; 
and 
8) addressing in a quantitative manner the desired future conditions of the 
groundwater resources for the conservation of groundwater.37  
GCDs must also adopt rules to implement the management plan, keep records of 
wells and groundwater use and production, permit and register certain wells, and adopt 
bylaws to govern administrative and financial procedures.38  To enforce the adopted rules 
and permitting requirements, GCDs are authorized to seek injunctions and civil penalties 
for violations of any of its rules through the civil court system.  GCDs are funded by 
revenues generated from either levying ad valorem taxes39 or by assessing production 
                                                 
37 Goal No. 8 was added in response to the joint-regional groundwater-planning process that was created 
by the 79the Texas legislature in 2005 via HB 1763.  Further discussion provided in Chapter 3, §3.2. 
38 B. Lesikar, R. Kaiser, & V. Silvy, QUESTIONS ABOUT GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICTS IN 
TEXAS, at 17 (2002). 




fees.40  To date, there are 98 confirmed GCDs covering all or part of 174 of the state’s 
254 counties and the majority of the major and minor aquifers in Texas (Figure 4).41  
                                                 
40 TEX. WATER CODE §36.205(c).  (Revenue may also be augmented with administrative fees, grant 
funding for certain projects, or assistance from local government such as counties.) 
41 Texas Groundwater Protection Committee. What is a Groundwater Conservation District? (August, 









1.1.6 Water Management in Texas 
In summary, the evolution of the management of the water resources in Texas 
diverged along a bifurcated path beginning with the judgment in the East case where 
groundwater was pulled apart from surface water due in part to the ignorance of the 
movement and behavior of groundwater in the subsurface42 but also because of an 
underlying resistance to any attempt to limit the property rights of Texas landowners.43  
This legal divergence that was more firmly entrenched with the passing of the 
Groundwater Conservation District Act in 1949 established a legal framework that now 
considers surface water as property of the state whereas groundwater is a private property 
right.44  The final product in place today is a system of centralized management of 
surface water where any diversions of state water must first be appropriated by the state 
via the state agency charged with issuing water rights permits, the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ), and paradoxically, a system of decentralized 
management of groundwater where small-scale local districts with limited authority and 
                                                 
42 See East, supra note 2. 
43 See East, supra note 2, at 280.  (quoting Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 
1843) ―That the person who owns the surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there found to his own 
purposes at his free will and pleasure; and that if, in the exercise of such right, he intercepts or drains off 
the water collected from the underground springs in his neighbor’s well, this inconvenience to his neighbor, 
falls within the description of damnum absque injuria, which can not become the ground of an action.‖);  
See Also, Id. at 281. (―An owner of soil may divert percolating water, consume or cut it off, with impunity.  
It is the same as the land and cannot be distinguished in law from land.  So the owner of the land is the 
absolute owner of the soil and of percolating water, which is a part of, and not different from, the soil.‖). 
44 Act of May 27, 2011, 82
nd
 Leg., R.S., SB 332 [ hereinafter cited as SB 332].  (codified as amendments to 
TEX. WATER CODE Ch. 36)  (SB 332 more firmly establishes groundwater as real property.  TEX. WATER 
CODE §36.002 now states:  “The legislature recognizes that a landowner owns the groundwater below the 
surface of the landowner's land as real property.‖).  See also Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 
814, 814 (Tex. Feb. 24, 2012).  (―We decide in this case whether land ownership includes an interest in 
groundwater in place that cannot be taken for public use with adequate compensation…. We hold that it 




resources are the preferred approach.  The divergence in the paths on which surface water 
and groundwater management evolved has generated incompatible policies that have 
effectively widened the gap in management logic and increased pressures on the state’s 
aquifers and on the GCDs responsible for groundwater management.  Although it is clear 
that this divergence was a necessary compromise at the time the two paths were set, the 
bifurcation of the waters in spite of their inextricable link in nature and the associated 
effects, will require reconciliation. (See Also Appendix 3 for a listing of significant events 
affecting Texas groundwater management.) 
1.2 THE TEXAS PREFERENCE FOR LOCAL CONTROL 
1.2.1 Why Local Control? 
 
 Texas places a significant amount of emphasis on local control, whether it is 
through GCDs, school districts, real estate appraisal districts, municipal utility districts, 
or the plethora of other special districts that exist.45  The Texas Special District Local 
Laws Code is a good indicator of this preference with nearly 600 chapters governing and 
enabling the many local political subdivisions in the State.  This long-standing preference 
for local control, particularly as it relates to groundwater governance, can be attributed to 
several factors, including: a strong belief in private property rights,46 a general aversion 
                                                 
45 See Foster, supra note 27, at 397. 
46 See R. Kaiser & F. F. Skillern, Deep Trouble: Options for Managing the Hidden Threat of Aquifer 
Depletion in Texas. 32 TEXAS TECH LAW. REV, 249, at 251 (2001);  See also K. H. Norris, The Stagnation 





to outsider interference via state or federal control, the related desire to preserve local 
autonomy and prevent the export of groundwater outside of the area of origin. 
Private Property Rights 
This concept of groundwater as private property and the right of unfettered use 
are core tenets of ―The English Rule‖ or the rule of absolute ownership which inspired 
the rule of capture.47  Ever since, this notion of absolute ownership with only limited 
exceptions48 has reinforced the tightly held belief by Texans in local control and the 
treatment of groundwater as private property.  While groundwater in the western states 
has evolved away from the absolute ownership doctrine towards the doctrines of 
reasonable use49 and prior appropriation,50 Texas has failed to follow this trend, largely 
because of the traditional Texan’s aversion to governmental intervention in private 
property ownership matters.51  The vigorous defense of groundwater as a private property 
right has taken center stage recently with landmark events occurring in both the 
                                                 
47 The classic statement of the English rule comes from Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 
1223 (Ex. 1843); See also East, supra note 2&4, at 280.  
48 East, supra note 2, at 282. (The court left open the possibility of liability in the case of malice or wanton 
conduct.). 
49 J. Ashley & Z. A. Smith, GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST, at 9 (1999).  (The Doctrine of 
Reasonable Use (also known as the American Rule) limits a landowner’s right to the water beneath his or 
her land to that amount necessary for some reasonable and beneficial purpose on the land above the water.  
Under the reasonable use doctrine, the waste of water or the transportation of water off the land is not 
considered reasonable beneficial use if such use interferes with the right of adjacent landowners to use the 
water beneath their own lands for the beneficial use of those lands.)   
50 Foster, supra note 27, at 385; Id. at 9.  (The doctrine of prior appropriation provides that the first 
appropritor of water, by putting that water to beneficual use without waste, has a right to continue that use.   
And such rights are superior to the rights or people who appropriate water at a later date.). 




legislature and the courts.52  This ongoing debate has had an underlying effect on the 
state’s approach to groundwater management as property right advocates have 
consistently fended off alternatives to local control in an effort to preserve local 
autonomy and manifested a general aversion to larger-scale regional or centralized 
groundwater governance – alternatives that they perceive to be a likely affront to those 
rights. 
Aversion to Centralization 
The well-documented debate over groundwater management that was building 
before passage of the GCD Act in 1949 described above provides a good illustration of 
the strong aversion to centralization or state control that was in place in the rural and 
agricultural communities of the Texas Panhandle.53  In Green’s book, Land of 
Underground Rain, he devotes an entire chapter to the debate that culminated in the GCD 
Act.  In his summary of the events leading up to the Act, Green concludes: 
The District Groundwater Law enacted by the Texas Legislature in 1949 suited 
the wishes of most High Plainsman because it lacked any strong regulatory 
provisions for ground-water conservation and because it was a means of 
preventing a state board from controlling ground-water resources.  In other words, 
rural interests on the High Plains supported the act because it promised an 
effective means for preventing rather than establishing a system of ground-water 
conservation.54 
 
The Act was a clear defensive maneuver that served to quiet, at least temporarily, 
the concerns at the time over the specter of state governance and the associated effects on 
                                                 
52 See note 44. 
53 Green, supra note 12. 




groundwater as private property rights.  The issue, however, continued to persist and is 
vigorously debated even today (further discussion in Chapter 2). 
 While avoidance of state intervention can be a powerful motivator, the desire to 
preserve some semblance of local autonomy in the face of federal intervention could 
perhaps be more of a motivating factor.  Historically, the federal government has deferred 
to the states to pass laws governing water, however, the courts55 have dispelled what 
some refer to as the ―myth of state control‖ by judging that state authority over water can 
be superseded by the exercise of federal powers over commerce and public land.56  Such 
threats of federal intervention have been made with regard to Texas groundwater 
management in response to the belief that the major aquifer serving the Great Plains, the 
Ogallala, was being depleted.57  In 1994, state and federal officials were demanding that 
the western states get their resource management houses in order by introducing 
legislation that would have required 17 western states to submit statewide management 
plans to the U.S. Secretary of the Interior using federally established criteria.58  The 
response from Texas was that the evidence for Ogallala depletion was contradictory and 
that local control enjoyed strong citizen support, which was successful in preempting 
federal intervention.59  It is interesting to note that there is a very distinct parallel between 
                                                 
55 United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). 
56 Ashley & Smith, supra note 49, at 184-185. 
57 M. Somma, Local Autonomy and Groundwater District Formation in High-Plains West Texas, 21(2) 
PUBLIUS, at 54 (1994).  
58 Id. at 54.  




the state reforms driven by the potential threat of federal intervention and the local action 
in Texas driven by the threat of state intervention.60  
The threat of federal intervention has been successful in motivating reluctant 
states in the west to reform water laws with perhaps the most powerful legal influence on 
western water policy being the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). 61    The 
provisions of the ESA have the potential to affect any major water policy or project that 
may jeopardize the continued existence or habitat of a federally listed endangered or 
threatened species.62  Faced with an immediate threat of federal regulatory action, states 
have chosen to reform water laws to soften the effect of federal laws and supplant the 
need for federal presence.  State reactions, however, have typically been piecemeal, 
reactive, and the minimum necessary to comply with federal laws.63  The threat of 
(federal) judicial regulation of the Edwards Aquifer represents an example in Texas 
where the state legislature reacted by passing the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act and 
creating a regional groundwater management entity, the Edwards Aquifer Authority, to 
end federal litigation.  The Act, however, was narrowly aimed at the region of the San 
                                                 
60 W. Blomquist, State Differences in Groundater Policy Adoptions, 1980-1989, 21(2) PUBLIUS, at 101-115 
(1991).  (Blomquist cites Henry Hart who suggested ―…that changes in state gorundwater laws and 
policies, and in their administration, were more likely to be driven by state political cultures and by the 
distribution of formal governmental power thanby the acuteness of groundwater supply or quaolity 
problems.‖). 
61 Ashley & Smith, supra note 49, at 209.  (Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming were forced to negotiate 
water allocation issues in the Platt River due to affected whooping crane habitat in the central Platt.  The 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) motivated major changes in water management of the Snake and Columbia 
Rivers after seven species of salmon were listed as endangered or threatened.).   
62 Id. at 209.  (Section 7 of the ESA requires a consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service before any 
federal permits or approvals are granted to determine if a proposal would cause jeopardy to listed species.  
Under Section 9 of the ESA, even non-federal actions that result in habitat modification on private land can 
constitute a prohibited ―taking‖ of species.).   




Antonio segment of the Edwards Aquifer and did not resolve the groundwater 
management issues in the remainder of the State.64  The Edwards Aquifer Authority as an 
example of groundwater management reform in Texas is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4.     
Local Autonomy 
The strong aversion to centralized regulation is consistent with the strong desire to 
preserve local autonomy.  The testimony offered in the hearings provided by the local 
citizenry over the designation of the North Central Texas-Trinity and Woodbine Aquifers 
PGMA (Figure 1) serves as a well-documented example offering a glimpse into the 
motivational sentiments behind the desire to preserve local autonomy and the fervent 
resistance to outside intervention of even adjacent counties.   
On September 2, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Carol Wood issued a Proposal 
For Decision (PFD) with recommendations to designate a PGMA for the North Central 
Texas – Trinity and Woodbine Aquifers Area.65  In her PFD, the debate over establishing 
multiple single-county GCDs over the area versus a single multi-county GCD was a 
central theme and is demonstrative of the deeply embedded preference for local control.  
The TCEQ Executive Director recommended the creation of an eight-county regional 
GCD to include Collin, Cooke, Dallas, Denton, Ellis, Fannin, Grayson, and Johnson 
                                                 
64 Id. at 210. 
65 TCEQ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DESIGNATE A PRIORITY 
GROUNDWATER MANAGMENT AREA FOR THE NORTH-CENTRAL TEXAS--TRINITY AND WOODBINE AQUIFERS 




Counties funded by production fees.  The judge concurred.  The following points outline 
the arguments of those that were opposed to the single multi-county (regional) GCD that 
was proposed:66 
 A single, regional GCD would ignore the political, demographic, economic, and 
practical differences and realities that distinguish the various counties involved, 
which are substantial enough to invite significant differences in perspective 
among the members of the governing body of the proposed GCD.  For example, 
rural counties have characteristics that are fundamentally different from urban 
counties. 
 For GCDs where representation on the board of directors is allocated equally by 
county, counties with a lesser reliance on groundwater are given equal votes as 
those with a greater reliance.  
 Smaller counties would face a substantial loss of influence and control resulting in 
water policy dictated by others.  
 A single, regional GCD would create inequities in service – larger more 
significant users would get more attention than lesser users in terms of water 
availability.   
 Adjacent counties with vast differences in reliance on surface water versus 
groundwater would have equally different concerns and interests. 
                                                 




The deliberations over the formation of GCDs in the North Central Texas PGMA 
provide an indication of similar statewide sentiments in the management of water in 
Texas.  That is, a general fear of inequitable representation, infringement on private 
property rights, and a loss of local autonomy.  
Rural to Urban Groundwater Export 
Efforts to preserve local autonomy also tend to represent the division between 
rural and urban interests with urban interests favoring larger-scale control (either regional 
or centralized) that would enable the rural to urban water transfers and rural interests 
preferring to maintain local autonomy and control of their portions of a common-pool 
resource.
67
  Concerns over an increase in groundwater marketing became the motivation 
for some communities to propose GCD creation and to adopt rules to protect against the 
prospects of large-scale rural to urban water transports.  In 1995, the rules of the 
Panhandle Groundwater Conservation District prohibiting any groundwater export were 
challenged at District Court in Potter County.68  The court found that, absent any express 
statutory authority, any rules attempting to prevent water exports were beyond a GCD’s 
authority.69  In 1997, in response to concerns over potential groundwater exports, SB 1 
included provisions to authorize the regulation of out-of-district groundwater exports 
through permits.  In 1999, the legislature reacted to the transport provisions of SB 1 by 
                                                 
67 See D. Todd, Common Resources, Private Rights and Liabilities: A Case Study of Texas Groundwater 
Law. 32 Nat. Resources J., 233, at 244 (1992). 
68 Quixx v. Panhandle Groundwater Conservation District No. 3, No. 79-687C, 251
st
 District Court, Potter 
County. 




proposing a number of new GCDs with authority allowing prohibitions or severe 
limitations on groundwater exports.70  The authority authorized by SB 1 coupled with 
substantial modifications under SB 2 in 2001 allowed GCDs to impose surcharges on 
export (transport) permits71 and to consider certain criteria in permitting transport, 
however, SB 2 stipulated that GCDs may not impose more restrictive permit conditions 
on transporters than would be imposed on in-district uses.72  The modifications of SB 2 
requiring equal treatment of in-district and transport permits appeared to have effectively 
stanched GCD creation solely for the purpose of limiting exports.    
As illustrated in the build up to the GCD Act of 1949 and in the description of the 
North Central Texas PGMA hearings, there is a strong sentiment to accept local control 
only if the alternative of centralized state control appears imminent.  This seems to be a 
recurrent theme that has played out over the years and remains in place even today.  At 
present, the County Commissioners in Comal County are expressing a very similar 
sentiment in the debate over creation of a GCD in the uncovered portions of the Hill 
Country PGMA.  The commissioners were reported to emphasize the need to be 
proactive in creating a GCD in order to ―prevent losing local control.‖73  It is remarkable 
                                                 
70 Id. at 17, 20.  (―The 76th Legislature considered creating at least 30 new groundwater districts.  …the 
abundance of districts cause concern since only 44 districts had been created and confirmed in the previous 
50 years.‖). 
71 Production of groundwater to be used outside of a GCD is referred to as ―transport‖, ―transfer‖, and 
―export‖ of groundwater.  These terms are used interchangeably in statute and GCD rules.   
72 TEX. WATER CODE §36.122(c)-(e) 
73 E. J. Weilbacher, County Mulls Groundwater District Plan (December 7, 2011) 
www.mysanantonio.com/community/bulverde/article/County-mulls-groundwater-district.  (―In 
order to prevent losing local control, county commissioners emphasized the need to be proactive in creating 




that over 60 years later, this notion of ―if there must be any control, let it be local‖ has 
remained unchanged and is a strong indicator of the preference for local control primarily 
to avoid outsider interference.  There also appears to be an equally powerful motivation 
among rural communities to create GCDs in a defensive posture to prevent exports of 
groundwater to urban areas.    
As evidenced by the reactions of both the courts and the legislature, the desire to 
preserve local control has been extremely effective in influencing political will and 
groundwater policy in Texas.  
1.2.2 Why Single-County GCDs? 
 
The preference in Texas for local control has been well established.  The shape 
and form of those local entities, however, has followed a precedent that presents its own 
set of unique issues and challenges.  The creation of GCDs has evolved to follow a 
template that uses county-based jurisdictions as boundaries despite the obvious conflict 
between natural aquifer boundaries and politically drawn boundaries at the surface.  The 
pattern stands in contrast to the earliest development of GCDs.  Of the GCDs created 
from 1949 to 1984, more than 70 percent were configured along multi-county lines, 
primarily for the purpose of managing significant portions of major aquifers threatened 
by overpumping (Figure 5).74  Due to a convergence of certain events in the mid 1990s, 
the early precedent for larger-scale GCDs was replaced with the precedent of the creation 
                                                 
74 SENATE INTERIM COMM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES.  INTERIM REPORT TO THE 77TH LEGISLATURE - 




of single-county GCDs (further discussion in Chapter 3).  The product has been a 
proliferation of small-scale GCDs with politically drawn boundaries (Figure 5).  Of the 
98 GCDs established in Texas to date, 57 (58%) encompass the area of a single county or 
less and the large majority are configured along county lines (Figure 5, Appendix 1).75  
The tendency to create single-county Districts can largely be attributed to: 1) the desire to 
preserve county autonomy, 2) the influence of county governments in the GCD creation 
process, 3) administrative convenience, and 4) ―path dependency‖ once a precedent has 
been established.   
                                                 
75 Two of the earliest GCDs created – the High Plains UWCD No. 1 and the North Plains GCD – were 
created when the process required that GCDs to be created within designated “underground reservoirs.”    






Figure 5: Map of GCDs referenced by the number of counties present in each GCD.  
As indicated in the GCDs shaded in red, 57 (58%) of the 98 confirmed 
GCDs encompass a single county or less. 
Influence of County Governments 
 County governments have been hard-wired into groundwater management in 
Texas on many levels beginning with the GCD Act of 1949.  The GCD Act, which 




included a prominent role for county governments.76  Although GCD creation could also 
be initiated by legislation, this option was not commonly utilized in the period just after 
the Act was passed.77  The process for GCD creation via local petition under the GCD 
Act was a three-step process involving: 1) designation of a hydrological reservoir, 2) a 
decision by the local county commissioners court that formation of the district is 
―feasible and practical,‖ and 3) approval by local residents by a majority vote.78  Counties 
were also given sufficient latitude in disapproval of a GCD by allowing citizens of 
counties in a proposed GCD to be excluded from the proposed GCD if the voters of a 
county voted against confirmation.79  The complexity of the petition process and the 
heavy reliance on local persistence throughout the process were criticized as being self-
defeating and ineffective,80 two qualities that were perhaps an inevitability considering 
the resistance by many locals to any form of groundwater management at the time.  The 
structure of this petition process in its nascent form appears to be where the involvement 
and influence of county governments took root.  Although the petition process would 
later be all but abandoned in favor of legislatively created GCDs,81 the precedent for 
substantial county involvement and influence in GCD creation was firmly established.   
                                                 
76 See Snyder, S. E., Ground Water Management: A Proposal for Texas. 51 TEXAS L. REV., 289, at 294 
(1972-1973).  
77 Id. at 294. 
78 Id. at 294. 
79 Id. at 294. (Snyder cites TEX. WATER CODE §§ 52.001-.401 (1972) - the provision of the Water Code 
dictating the process for creation of Water Control and Improvement Districts which also governed GCD 
creation by reference.).  
80 Id. at 295. 
81 R. E. Mace, R. Petrossian, R. Bradley, & W.F. Mullican, A Streetcare Named Desired Future 




 The precedent of county influence that took root in the local petition process of 
the GCD Act in its initial form has also been maintained and statutorily incorporated into 
what is now the PGMA program.  In its current form, the PGMA program requires that 
the county commissioners of all the counties of the affected area are notified upon 
designation of a PGMA, where the process to determine the recommended action for 
GCD creation begins.82  Further, once a new GCD within a PGMA is proposed, the 
county commissioners are empowered to appoint a steering committee to begin the 
process of informing local constituents on the GCD creation process.83  The county 
commissioners of a county within a PGMA are also empowered in the process to request 
annexation of the entire county by an adjacent existing GCD within the PGMA.84  As an 
illustration of the influence of county governments in GCD formation, Figure 6 depicts 
the Hill Country PGMA that was established at a scale sufficient to encompass the Hill 
County Trinity Aquifer and the infill of single-county GCDs that occurred in response to 
the PGMA designation.85  
                                                                                                                                                 
TEXAS (REVISED), at 1, FN 5 (May 2008).  (―By 2001, only 7 GCDs had been created via petition vs. 77 
created via legislation.”).  
82 Id. at 19. 
83 Id. at 24. 
84 Id. at 25. 
85 The boundaries of the Hill Country PGMA were established using a practical hybrid of county and 
aquifer boundaries.  The county boundaries that were used roughly mimic the aquifer boundaries.  More 





Figure 6: Map of GCDs in the Hill Country PGMA. The PGMA was created to 
generally encompass the Hill Country Trinity Aquifer and to initiate GCD 
creation.  The response was infill with single-county GCDs.   
Path Dependency 
Although the role of counties in GCD creation through the petition process has 
clearly had an influence on setting the initial pattern for single-county GCDs, petitions 




is through legislation.  A common practice in drafting legislation is to begin with 
modeling a bill after the enabling legislation of a standard GCD with standard authorities 
and the boundaries of existing structures of governance – that is, counties.  This is a 
recognized institutional practice referred to as ―path dependency‖ which describes the 
pronounced tendency of human systems to follow well-defined courses once they are 
launched on particular paths.86  It becomes the standard less because of the logic and 
more because of the familiarity, convenience, and comfort.87  The reaction to the 
prospects of urban to rural groundwater exports and to Sipriano in which the courts 
pointed to the legislature’s responsibility for groundwater management was a tremendous 
increase in legislatively created Districts (Figures 2 & 3).  It also provides a good 
example of this preference to follow the comfortable path.  Bills filed in the 76
th
 
Legislative Session in 1999 proposed at least 30 new GCDs, the majority of which were 
to be configured along county boundaries and single-county in scale.88  The legislature 
compromised by authorizing a reduced number of GCDs on the basis of concerns 
expressed by the bill’s author over the single-county GCD precedent.89  Nevertheless, the 
path had been established (further discussion in Chapter 3). 
 The points raised in the North Central Texas PGMA hearings are also clearly 
indicative of the rationale behind the single-county GCD precedent.  Although county 
                                                 
86 O.R. Young, THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FIT, INTERPLAY, AND 
SCALE, at 71 (2002). 
87 C. Allan & A. Curtis. Nipped in the Bud: Why Regional Scale Adaptive Management is Not Blooming, 
36 (3) ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, at 422 (2005). 
88 HOUSE COMM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 69, at 17. 
89 SB 1911: Bill Analysis, 76
th




boundaries appear arbitrary from a hydrological sense, such boundaries address certain 
political realities.  That is, counties overlying one aquifer may differ in the size of their 
tax base, which may lead to an arrangement where well-healed counties are subsidizing 
other counties by bearing a greater share of the cost.90  Similarly, there may be perceived 
levels of inequity where adjoining counties may use different amounts of groundwater for 
different reasons.91  These differences in both funding contributions and water interests 
can often be the motivations for single-county GCDs for the purpose of keeping funding 
close and preserving very specific local interests.   
The product of the GCD creation process has evolved from the petition process 
under the GCD Act and the PGMA program in the current statute into the current 
preference for legislatively created GCDs.  One factor that has remained constant is the 
predominant practice of using counties as the basis for groundwater governance.  The 
intimate link between GCDs and county governments coupled with perceived inequities, 
the administrative convenience of county jurisdictions, and the well-established 
legislative precedence has clearly had an influence on the current system of county 
dominated GCDs. 
                                                 
90 HOUSE COMM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 69, at 18. 




Chapter 2:  Challenges of Groundwater Governance  
Governance of natural resources considered to be common-pool resources, such 
as water, forests, and fisheries, comes with certain challenges associated with the nature 
of the resource.  Common-pool resources are considered any resource that is subtractible 
and has low excludability.92  According to Ostrom, subtractability involves the possibility 
of approaching the upper limit of resource units that can be produced.  For groundwater, 
this is exhibited by the fact that all water discharged by wells is balanced by a loss of 
water somewhere and that in this respect some groundwater is always being mined.93  
Groundwater also exhibits low excludability meaning that it is difficult to exclude well 
owners from pumping water from an aquifer.  This is particularly true in Texas where the 
rule of capture applies outside of GCD-regulated areas and even within GCDs where 
landowners are entitled to some access to a ―fair share‖ of groundwater.94  
Regardless of the institutional challenges in Texas, the nature of groundwater as 
opposed to surface water offers its own unique set of challenges.  Some of the 
contributing factors include: ―fuzzy‖ hydrogeologic boundaries that can be diffuse and 
difficult to define, complex connections to surface waters and other aquifers, 
unaccounted pumping from exempt wells and unauthorized withdrawals on private 
                                                 
92 E. Ostrom, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, at 
31-32 (1990). 
93 I. Theesfeld, Institutional Challenges for National Groundwater Governance: Policies and Issues, 48(1) 
GROUNDWATER,  at 132 (2010); C.V. Theis, The Source of Water Derived from Wells: Essential Factors 
Controlling the Response of an Aquifer to Development. 10(5) CIVIL ENGINEERING, at 277–280 (1940). 
(Theesfeld citing Theis).   
94 See Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. Feb. 24, 2012).  (―As with oil and gas, one 
purpose of groundwater regulation is to afford each owner of water in a common, subsurface reservoir a 




property, and adverse effects of overpumpage that can often be separated in space and 
time.95  These factors can be confounded by the increasing pressures on groundwater 
owing to the advantages over surface water96 as well as the institutional challenges that 
are affected by legal, political, economic, and cultural factors.97 
When a common-pool resource that is subtractible and has low excludability also 
faces the pressures of increasing demand, what is to be done to extend the resource and 
ensure its long-term collective and individual benefit?  Much has been written about the 
challenges of common-pool resource management and many believe that the size, shape, 
and structure of the institutions98 designed to govern groundwater are a key component of 
the solution.  The following section focuses on the importance of ―fit‖ and ―scales of 
governance‖ as pertinent factors generally affecting management of groundwater as a 
common-pool resource in Texas given the state’s preference for small-scale county-based 
GCDs.  Further discussion is provided to address the institutional challenges unique to 
the GCD system of governance.  
                                                 
95 A. Ross, & P. Martinez-Santos, The Challenge of Groundwater Governance: Case Studies form Spain 
and Australia. 10(4) REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE,  at 300 (2010). 
96 Id. at 300.  (the advantages of groundwater over surface water include: 1) it is not subject to evaporation 
like surface water, 2) it moves comparatively slower, 3) it can be tapped closer to its place of use, and 4) it 
is generally more available, even during drought.). 
97 See Foster, supra note 27, at 380.  (―Since most of the state’s surface water is allocated and constructing 
reservoirs require significant expense on less optimal sites along with substantial opposition from local 
residents and environmental groups, groundwater has become the more attractive option for satisfying 
future water supply demands.‖).  See also M. A. Gershon, The Recent Evolution of Texas Water Policy and 
Law. SOUTHWEST HYDROLOGY, at 24 (July/August 2003).  (―…[In Texas] water is managed under a 
bifurcated system which often views groundwater and surface as mutually exclusive resources.  Nowhere is 
this more prevalent than with statute restricting interbasin transfer of surface water, but not groundwater.   
While the legislative intent was to protect in-basin water users, a significant side effect has been the shift to 
a reliance on groundwater, for which there are no similar restrictions.‖). 
98 Young, supra note 86, at 31.  (Defines Institutions as ―sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and 
programs that give rise to recognized practices, assign roles to participants in these practices, and govern 




2.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF “FIT”  
When designing institutions for effective common-pool resource management, 
recognition of the importance of ―fit‖ is a key consideration.  ―Fit‖ deals with congruence 
or compatibility between the natural resource to be managed and the institutional 
arrangements created to manage human activities affecting these systems.99  It follows 
that those endeavoring to create environmental or resource management institutions 
should begin with an assessment of the principal properties of the resource and proceed to 
design and build institutional arrangements that fit the biogeophysical contours of the 
problem.100 Young discusses the importance of fit as follows: 
… the effectiveness of environmental or resource regimes or, in other words, the 
capacity of these arrangements to prevent undesirable environmental changes and 
to solve environmental problems once they arise is determined in considerable 
measure by the degree to which they are compatible with the biogeophysical 
systems with which they interact.101   
 
Overall, the presumption is that the closer the fit between the natural resource and 
institutional systems, the better the relevant institutions will perform.  This is due in part 
to the fact that externalities associated with resource management decisions can be 
avoided by matching the spatial extent of those externalities with the spatial extent of the 
regime.102  It stands to reason that one of the goals of finding the right fit is to avoid 
misfit.  Challenges associated with misfit can occur when both regime shape and size 
                                                 
99 Young, supra note 86, at 21. 
100 Id. at 59. 
101 Id. at 55. 
102 C. G. Lathrop, Finding the Right Fit: One Design Element in the International Groundwater Resource 




(areal extent) allow for myopic management decisions that fail to account for these 
externalities.103  This problem speaks to the need to consider both shape and areal extent 
in institutional design.  In other words, both institution shape and areal extent must be 
congruent with the resource to be managed and sufficient to avoid the problems of fit.  
Ideally, resource management institutions would be designed to avoid the 
problems of fit.  As a practical matter, however, mismatches between institutions and the 
ecosystem or resource to be managed are common.  Avoiding the problems of fit 
becomes more complex when other factors (i.e. legal, political, economic, and cultural 
factors) take precedence over biogeophysical factors and are the driving forces in 
determining the boundaries of institutional jurisdictions.104  The disproportionate weight 
of these factors in institutional design can oftentimes be attributed to the powerful 
influence of the interests of those whose livelihoods may be affected.105  The problems of 
fit are compounded once politically-based institutions are established and engrained and 
path dependency leads to more similarly designed institutions.  
                                                 
103 Id. at 415; V. Galaz et al. The Problem of Fit between Ecosystems and Governance Systems - Insights 
and Emerging Challenges, in INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, 
APPLICATIONS AND RESEARCH FRONTIERS, at 150 (O. R. Young, L. A. King, & H. Schroeder eds. 2008). 
(Lathrop quoting Galez) (misfit can occur ―when the [i]nstitutional jurisdiction [is] too small or too large to 
cover or affect the areal extent of the ecosystem(s) subject to the institution.‖).  
104 Young, supra note 86, at 70  (It is a rare instance when ecological considerations played a significant 
role in determining boundaries.  It is not surprising that coverages of these regimes fail to match the spatial 
boundaries of the ecosystem [resource].); See also Theesfeld, supra note 93, at 138; W. Blomquist & E. 
Schlager.  Political Pitfalls of Integrated Watershed Management. 18 (2) SOCIETY AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES, at 101–117 (2005).  (Theesfeld quoting Blomquist & Schlager) (―the selection of boundaries is 
always a political act and even integrated water management has many tradeoffs.  Likewise, there are no 
ultimate boundaries.‖). 




2.1.1 Texas GCDs and the Problems of Fit 
Texas is a clear example of the power of political, economic, and cultural forces 
in delineating institutional jurisdictions.  It is also an example of how path dependency 
led to the predominance of county-based districts.  While the development of this 
preference has been well established, the challenges associated with this decision deserve 
further attention.  These include challenges associated with the hydrological disconnect 
between the aquifers and the GCDs and the insufficient areal extent and scale that are 
typical of county-based GCDs.  
Hydrological Disconnect 
Applied to groundwater management, the notion of fit asserts that boundaries of 
groundwater management institutions must be clearly defined106 and the shape and 
jurisdictional area (areal extent) must be congruent and compatible with the hydro-
geographical boundaries of the aquifers.107  Failure to recognize these boundaries can 
result in transboundary aquifers and the many challenges associated with joint 
management of a single groundwater resource.  Transboundary aquifers, particularly 
aquifers that straddle international and state boundaries, can be extraordinarily difficult to 
manage.108  Texas is fortunate in that it is of the scale of, or even larger than, many 
sovereign states.  As such, most of its major aquifers are largely contained within its 
                                                 
106 Ross, supra note 95, at 300; Ostrom, supra note 92.  (Ross quoting Ostrom). 
107 Theesfeld, supra note 93, at 138.  (―In order to achieve the successful implementation of decentralized 
water resource management, the institutional arrangements have to be clearly defined and reasonably well 
matched with the aquifer system.‖).   
108 T. Jarvis et al, International Borders, Groundwater Flow, and Hydroschizophrenia, 43(5) GROUND 
WATER, at 765 (September-October 2005).  (―Despite many agreements and international laws 
acknowledging the growing significance of ground water resources, transboundary aquifers are usually 
only addressed in a cursory, poorly defined manner due to a lack of consensus regarding applicable 




boundaries.  This advantage of sufficient areal extent, however, has been undermined 
with the proliferation of county-based GCDs which has created a system of entities that 
were out-of-sync with the hydrogeography of the State’s major aquifers (Figure 7).  This 
is purely a construct of the Texas decision to ignore aquifer boundaries in favor of county 
boundaries.  The product is multiple transboundary aquifers overlain by a multitude of 
the institutions that were designed to manage them.  
Management of transboundary aquifers by county-based entities can pose many 
challenges.  For example, a typical single-county GCD will more often than not only 
encompass a small area (or for some, no area) of the overlying land where the aquifer 
receives recharge to replenish the discharges from springs, gaining streams, and water 
wells.109  Moreover, most of the area providing replenishment to the aquifer may be 
located in adjacent counties that may be managed (or not) by a GCD with very different 
objectives, or even more problematic, may be outside the jurisdiction of any GCD and 
subject to the rule of capture.  This is particularly challenging for GCDs seeking to 
manage within their single-county jurisdiction on the basis of the principles of safe or 
sustainable yield.110  In general, sustainable yield seeks to balance the volume of recharge 
or water coming into the system with discharge of water that leaves the system through 
natural means such as seeps, springs, baseflow to rivers, and through withdrawals from 
                                                 
109 R. Petrossian, C. Ridgeway, & A, Donnelly, Balancing the Checkbook Account Through House Bill 
1763, (April 3, 2007), 
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/groundwater/docs/Balancing_the_Groundwater_Checking_Account.pdf 
110 S. A. Pierce, R. Mace, & J.M. Sharp, Using an Aquifer Yield Continuum as a Guide for Groundwater 
Management, at 2 (2004). (Sustainable Yield is used synonymously with “Safe Yield”.  Pierce cites 





wells.  The inherent logic to this type of management approach is conditioned on having 
the ability to manage and account for the only manageable component of the sustainable 
yield equation – withdrawals from wells.   Managing for sustainability or even some level 
of allowable depletion111 breaks down with small-scale county-based GCDs that do not 
have the power to regulate wells that are outside their district, even though such wells 
may draw from and deplete groundwater resources common to multiple districts.112 
                                                 
111 TEX. WATER CODE §36.116(2)(E). (Authorizes GCDs to regulate well production in order to manage 
the rate of aquifer depletion.) 
112 See C.W. Johnson, The Continuing Void in Texas Groundwater Law: Are Concepts and Terminology to 





Figure 7: Map of GCDs and Designated Major Aquifers in Texas.  With the exception 
of the GCDs created in the Texas Panhandle and over the Edwards Aquifer, 
the majority have boundaries that do not correspond well to the mapped 





Insufficient Funding and Areal Extent 
The importance of fit may also be applied when considering the areal extent of a 
GCD’s jurisdiction and how that areal extent relates to a GCD’s capacity113 to fund the 
operations and the purpose for which it was designed.114  Benjamin Franklin once said 
―We will know the worth of water when the well runs dry.‖  It would stand to reason that 
this same logic would apply to creating institutions with the necessary resources and 
funds to prevent ―the well‖ or the State’s water resources from ―running dry‖ or being 
unsustainably managed.  In Texas, GCDs are generally limited to generating revenue for 
operating expenses by either levying ad valorem taxes or by assessing production fees.115  
Both of these revenue-generating mechanisms are affected by the areal extent of the 
jurisdiction of a GCD.  The typically insufficient jurisdictional area associated with 
single-county GCDs exacerbated by other limitations associated with the nature of these 
funding mechanisms can hinder operational efficiency and limit the availability of 
resources and human capital needed to effectively manage the resource.  Similarly, lack 
of resources can limit institutional resilience, which may compromise the political will of 
a GCD to make critical resource management decisions.  
                                                 
113 Young, supra note 86, at 100.  (Young refers to ―capacity‖ as ―a measure of the availability of social 
and institutional capital as well as material resources necessary to make good on commitments…) 
114 TEX. WATER CODE §36.0015 (The stated purpose of GCDS as defined by statute is “to provide for the 
conservation, preservation, protection, recharging, and prevention of waste of groundwater, and of 
groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions, and to control subsidence caused by withdrawal of water from 
those groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions, consistent with the objectives of Section 59, Article 
XVI …”) 
115 Revenues may also be augmented with administrative fees, grant funding for certain projects, or 




Funding of GCD Operations 
The ad valorem taxation option for funding provided in the Texas Water Code 
authorizes the board of directors of a GCD to annually levy taxes at a rate not to exceed 
$0.5/$100 of assessed property valuation.116  The actual rate set must be confirmed by a 
majority vote of the electorate within the GCD jurisdiction.117  The tax rate is capped by 
statute and must be set considering the income available from other sources.118  However, 
as a practicable matter, the proposed tax has to be set at a rate that would survive a 
ratification election, which can be a formidable challenge in a political climate where the 
simple mention of a new tax can be a nonstarter.119  GCDs can tend to be hostages to this 
process by having to compromise and accept a rate that provides very limited funding.  
Further, it has not been uncommon for the voters to elect to participate in a district but 
refuse to tax themselves (at least at an appreciable rate) to provide for sufficient 
management or even to satisfy duties as mandated by statute.  As a result, rates approved 
are on average an order of magnitude less than the statutory cap (Table 1).  This is 
especially important in small single-county GCDs with relatively small jurisdictional 
areas or a low tax rate that cannot generate sufficient revenues to be effective or in some 
cases sustainable.  
                                                 
116 TEX. WATER CODE §36.201((b) 
117 TEX. WATER CODE §36.201(c) 
118 TEX. WATER CODE §36.203 
119 See Day, supra note 94, at 30, FN 110:  (―Voter approval is often the most significant hurdle, as 
unwanted taxes and groundwater regulation lead to opposition to creation of new districts.‖).  See Supra 
Note 25.  TCEQ, TWDB, 2011. Table 6 at p. 39.  (Since 1989, there have been 15 attempted confirmation 












 Table 1. Taxing Rates for Tax-based GCDs.  Data represents statistics of the 
available data for tax rates of 45 tax-based GCDs (see Appendix 2).  Tax 
rates are generally an order of magnitude less than the statutory cap of 
$0.5/$100 of assessed property valuation. 
As an alternative to tax-based funding, a GCD may also be established with 
production fees as the primary funding mechanism (Appendix 2).120  This may be a 
decision from the outset as established by enabling legislation or as a fallback position 
should a taxing option fail to be confirmed by a majority of voters.121  Production fees are 
generally statutorily capped at very low rates when compared to other raw water sources.  
For example, the production fees prescribed by statute are $1/acre-foot for agriculture use 
and $10/acre-foot for all other purposes.122  By comparison, the Lower Colorado River 
Authority’s (LCRA) firm raw123 water rate is $151/acre-foot.124  Funding via production 
fees can also be limiting in the amount of revenue generated, especially with the statutory 
                                                 
120 TEX. WATER CODE §36.205(c) 
121 TEX. WATER CODE §36.017(i) 
122 TEX. WATER CODE §36.205(d)(e).  (Allows in increase of the production fee cap of up to either 
$0.17/thousand gallons or a rate specified in other statutes for certain GCDs.) 
123 “Raw water” refers to untreated and undelivered water supplies. 
124 LCRA. LCRA FIRM WATER SUPPLY CONTRACTS (February 18, 2009), 




cap being so low relative to surface water.125  Moreover, reliance on production fees can 
be a serious disincentive to making policy decisions and implementing rules to limit 
pumping.  GCDs might be inclined to permit beyond a sustainable amount or to allow the 
dewatering an aquifer over time to generate sufficient funding for annual operations.126   
Even when an actual conflict of interest is not realized, production fee funding can create 
the perception of one.  
 Revenues generated by either ad valorem taxation or production fees are affected 
in a substantial way by the area encompassed by a GCD.  Insufficient jurisdictional area 
is a problem of fit that affects the amount of taxes collected and the volume of water 
(either permitted or pumped annually) used to determine revenue from production fees.  
This is especially limiting in small single-county GCDs with relatively small 
jurisdictional areas and a low tax rate or relatively few nonexempt wells that would be 
subject to permitting and/or production fees.  In these common examples of insufficient 
areal extent, GCDs typically cannot generate sufficient revenues to be effective or in 
some instances sustainable.  Some GCDs are only resourced sufficiently enough to 
register wells and serve administrative functions with limited additional funding for rule 
enforcement, legal fees, aquifer studies, or data collection.  In other words, they offer the 
                                                 
125 Revenue generated from production fees based on actual pumped versus permitted volumes can also be 
highly variable depending on meteorological conditions. 
126 L. B. Marbury & M. Kelly, Down to the Last Drop, 2009 Update: Spotlight on Groundwater 
Managment in Texas. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, at 19 (2009).  (―The idea that groundwater districts 
should have to depend on permitting massive amounts of groundwater withdrawals to supply their budget 
needs is as counter-productive as it gets. This also may create a conflict of interest, as often underfunded 





perception of active groundwater management but are in fact governance in name only.127  
It is again an example of how the process provides ample opportunities for county 
governments and their electorate to influence both the decision to establish a GCD and 
then to fund a GCD in a manner that limits its effectiveness. 
These issues of insufficient areal extent also speak to economies of scale.  Single-
county scale GCDs cannot fund the same level of technical and managerial staff as multi-
county GCDs despite the higher tax rates that are generally needed by the former.128  
Moreover, smaller entities must cover duplicative overhead functions that could 
otherwise be shared in a larger scaled area, an additional inefficiency.  The preference for 
GCDs of single-county scale is indicative of the strong influence of the effective value of 
local autonomy and a clear choice of autonomy over cost benefit.129  However, what is 
politically acceptable in a process that is heavily stacked in favor of local governments is 
often ineffective and unsustainable in terms of authority and resources.  
Institutional Resilience 
The debate over groundwater ownership in Texas has recently been provided with 
some clarity from both the legislature through the passing of SB 332 and the Texas 
                                                 
127 The Hays Trinity GCD (HTGCD) is example of a GCD with specific enabling legislation (Act of May 
28, 2001, 77
th
 Leg., R.S., SB 2, Part 3) that further limits the ability to generate revenue by mechanisms 
available to most GCDs under TEX. WATER CODE Ch. 36.  The Hays Trinity GCD has neither the authority 
to collect ad valorem tax revenue nor production fees.  All revenue is generated by a one-time permitting 
fee plus any other secondary funding that may be available from grants and county subsidies.  (See Also 
Appendix 2.). 
128 Somma, supra note 57, at 59. 
129 See Id. at 59, (Somma emphasizes this by pointing out that the larger-scale GCDs – The High Plains, 
Panhandle, and North Plains GCDs - enjoy the benefits of economies of scale by having sufficient 




Supreme Court with the opinion issued in the Day case.130  In short, SB 332, which 
became effective in 2011, recognized that a landowner has a property interest in 
groundwater in place subject to reasonable regulation by a GCD but also concluded that 
―unreasonable‖ regulation by a GCD may constitute a compensable taking of that 
property for public use.131  For small single-county GCDs with insufficient jurisdictional 
area and limited resources and funding, this could open the door for takings claims from 
disgruntled landowners that have been unsatisfactorily affected by a GCD’s regulatory 
decision.  Takings claims can be long, complex, and expensive cases to litigate and 
defend.132  Although the bar for satisfactorily demonstrating a compensable taking is 
high, the resources needed to defend a regulatory scheme as reasonable could exhaust the 
meager resources of many small, less resilient GCDs.  The lack of institutional resilience 
to sustain legal challenges that may be associated with difficult resource management 
decisions may compel a GCD to err on the side of caution and relax regulations, or even 
avoid implementing sustainable resource management policies, in order to avoid a 
protracted legal defense.133  Evidence of the potential and intent to challenge GCD 
                                                 
130   See supra note 44. 
131   See Day, supra note 94, at 814. 
132   Id. at 46.  (citing the Edwards Aquifer Authority (―Authority‖) brief:  ―The Authority worries that the 
financial burden of such [takings] claims could make regulation impossible, or at least call into question the 
validity of existing permits. Regulatory takings litigation is especially burdensome, the Authority notes, 
because of the uncertainties in applying the law that increase the expense and risk of liability.‖  The court 
concurred stating: ―…the expense of such litigation cannot be denied.‖). 
133 J. Civins, Ground(water) Breaking Decision – A Bad Day for Groundwater Management in Texas.  
Environmental Law Articles (February 27, 2012), www.martindale.com/environmental-law/article_Haynes-
Boone-LLP1458438.html.  (―…groundwater conservation districts are left having to determine whether and 
to what extent their issuance of a permit constitutes a regulatory taking, if the applicant’s request is denied 




authority and examples of GCDs’ unwillingness to infringe on private property rights has 
already emerged.  For example, the Fox Crossing Water District cited SB 332 and the 
court’s opinion as a basis for formally calling for the dissolution of the District.134  It was 
also used by the Burnet County GOP as the basis for passing a resolution to be submitted 
for possible inclusion in the state’s platform opposing GCDs’ rulemaking powers.135  
Both of these examples appear to be harbingers of what is to come for GCDs, reinforcing 
the need for GCDs to be resilient enough to sustain while the GCDs and property rights 
advocates grapple with the challenge of finding a balance between responsible and 
effective resource management, property rights, and sustaining a healthy economy.   
                                                                                                                                                 
and are unable to bear the costs of litigation, will be to severely chill their ability to manage groundwater 
because of the liabilities they may incur in issuing permits.‖). 
134 Fox Crossing Water District Board of Directors, A RESOLUTION, (March 13, 2012).  (quoting citations 
from the resolution). 
Whereas Senate Bill 332 …clearly defines groundwater as real property belonging to landowners 
…, 
Whereas the unanimous decision of the Texas Supreme Court in [Day] clearly affirms 
groundwater as private property …,  
*** 
Whereas any liability that may befall Fox Crossing Water District, should the District in any 
action that might constitute a taking of private property under the laws of the state of Texas, would 
result in the necessity to impose taxes, fees or both,   
*** 
Whereas this Board believes that government is incapable of effectively managing large, complex, 
multi-variable systems, like groundwater … which may be affected by policies, procedures and 
activities completely outside the borders of said government, 
*** 
Be it resolved, that the Board of Directors of Fox Crossing Water District unanimously 
recommends the complete dissolution of said District effective immediately. 
 
135 J. Walker, GOP Opposes Groundwater District's Rulemaking Power. BURNET BULLETIN, (April 24, 
2012, 9:00 AM),  http://burnetbulletin.com/news_article.php?category_id=2&article_id=2497. (―Burnet 
County Republicans at their county convention Saturday approved a resolution to be submitted for possible 






2.2 SCALE OF GOVERNANCE - CENTRALIZATION VS. DECENTRALIZATION  
In terms of the scale of groundwater governance, the end members are generally 
represented with centralized (top down) governance on one end and decentralized (local 
control) on the other.  The merits of centralized verses decentralized governance have 
been long debated and are largely dependent on the purpose and the need for governance 
and the media to be governed.  The following section provides a discussion of the merits 
of these end-member scales of governance as it pertains to addressing challenges unique 
to groundwater as a common-pool resource and the efficacy of its management.   
2.2.1 Decentralization 
Whereas the debate over the appropriate scale of governance can often degenerate 
into arguments that are products of politics rather than a discussion on the merits, 
theoretical-based discussions of natural resource management and governance have 
increasingly stressed the principles of user participation enabled though 
decentralization.136  This emphasis in theory is largely based on the idea that top-down 
governance, such as centralized state-level control, is unlikely to achieve resource 
management objectives without support from the main water users.137  This is consistent 
with one of the key tenants of governance, that is, authority to govern must be derived 
from the consent of the governed.138  Ostrom for example, who has written extensively 
                                                 
136  L. Cook and J. Sachs, Public Regional Goods in International Assistance, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, at 436–39 (I. Kaul, I. Grunberg & M. Stern eds. 
1999). 
137 Ross, supra note 95, at 307. 
138 U.S. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. (1776),  www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Declarind.html.  
(Retrieved March 25, 2012 from the Library of Congress website). (―We hold these truths to be self-




about the management of common-pool resources, uses case studies of long enduring 
resource management institutions139 to suggest that small-scale community-governance 
institutions may be more effective than centralized institutions for common-pool resource 
management.  From these studies, Ostrom established principles for self-governing 
resource management systems.  One of these key principles requires institutions to have 
―collective choice arrangements,‖ meaning that many of the individuals affected by 
extraction limits are included in the group who can modify these rules.140  Another 
suggests the need for minimal recognition of the rights of the user to devise their own 
institutions that are not challenged by external government authorities.141  These are best 
accomplished at a smaller scale.    
Ostrom also warns that when designing resource management institutions, ―one 
size does not fit all.‖  In other words, management regimes will have to be tailored to the 
particular circumstances of individual cases.142  Proponents of local control in Texas 
concur with this point arguing that local ―home-grown‖ institutions allow for more 
focused, evolutionary kind of change that is more nimble, adaptable,143 and best suited to 
address the large diversity of climatic conditions, water use patterns, growth projections 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed..."). 
139 Young, supra note 86, at 31.  (Young defines institutions as ―sets of rules, decision-making procedures, 
and programs that give rise to recognized practices, assign roles to participants in these practices, and 
govern interactions among occupants of specific roles.‖). 
140 Ostrom, supra note 92.  See also E. Ostrom, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (2005). 
141 Id.  
142 E. Lopez-Gunn, Governing Shared Groundwater: the Controversy Over Private Regulation.  175(1) 
THE GEOGRAPHICAL J., at 42 (March, 2009).  




and aquifer characteristics across the State.144  Such diversity, which certainly exists in 
Texas, would make it difficult to formulate and administer uniform laws and regulations 
to govern the development and use of groundwater statewide.  
Challenges Associated with Decentralized GCDs in Texas 
While there are theoretical and logical benefits to decentralized groundwater 
governance, the Texas experience since implementation via the GCD Act in 1949 has 
drawn criticism pointing to significant challenges associated with local control.  These 
challenges primarily involve the compromised groundwater management efforts 
associated with local politics and the tendency to preserve self-interests that can be 
inherent to small-scale governance.  
 In most social settings, issues related to natural resource management are matters 
of public policy and therefore subject to manipulation on the part of actors seeking to 
promote their own interests through political processes.145  This generalization also 
applies to the decentralized GCD system where smaller jurisdictions can be more easily 
influenced without the dilution that may come from actors representing a larger area.  
The notion suggests that local GCDs will generally tend to give disproportionate weight 
to the local constituency which may oftentimes lead to resource management decisions 
that are counter to larger statewide management objectives.146  Opportunity for undiluted 
influence was almost certainly a motivating factor in the political compromise that 
                                                 
144 Fipps, supra note 25, at 6. 
145 Young, supra note 86, at 74. 




resulted in the GCD Act in 1949 allowing local interests to dictate water policy.  As an 
alternative to state control, local interests recognized that the next best thing to no 
regulation is self-regulation.147  This has resulted in a form of governance where entities 
that are tasked with regulating themselves can be compromised by self-interests and a 
general reluctance to tell themselves ―no.‖    
The tendency for management (or lack thereof) to be motivated by self-interests 
has been characterized by some as the most serious barrier to effective resource 
management in Texas.148  This is an intuitive conclusion, particularly where groundwater 
production limits affect economic returns (e.g. crop yields, land development, natural gas 
extraction, etc.).  In these situations, GCDs run by boards that are often dominated by 
those with economic interest affected by local water availability will tend to not 
aggressively push for production limits.149  This thinking was most prevalent with the 
creation of the first GCDs in Texas and continued while there was relatively limited GCD 
formation in the first 50 years after the GCD Act.150  Since that time, these types of 
                                                 
147 Somma, supra note 57, at 59. (“... one can organize one‟s own water rules or have the state or 
government do it for you.”)   
148 See Snyder, supra note 76, at 298. (“Despite the gaping holes in UWCD‟s [underground water 
conservation districts] management powers, however, the most serious barrier to effective action is its 
dependence on local politics.”); (“The district cannot be effective unless local residents, acting through 
popularly elected directors, are willing to impose management controls on their pumping activities.”); 
(“While the people in power hesitate to regulate themselves, the state‟s water problems are growing.”);  
(“elected officials are acutely aware of the attitude of their electorate.  They publically denounce any 
conservation proposal that even suggests the possibility of production regulation.”).  See Johnson, supra 
note 112, at 1282.  (“…the legislature has passed the buck to local communities by authorizing them to do 
something about groundwater if they wish to do so.  The response of local communities has been uneven 
and generally inadequate.”).   
149 See Snyder, supra note 76, at 302. 
150 See Sipriano, supra note 4, at 81. (―Yet in the fifty years since the Legislature first authorized the 




criticisms of GCDs and local control have subsided somewhat in response to the slow 
evolution and maturation of GCDs and groundwater management in Texas.151  
Nonetheless, the tendency for self-interest and conflicts of interest associated with local 
politics are still relevant and cannot be dismissed.  Some strongly believe that this will 
always be a flaw in the decentralized system and that resource management decisions 
should not be left up to entities with primarily narrow and local interests, particularly 
when there are clashes between the fate of a resource and communities that profit from 
exploitation of that resource.152    
In addition to obstacles resulting from economically driven conflicts of interest, 
small GCDs can also be compromised by local politics driven by ideology.  For example, 
the action of the Fox Crossing Water District in response to the Day case opinion, 
referenced above,153 is evidence of a GCD going to extremes (i.e., formally resolving to 
dissolve itself) in response to the strong anti-government ideology of individual board 
members.154  Similarly, just on the heels of the opinion issued in Day, the Burnet County 
GOP party voted unanimously at their local convention in 2012 to challenge a GCD’s 
regulatory authority as part of its platform.155  This type of reaction may be representative 
                                                                                                                                                 
some forty-two such districts have been created, covering a small fraction of the state‖.).  Some 54 GCDs 
have been created and confirmed in the short time from Sipriano to present.  
151 Much of this maturation can be attributed to judicial scolding and finger pointing directed at the 
legislature with directives to fulfill constitutional obligations mandated by the Conservation Amendment.  
See also Sipriano, supra note 4, at 79 (“Like the voters that passed the 1917 constitutional amendment, this 
Court has consistently recognized “the need for legislative regulation of water” (citation omitted.”)  
152 See S. L. Shadwick, Obsolescence, Environmental Endangerment, and Possible Federal Intervention 
Compel Reformation of Texas Groundwater Law. 32 SOUTH TEXAS L. REV., 641, 677 (1990-1991).  
153 See Day, supra note 94. 
154 Supra note 134.  




of the local politics and ideology of the political party of the county and the GCD in place 
for Burnet County156 but it may not be representative of the larger population of aquifer 
dependents not represented.  A democratically elected governing body should, by design, 
reflect the ideology of its constituents.  However, in a decentralized system dominated by 
small single-county GCDs, actions based on extreme ideologies can affect stakeholders 
who also rely on the resource but that may be outside of the jurisdictional area. 
2.2.2 Centralization 
As documented by Green and discussed in Chapter 1, the question of whether 
groundwater governance in Texas should be centralized, that is managed from the top 
down by a state agency like the TCEQ, has been the subject of ongoing debate since the 
build up to the GCD Act in 1949.  Prior to the GCD Act, there was a real push by state 
agencies and other governmental groups to centralize groundwater governance.  This idea 
was also strongly endorsed by the Great Plains Committee, a national committee of Great 
Plains states set up by President Roosevelt in response to the Dust Bowl.  The committee 
supported findings by the National Advisory and Legislative Committee on Land Use 
which urged states in its report to ―declare all inappropriate [sic] waters to be public 
waters of the state, subject to appropriation for beneficial use‖ in the same way that 
surface water was managed.157  Those supporting centralization saw a need to unify 
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157 Green, supra note 12, at 172.  See also J. W. Nachbaur, Drivers of Formal, Local Groundwater 




groundwater and surface water governance.  The debate over centralized control of 
groundwater was also generally divided along rural vs. urban interests.  Advocates for 
state control lobbied to revoke the absolute private ownership of water and for state 
allocation of water resources, with preference given to municipalities and manufacturers 
over irrigated agriculture.158  This division is present today with urban interests favoring 
centralization as a way to reallocate water supplies from rural agricultural uses to 
growing urban populations,159 while the rural interests are vigilantly lobbying to maintain 
local control and to fend off an urban invasion of their water supplies. 
Centralization as an Alternative to Decentralized GCDs in Texas 
Passing the GCD Act in 1949 served to quiet the debate over centralization but 
only temporarily.  Since then, much of the call for centralized groundwater governance 
tends to be in the form of an indictment against the existing system of local GCDs.  Such 
criticism often leads to a de facto endorsement of centralization as the extreme 
alternative.  Throughout the literature, the idea of centralization of groundwater 
management in Texas has been invoked as the antidote to what some have referred to as 
―decentralized dysfunction.‖160  For example, Shadwick, in her criticisms of local control, 
describes centralized regulation and administration of Texas groundwater as ―the 
                                                 
158 Green, supra note 12, at 175-176.  (In 1948, The Texas Water Conservation drafted a bill that would 
have placed groundwater under the correlative rights doctrine to be allocated by the state engineer.  The bill 
also established priority of water rights with municipal rights designated as the top priority and irrigation at 
the bottom.).  
159 M. Jones & A. Little, The Ownership of Groundwater in Texas: A Contrived Battle for State Control of 
Groundwater. 61(2) BAYLOR L. REV., 578, at 608 (2009).  (―Pressures from cities eager for predictable and 
long-term supplies of water… drives the controversy‖).  




Hannibal’s sword that can cut through the Gordian knot of conflicting local interests,‖ 
suggesting that centralization is needed to overcome the challenges of bureaucratic 
inertia, funding problems, and the self-limiting nature that characterize the Texas system 
of local control.161  She further posits that centralization is needed to unify the regulatory 
scheme and provide for equitable administration while conforming to hydrological 
reality.162  Other advocates suggest that only a single entity, rather than many smaller 
ones, with adequate statewide powers could effectively manage the state’s groundwater 
resources.  The Texas Railroad Commission, the state agency with regulatory authority 
over oil and gas in Texas, is often cited as an example of a centralized agency with 
statewide authority that could and should be implemented to manage groundwater.163  
The persistent threat of moving towards centralized state control in response to 
the alleged dysfunction of local governance has also been effectively used to galvanize 
the rural community in efforts to maintain local control.  For example, some of the 
arguments in the recent debate over the ownership of groundwater that played out in the 
Day case have invoked the threat of state control as political pressure to affirm 
groundwater as a private property right in place and preserve local control.164  The 
control of groundwater by a centralized state agency has been equated to a threat to 
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stand before their constituents to say that this precious resource [groundwater], long the property of 




livelihoods of those that depend on the irrigated agriculture economy.165  The arguments 
used in the Day case to affirm groundwater as private property relied heavily on the logic 
of treating groundwater the same as oil and gas.  Proponents of this argument point out 
that oil and gas has a well-established set of case law that has addressed and put to rest all 
of the same questions over ownership.166  The Supreme Court agreed.167  As mentioned, 
the Texas Railroad Commission is a centralized state agency with the statewide authority 
to regulate the allocation of oil and gas reserves in Texas.  It is somewhat ironic that 
those in favor of affirming groundwater as private property did so in part to preserve 
local control by arguing that groundwater should be regulated the same as oil and gas, 
which is regulated by a centralized state agency. 
While decentralization receives high marks in facilitating local involvement in 
management decisions and adaptability, those that favor centralization largely do so 
because of some of the inherent challenges, such as compromised objectives resulting 
from self-interests and local politics, which tend to be associated with small-scale local 
governance.  If the objective is the sustainable stewardship of a common-pool resource 
like groundwater, the challenges associated with these challenges are compounded where 
groundwater institutions are also susceptible to problems of fit, that is, hydrological 
disconnects and insufficient areal extent to provide adequate funding and institutional 
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166 Jones and Little, supra note 159, at 597.   
167 See Day, supra note 94, at 825.  (―Whether groundwater can be owned in place is an issue we have 





resilience.  It is fair to say that neither end-member of the scale-of-governance spectrum, 
state control or small single-county GCDs, is without flaws.  The sounder approach, as 





Chapter 3:  Regionalization of Groundwater Management in Texas 
The previous chapter provided a summary of the criticisms of the current 
decentralized system of groundwater management in Texas and the often-invoked 
alternative of centralized or state control.  The following chapter will focus on 
regionalization as a policy proposal providing an alternate management approach that 
should be considered as middle ground between these two extreme scales of groundwater 
governance.   
3.1 REGIONALIZATION – A POLICY PROPOSAL 
The 2012 State Water Plan projects that demand for water is expected to increase 
by 22% by the year 2060 while the projected water supplies are expected to decrease by 
about 10%.168  The State Water Plan goes further to predict that the existing groundwater 
supplies and future groundwater availability are projected to decrease by 30% and 24% 
respectively between the years 2010 and 2060.169  Since most of the state’s surface water 
is fully allocated and constructing reservoirs involves significant expense on less optimal 
sites that tend to be met with substantial opposition by landowners and environmental 
groups, there will be increased pressure to make up these supply shortfalls by further 
exploitation and depletion of the state’s aquifers.170  Faced with an uncertain water supply 
future and in recognition of the need for more effective groundwater management, the 
State has been laboring to find a workable path towards reconciliation of the strong 
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preference for local control and the disjointed and hydrologically disconnected nature of 
the existing GCD system.   
One of the core objectives of this thesis is to offer a policy proposal for Texas 
groundwater management that is responsive to these challenges.  What is needed is an 
institutional arrangement that represents a compromise between centralization and 
decentralization - one that is appropriately scaled to offer the institutional resilience, 
objectivity, uniformity, and the means of centralized governance while taking advantage 
of the familiarity, responsiveness, and adaptability of decentralized governance.  To 
accomplish this requires a shift to a somewhat higher scale than the predominant model 
of single-county GCDs.171 Regionalization is being offered here as a policy proposal that 
can provide for this balance at the appropriate scale.  For the purposes of this chapter, the 
term ―regionalization‖ shall be used to describe a scale of groundwater governance with 
multi-county institutions configured with jurisdictional boundaries that are generally 
congruent with the boundaries of the natural system to be managed, namely, the 
designated major aquifer systems in Texas.  Regional institutions in this context describe 
institutions that are designed to avoid the challenges associated with the problem of ―fit‖ 
and insufficient areal extent.  That is, they are of the appropriate jurisdictional area and 
size to minimize hydrological disconnects and provide sufficient funds, authority, and 
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resources to effectively manage the resource and equitably accommodate all affected 
actors to the maximum extent practicable.  
3.2 SHIFT TOWARDS REGIONALIZATION 
Regionalization is not a new or revolutionary concept but is in fact something that 
Texas has been slowly evolving towards for some time.  The slow incremental shift 
appears to be evidence and recognition of the challenges of the current GCD system and 
the proliferation of singe-county GCDs that are in place.  This issue coupled with the 
growing competition for the state’s water supplies would finally nudge the Legislature 
towards attempts at developing a workable way to expand management areas through 
regionalization.  
3.2.1 “Groundwater Management Areas” 
The logic of designing groundwater management institutions to ―fit‖ within the 
boundaries of major aquifer systems was established from the outset in the GCD Act of 
1949.  Mace et al. (2008) chronicles the history and evolution of the concept of 
delineating areas ―best suited for groundwater management‖ and the terms used to 
describe them.172  In short, the GCD Act of 1949 as described in Chapter 1 required that a 
local petition be first filed to initiate a study to delineate ―underground water reservoirs‖ 
                                                 




which was the precursor to GCD creation within that reservoir.173  The term was changed 
to ―management areas‖ by HB 2 in 1985, then to ―underground management areas‖ by 
SB 1212 in 1989, then to ―groundwater management areas‖ by HB 2294 in 1995.  HB 2 
built on the GCD Act by establishing economic incentives for GCD creation within 
designated ―critical groundwater areas‖ and set up a process for designation of these 
areas by the Texas Water Commission, predecessor to the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ).174  Further, HB 2 incorporated the petition process 
requirement that the boundaries of a GCD had to be coterminous with a designated 
management area, although political boundaries could be considered.175  This provision, 
however, was later repealed by SB 1212 for legislatively created GCDs.176 SB 1212 did 
serve to strengthen HB 2 by providing the method for establishing critical areas and for 
determining the need for creation of a GCD in those areas.  The creation of a GCD in 
accordance with this provision remained optional, however, failure to do so prohibited 
the use of TWDB funds in the designated areas.  HB 2294, which finally settled on the 
term ―groundwater management areas‖ (GMAs), would prove to provide the foundation 
for future progress in the shift towards regionalization by 1) establishing Chapter 35 of 
                                                 
173 Id. Appendix A.  (GCD Act of 1949 was amended in 1955 to authorize the Texas Board of Water 
Engineers to designate underground water reservoirs by its own initiative without having to be initiated by 
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174 Id. at 1. FN 9.  (The ―critical areas program‖ was the predecessor to the Priority Groundwater 
Management Area (PGMA) program that established area with existing or projected groundwater 
management problems for the purpose of initiating the creation of a GCD).  See also Ch. 1, §1.1.4.   
175 Id. at 1.  
176   R. Johnson, Groundwater Law and Regulation, ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER RESOURCES, at 114 (M. 
K. Sahs, ed., 2009). (―The vast majority of groundwater conservation districts have been established 




the Texas Water Code for the purpose of creating GMAs for reasons similar to those 
cited for creation of GCDs,177 and 2) by providing the discretionary authority to the 
TCEQ to designate GMAs with the objective of providing the area most suitable for the 
management of the groundwater resources using boundaries that coincide with aquifer 
boundaries where feasible.178   
3.2.2 Regional Water Planning 
 
In addition to the significant provisions of SB 1 passed in 1997 affecting 
groundwater management as described in Chapter 1, SB 1 was also notable for shifting 
water planning to a more regional approach through the much lauded regional water 
planning process.  Prior to SB 1, early efforts were typically more centrally oriented with 
the plans internally developed and prepared by the engineers, hydrologists, and planners 
of the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB).  These plans were developed with little 
interest or participation from the public since the plans were used for little more than a 
reference document.179  The extreme drought experienced in Texas in 1996 and 1997 
                                                 
177 TEX. WATER CODE §35.001.  (―Purpose.  In order to provide for the conservation, preservation, 
protection, recharging, and prevention of waste of the groundwater, and of groundwater reservoirs or their 
subdivisions, and to control subsidence caused by withdrawal of water from those groundwater reservoirs 
or their subdivisions, consistent with the objectives of Section 59, Article XVI, Texas Constitution, 
groundwater management areas may be created as provided by this chapter.‖). 
178 TEX. WATER CODE §35.004(a).  (―On its own motion from time to time, or on receiving a petition, the 
commission may designate groundwater management areas.  Each management area shall be designated 
with the objective of providing the most suitable area for the management of the groundwater resources.  
To the extent feasible, the management area shall coincide with the boundaries of a groundwater reservoir 
or a subdivision of a groundwater reservoir.  The commission also may consider other factors, including the 
boundaries of political subdivisions.‖).  
179 R. Kaiser, B.J. Lesikar, C.S. Shafer, & J.R. Gertson.  Water Management Strategies: Ranking and 




helped to convince State leaders to take future water planning more seriously.180  SB 1 
implemented what has been described as a ―bottom-up‖ approach to State water planning, 
meaning that the plan is developed first on a regional basis and passed up to the State 
level to be incorporated into the larger State water plan.  It established 16 regional water 
planning areas that were largely delineated by the major river basins in the state and 
Regional Water Planning Groups (RWPGs) for each (Figure 8).  Each group consists of 
representatives from 11 different interest groups that include: public, county, 
municipalities, industry, agriculture, small business, electric-generating utilities, river 
authorities, local government, water districts, and environmental representatives.181   
RWPGs were tasked with developing regional water plans that identified existing 
and future available water supplies and projected future population growth and water 
demands over the next 50 years.  A range of water supply strategies is then identified to 
address any shortages.182  The significance of this new, unprecedented water planning 
approach was that 1) it first introduced regionalization as an ideal scale for water 
planning, and 2) it recognized the importance of designating stakeholder positions from 
the affected sectors over the entire planning area to ensure equitable representation in 
water planning decisions.   
                                                 
180 Id. at 3.   
181 TEX. WATER CODE §16.053(c).  
182 TEX. WATER DEV. BD., Regional Water Planning. (2011, November 10). 





Figure 8: Map of Regional Water Planning Groups 
3.2.3 Recognition of the Problems of Fit  
The period building up to the 76
th
 Legislative Session in 1999 involved several 
significant events affecting groundwater management in Texas.  In the decision in 
Sipriano, the court highlighted the need for groundwater management and pointed to the 
legislative duty and responsibility to do so under the Conservation Amendment.  This 




designation of GCDs as the preferred method of groundwater management that came out 
of SB 1, and the prospects of large-scale rural to urban groundwater exports would prove 
to be the impetus for a substantial increase in proposed new GCDs in the 76
th
 session.  
That session the Legislature considered creating at least 30 new GCDs.183 The abundance 
of proposed GCDs caused concern considering that only 44 GCDs had been created in 
the previous 50 years and more importantly, because many of the proposed GCDs were 
based on political (county) lines rather than aquifer boundaries.  Senator J.E. ―Buster‖ 
Brown, the then-current chairman of the Senate Committee on Natural Resources and 
author of SB 1, expressed concerns over the developing single-county GCD precedent.  
Senator Brown worried that the proposed GCDs might interfere with regional water 
planning efforts under SB 1 and recommended that the Senate not consider the creation 
of those Districts.184  The Legislature compromised by passing SB 1911 creating 13 new 
temporary GCDs with limited regulatory authority, 8 of which were to be single-county 
GCDs185 and 3 were to be configured along county boundaries (Figure 3).186  Although 
the bill was a compromise, it nevertheless served to firmly establish the single-county 
                                                 
183 HOUSE COMM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 69, at 17. 
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186 HOUSE COMM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 69, at 17. 
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GCD precedent and set the path for subsequent GCDs to follow – a point that was 
included in the bill analysis of SB 1911.187   
Prior to the 77
th
 Legislative Session in 2000, the House Committee on Natural 
Resources (Committee) was assigned interim charges aimed directly at addressing the 
developing water management problems.  The first charge directed the Committee to: 
Study all issues related to groundwater availability, including the role and needs 
of groundwater conservation districts to ensure effective management of the 
resource. Consider the effectiveness and feasibility of aquifer-based management, 
and the adequacy of data and modeling for regional water planning efforts. Assess 




The resulting report included a thorough analysis of the developing issues related 
to this charge and concluded by acknowledging the single-county GCD precedent and 
finding that county based-GCDs that overlay only portions of regional aquifers may be 
ineffective, especially when adjoining GCDs have conflicting rules and varying degrees 
of pumping.189  The committee recommended that the GCD creation process needed to be 
streamlined and that new GCDs, where feasible, should be encouraged to be created 
along designated management boundaries as opposed to political boundaries (emphasis 
                                                 
187 SB 1911 Bill Analysis, supra note 89.  (―During the 76th Legislative session, bills have been filed 
seeking to create more than 20 new groundwater conservation districts, many of them single-county 
districts.‖).  (―Concerns have been raised that the myriad of groundwater districts proposed legislatively 
this session are based on political instead of hydrologic boundaries and, therefore, may not be able to 
manage the underlying aquifers consistent with the powers and duties of Chapter 36, Water Code 
(Groundwater Conservation Districts) or with the long-range water management planning envisioned by 
Senate Bill 1.‖).   
188 HOUSE COMM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 69, at 2. 
 





added).190  The Committee further recommended that the legislature should strengthen 
statues that encourage joint management by GCDs that share the same aquifer.191   
The debate that preceded the passing of SB 1911 in 1999, the Committee’s 
interim charges that were assigned in 2000, and the resulting findings and 
recommendations were significant in that it was a clear acknowledgement of the then-
developing single-county GCD precedent, the associated problems of fit, and the 
potential to interfere with the recently established preference for regional-scale water 
management in the state under SB 1.  Subsequent unsuccessful attempts were made to 
compel larger-scale multi-county GCDs,192 however, policy makers seemed compelled to 
accept that given the formidable resistance, another approach would be necessary. 
3.2.4 Voluntary Joint Regional Groundwater Planning 
Momentum to address the single-county GCD precedent and the associated 
problems of fit was building coming into the 77
th
 Legislative Session in 2001.  The 
product of this momentum was realized in components of SB 2.  As discussed in Chapter 
1, the provisions of SB 2 substantially increased the authority of GCDs, however, perhaps 
the most notable provisions pertaining to regionalization were those that laid the 
foundation for more comprehensive joint groundwater planning and GCD coordination.  
SB 2 moved the responsibility for creating GMAs from the TCEQ to the TWDB and 
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 Leg., R.S., HB 3335 authored by Representative Callegari and sponsored by Senator Averitt was 
filed to require that GCDs created in response to a PGMA designation were composed of territory within 
two or more contiguous counties.  HB 3335 did not pass. 




directed the TWDB to create GMAs for all the State’s major and minor aquifers by 
September 1, 2003.193  TWDB created 16 GMAs covering the entire state using aquifers 
and other hydrological boundaries that primarily honored the designated major aquifers 
in Texas (Figure 9).194  SB 2 also required that GCDs within their respective GMAs share 
management plans with each other and participate in joint planning on a voluntary basis 
if an individual GCD called for it.195  These GCDs could also undertake joint studies, 
research, or projects.196   
Provisions of the introduced SB 2 that did not make it into the final bill would 
also prove to be important building blocks for the future form of the joint regional 
groundwater planning process that would emerge out of HB 1763 in 2005.  The 
introduced version of SB 2 included requirements for the regional water planning groups 
to develop ―groundwater management standards‖197 and ―groundwater withdrawal 
                                                 
193 Act of June 15, 2001, 77
th
 Leg. R.S., §2.22 of SB 2 [hereinafter cited as SB 2] (codified as amendments 
to TEX. WATER CODE §35.004(a)). 
194 Mace, supra note 81, at 2.  (―TWDB staff used aquifers and other hydrologic boundaries to guide the 
delineation of groundwater management areas. The boundaries primarily honored the boundaries of the 
major aquifers of Texas as identified in various TWDB publications. In areas with multiple major aquifers, 
TWDB generally placed a preference on the shallowest aquifer. The TWDB divided several of the major 
aquifers into multiple groundwater management areas. These divisions were based on hydrogeology and 
current water-use patterns and coincided with natural features where possible. Where possible, the TWDB 
aligned boundaries with county and existing groundwater conservation district boundaries.‖(emphasis 
added)). 
195 §2.48 of SB 2 (codified as amendments to TEX. WATER CODE §36.108(a)). 
196 §2.48 of SB 2 (codified as amendments to TEX. WATER CODE §36.108(j)). 
197 §2.19 of SB 2 (Introduced version), (proposed amendments to TEX. WATER CODE §16.0531)  
(Provisions associated with the proposed Groundwater Management Standard:  ―…Requires the 
groundwater management standards to describe the desired condition of the groundwater source as 
indicated by indices of quantity of water in the source, quality of water produced from the source, or 
subsidence of the land surface. Requires the groundwater management standard to describe this condition 




rates‖198 which would later become ―desired future conditions‖ and ―managed (now, 
modeled) available groundwater‖ respectively under HB 1763.  These introduced terms 
appear to be the nascent form of the concept of using policy driven management goals 
and the best available science to determine groundwater availability. 
 
 
                                                 
198 §2.19 of SB 2 (Introduced version), (proposed amendments to TEX. WATER CODE §16.0532.).  
(Provisions associated with the proposed Groundwater Withdrawal Rate:  ―…Requires the regional water 
planning groups to use groundwater availability modeling information provided by the executive 
administrator to determine these rates. Requires the groundwater withdrawal rate to be the maximum rate 
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Figure 9: Map of Groundwater Management Areas (GMAs).  GMAs were configured 
to conform primarily to major aquifer boundaries.  (Source:  TWDB) 
3.2.5 The Joint-Regional Groundwater Planning Process 
The Failed Senate Bill 3 (2005) 
 In the 79
th
 Legislative Session in 2005, Senator Kenneth Armbrister filed SB 3 in 
an attempt to further develop the voluntary groundwater planning process.  SB 3 was 
intended to be the next omnibus water bill, building on the progress of SB 1 and SB 2 - 




up of several acts addressing a number of important water issues such as environmental 
flows, conjunctive use, and water conservation, but most notably, it included provisions 
that would formalize and mandate joint groundwater planning.  The introduced version of 
SB 3 proposed bold new steps towards regionalization of groundwater management in 
response to the persistent criticism of the single-county GCD precedent and the 
associated problems of fit and scale.  In 2004 during the interim period before the 79th 
Texas Legislative Session, the governor convened a Senate Select Committee on Water 
Policy with charges aimed directly at this issue. The relevant charges included the study 
of:199 
 the role of federal, state, regional, and local governments, and their coordination 
in setting consistent, nondiscriminatory water policies; 
 the role of GCDs; 
 the regional water planning process; and 
 the conjunctive use of both groundwater and surface water resources. 
The Committee identified certain specific concerns that might benefit from legislative 
attention.  Importantly, these concerns included:200 
 single-county GCDs, often with conflicting management goals, attempting to 
manage regional groundwater resources; and 
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 the ability of large-quantity groundwater pumping just outside the boundaries of a 
GCD to undermine the district’s efforts to manage the groundwater resources. 
 These recommendations again represented recognition of the ever-growing groundwater 
management issues that had been alluded to but largely ignored up to this point.  The 
product of the recommendations would be the proposed groundwater planning provisions 
of Senator Armbrister’s bill - SB 3.  The relevant provisions of the bill included:201  
 stating a policy goal to ―ensure consistent management of groundwater in a shared 
management area by the GCDs located in that area;‖  
 establishing Groundwater Management Area Councils (GMACs) to ensure the 
coordination of management in each GMA;  
 specifying the makeup of each GMAC to include: 1) the presiding officer from 
each GCD in the GMA, 2) a resident of the GMA representing a water utility, 3) a 
resident of the GMA representing each RWPG located wholly or partly in the 
GMA, 4) a resident of the GMA representing agricultural interests, and 5) a 
transport permit holder; 
 specifying duties of the GMAC including: 1) adopting desired future conditions, 
2) adopting groundwater availability estimates generated by the TWDB, 3) 
approving member groundwater management plans, and 4) verifying consistency 
with the established DFCs; 
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 specifying the authorities of a GMAC including:  performing area hydrogeologic 
studies, establishing groundwater monitoring networks, and designating certain 
duties to member GCDs;  
 providing technical assistance to GMACs by providing TWDB employee(s) 
dedicated to assisting each GMAC; and 
 providing funding to GMACs to fund groundwater management coordination. 
  The proposed groundwater planning provisions of SB 3 appeared to address a 
long overdue need in Texas by establishing regional scale institutions (GMACs) enabled 
with authority to set policy and approve GCD management plans, as well as funding and 
technical assistance to provide for regional groundwater management.  It also appeared to 
be largely inspired by the State water planning process adopted under SB 1 in 1997 that 
has been widely touted as being a successful planning model and by the GMAs 
established with the voluntary joint planning initiated under SB 2.  SB 3 passed through 
the Senate but was unable to make it out of the House even with a committee substitute 
that diluted the bill by deleting all of the groundwater planning provisions.  A modified 
version of the groundwater planning provisions was salvaged via an eleventh-hour floor 
amendment authored by Representative Robbie Cook and Senator Robert Duncan that 




administrative procedures bill202 that included a substantially weakened version of the 
original joint groundwater-planning concept.   
House Bill 1763 (2005) 
Although weakened, HB 1763 represented a substantial shift in Texas 
groundwater policy by presenting profound changes in how groundwater was managed 
and how availability was determined.203  The substantial provisions saved from the failed 
SB 3 of the 79
th
 Legislative Session, in essence, served to provide the first step towards 
regionalized management of groundwater in Texas.  The product of what was salvaged in 
HB 1763 was a joint-regional groundwater planning process that required the 
collaboration of GCDs with overlapping area in the TWDB-designated GMAs.
204
  The 
GCDs were charged with collectively determining what aquifer conditions should be 
achieved or maintained in a 50-year planning window while providing for future 
demands – also known as Desired Future Conditions (DFCs).
205
  The TWDB would then 
make a best-science estimate of what groundwater was available under those conditions – 
also known as the Managed Available Groundwater (MAG).
206
  The MAG estimates, 
                                                 
202 Act of May 30, 2005, 79
th
 Leg., R.S., HB 1763 [hereinafter cited as HB 1763].  (The introduced version 
of HB 1763 was captioned as: ―relating to the notice, hearing, rulemaking, and permitting procedures for 
groundwater conservation districts.‖). 
203 Mace, supra note 81, at 1. 
204 TEX. WATER CODE §36.108 (prior to amendments codified with Act of May 29, 2011, 82
nd
 Leg. R.S., 
SB 660 [hereinafter cited as SB 660]). 
205 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §356.2(8).  (Definition was also codified by SB 660 in 2011 adding TEX. WATER 
CODE §36.001(30).  Term defines ―desired future conditions‖ in statute to mean a quantitative description, 
adopted in accordance with Section 36.108, of the desired future condition of the groundwater resources in 
a management area at one or more specified future times.). 
206 31 Tex. Amin. Code §365.2(13).  (Definition was also codified and revised by SB 660 and Act of April 
14, 2011, 82
nd




after accommodating estimates of exempt use, were in essence a pumpage cap, which 
arguably could not previously have been set or enforced by a GCD.207  These GCD-
derived availability estimates are then provided to the planning groups to be incorporated 
into the regional water plans.
208
  The process also provided a mechanism that allowed 
certain parties by petition to appeal the reasonableness of a DFC
209
 and to petition the 
implementation of a DFC by a GCD.
210
   
HB 1763 represented a significant step towards regionalization by establishing a 
framework that allowed for a ―widening of the net‖ to encompass larger aquifer-based 
planning areas and more coordinated groundwater management in Texas.  However, like 
much of the historical groundwater policy decisions in Texas, this weakened version of 
the groundwater planning process that was initially envisioned in the failed SB 3 was the 
product of political compromise with certain parties holding fast to local control and the 
existing GCD structure.   
Senate Bill 660 (2011) 
With the passage of HB 1763, GCDs and state agencies found themselves faced 
with unique challenges associated with implementing this unprecedented and arguably 
compromised groundwater-planning process.  These challenges began to emerge owing 
to a number of converging factors building up to the 82
nd
 Legislative Session in 2011 
                                                                                                                                                 
660 and SB 737 revised term from ―Managed Available Groundwater‖ to ―Modeled Available 
Groundwater‖.). 
207 Mace, supra note 81, at 3. 
208 TEX. WATER CODE §36.1071(b). 
209 TEX. WATER CODE §36.108(l) (prior to amendments codified by SB 660). 




including the adoption of the first round of DFCs under the relatively immature joint-
regional groundwater planning process,211 the debate over ownership of groundwater,212 
and the TWDB sunset review.
213
  Leading into the 82
nd
 legislative session, the Sunset 
Advisory Commission coincidently scheduled review of the TWDB providing an 
opportune vehicle for identifying several specific issues related to regional water 
planning including coordination between GCDs and RWPGs and the DFC adoption 
process.  The product of the Sunset Advisory Commission’s report and recommendations 
was SB 660, the TWDB’s sunset bill, which implemented several new provisions that 
substantially affected the joint-regional groundwater planning process.  The relevant 
provisions of the bill included:  
 adding a representative of each GMA that overlaps with each RWPG as a voting 
member of that RWPG;214   
 requiring that regional water plans be consistent with the DFCs for relevant 
aquifers in place at the time of adoption of State water plan in the subsequent 
water planning cycle; 215  
                                                 
211 TEX. WATER CODE §36.108(d).  (The deadline for submittal of the first round of DFCs was September 
1, 2010.). 
212 Leading up to the 82
nd
 Legislative Session, a group referring to themselves as ―Texans for Groundwater 
Rights‖ consisting primarily of the Farm Bureau, the Texas Wildlife Association, and the Texas and 
Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association, hosted seven forums across the state on groundwater ownership 
in an effort to build support for legislation that would reinforce the concept of groundwater as a real vested 
property right. 
213 B. Howe, Texas Farm Bureau: 82nd State Legislature Summary, 2(3) TEXAS WATER JOURNAL, 23-38 
(2011). 
214 §9 of SB 660. (codified as amendments to TEX. WATER CODE §16.053(c)).  




 substantially modifying the requirements for providing public notice of GMA 
meetings, public hearings, and opportunities for public comment on proposed 
DFCs; 
 allowing GMAs to appoint and convene nonvoting advisory committees to assist 
in development of DFCs; 
 allowing GMAs to request assistance from TWDB technical staff to serve as 
advisors in the development of DFCs. Changing term ―MAG‖ from ―Managed‖ to 
―Modeled‖ Available Groundwater;216 
 requiring that DFCs are proposed considering certain factors and the ―balance 
test‖;217 
 specifying procedure for consideration of proposed DFCs and DFC adoption; 
 requiring that each GCD update its management plan and rules to include goals 
and objectives consistent with achieving DFCs within certain deadlines; and 
 requiring that adopted DFCs be submitted with an explanatory documenting how 
certain factors218 were considered.  
                                                 
216  This amendment also incorporated changes codified by SB 737.  The provisions of SB 737 relegated 
the MAG to being one of several factors that GCDs must consider when issuing permits rather than a 
permitting cap as it was defined under HB 1763. This effectively shifts the emphasis from permitting 
within the MAG volumes to monitoring actual pumpage and the effects of pumpage on the DFC – a goal 
that can be much more nebulous and difficult to measure.  While the MAG remains relevant as the source 
of water availability estimates for regional water planning purposes, the shift in groundwater-planning 
emphasis places the role of the DFC into a more prominent position, becoming the focus of the planning 
process both in terms of determining planning goals and in driving development of regulatory policies and 
rules that preserve the DFC.  
217 §17 of SB 660.  (codified as amendments to TEX. WATER CODE §36.108(d-2))  (Each DFC adopted 
must ―provide a balance between the highest practicable level of groundwater production and the 




While most believed that the 82
nd
 Texas Legislative Session would be quiet 
relative to water matters, the build-up of emerging groundwater issues resulting from an 
immature, hastily-passed, and arguably compromised version of the failed SB 3 that 
passed via HB 1763 in 2005 coupled with the TWDB sunset review provided the 
motivation and means for substantial change.  SB 660 was successful in making 
sweeping revisions to the DFC adoption process that is now much more involved with a 
greater level of participation at the GCD level.  These most current changes make up the 
current process as it stands today.  And while some consider the modifications of SB 660 
to be an improvement, the greater involvement at the GCD level marks a step away from 
the previous trend towards regionalization by reinforcing GCD autonomy and relegating 
GMAs to lines on a map.  Moreover, the current product represents the many incremental 
and arduous attempts to evolve toward a regional groundwater management approach – 
an evolution that has been striving to simultaneously incorporate the logic of regional 
management while holding fast to the powerful and politically-motivated precedent of 
local control.  Although the efforts are commendable, the many half-attempts and 
compromised solutions aiming to achieve both may be proving to be unworkable.   
                                                                                                                                                 
218 §17 of SB 660.  (codified as amendments to TEX. WATER CODE §36.108)  (The specific factors to be 
considered in the DFC decision include:  aquifer uses and conditions, water supply needs, hydrological 
conditions (e.g. total estimated recoverable storage), other environmental impacts (e.g. springflow), the 
impact on subsidence, socioeconomic impacts, private property rights, the feasibility of achieving the 




3.3 REMAINING PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT PROCESS  
The incremental steps towards up-scaling from local management via GCDs have 
produced a compromised system where GCD representatives within common GMAs 
have been designated as the regional planners.  This system that has evolved towards a 
larger scale while holding fast to local control, although improved, falls short of 
regionalized groundwater management as defined in the policy proposal above.  That is, 
groundwater governance via institutions of sufficient areal extent to minimize 
hydrological disconnects and provide sufficient funds, authority, and resources to 
effectively manage the resource and equitably accommodate all affected actors to the 
maximum extent practicable.  As mentioned, the GMAs are merely lines on the map to 
determine which local GCDs are to collaborate.  Although a reasonably close proxy, it is 
not regionalization per se.  As a result, challenges remain.  The following section focuses 
on the new challenges of the current process as well as some of the challenges described 
in Chapter 2 that remain unresolved.   
3.3.1 Unfunded Mandates 
Chapter 2 describes the limited funding and resources available to GCDs as a 
result of the nature of the funding mechanisms and the economies of scale that are 
precluded by institutions with insufficient areal extent.  As Texas began to recognize and 
develop a system of regional-scale groundwater planning, policy makers failed to make 
any strides towards providing adequate resources and funding.  To the contrary, the role 




process increased in complexity and new GCD responsibilities were added, requiring a 
much greater level of effort.  
For example, the process modifications, notice requirements, and new procedures 
for considering non-GCD input in adopting DFCs became much more involved with the 
provisions codified by SB 660.219  The changes, by opening up the process to be more 
inclusive, transparent, and accountable, are improvements in concept, however, there is 
an associated cost to GCDs in terms of both time and money that is now much more 
substantial.  Notifications, hearings, supporting materials, and the required reports require 
time and effort to prepare and distribute which are incurred solely by the GCD 
representatives and GCD staffs.  The additional responsibilities required by statute 
without funding describe the classic unfunded mandate.  The new time and effort 
commitments required will be felt as opportunity costs by diverting the limited resources 
away from groundwater management responsibilities and towards fulfilling these new 
unfunded mandates.  SB 660 did include provisions to make technical staff from TWDB 
available to assist in development of DFCs, however, the Legislature in the same session 
slashed the TWDB technical budgets and staff,220 rendering the assistance offered under 
this provision to be highly improbable.221   As is, the groundwater planning process has 
become a much more complex and resource-intensive unfunded mandate that has been 
                                                 
219 R. Mace, How the 82nd Legislature Changed (and Didn't Change) the Desired Future Conditions 
Process, INTERNATIONAL TEXAS WATER LAW CONFERENCE, at M2-3 (September 15-16, 2011). 
220 Id. at M2-8.  (―The Groundwater Technical Assistance Section suffered a 50 percent reduction in 
staffing, a 100 percent reduction in groundwater grants, and a 75% reduction in operating budget‖.).  
221 Id. at M2-8. (―Unless [GCDs] have in-house expertise, [GCDs] will most likely have to use existing 




placed squarely on the backs of the GCD representatives but with no additional authority 
or means to fulfill it. 
 The mandates may also have the effect of further eroding the already weakened 
institutional resilience of GCDs.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, the resources of 
underfunded GCDs are predicted to be further stressed as they work out the nuances of 
balancing private property rights and satisfying the statutory responsibilities of preserving 
and conserving groundwater resources.   The additional responsibilities of SB 660 may 
create increased risk by requiring such exhaustive reporting and documentation of DFC 
decisions – documentation that may also serve as litigious ammunition to those that may 
be looking to challenge GCD authority.  The sum total of the additional responsibilities 
and uncertainty has led some reviewers to question the ability of many GCDs to continue 
to exist, even suggesting that GCDs are being set up to fail to make room for statewide 
management of groundwater.222 
3.3.2 Inadequate Representation/Stakeholder Involvement  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a key principle for common-pool resource 
management institutions is to have ―collective choice arrangements‖ meaning that those 
affected by management decisions need to be included in the decision making.  This 
principle was recognized in 2000 in the Senate Natural Resources Committee’s Interim 
                                                 
222 T. L. Brown, Groundwater Issues and the 82nd Legislative Session. INTERNATIONAL TEXAS WATER 
LAW CONFERENCE, at 15 (September 15-16, 2011).  (―Groundwater Districts have been seriously 
underfunded from the beginning.  It is ironic for a legislative body like the Texas Legislature, which 
bitterly resents mandates from the federal government, to heap new cost mandates on districts, to the 
extent, I wonder how many will be able to survive.  Perhaps that is the Legislature’s ultimate objective, the 




Charges Report to the 77th Legislature, wherein the committee identified the need to 
advance stakeholder participation in water management policy as ―the fundamental tenet 
of SB 1.‖223  In the current regional planning process, this involves both the stakeholders 
of the GMA and the RWPGs that are responsible for incorporating the results.  In their 
review of the TWDB, the Sunset Advisory Commission identified several issues related 
to inadequate RWPG representation224 and stakeholder involvement. 
As mentioned, the voting members of GMAs are solely made up of 
representatives from the GCDs located wholly or partially within the GMA.225  RWPGs, 
on the other hand, include representation from a broader range of specified interests.226  
This arrangement was described in the Sunset Commission’s staff report as a disconnect 
that allows GCDs with representation on RWPGs to have input into the RWPG decisions 
but provides no opportunity for RWPGs to provide input into GMA decisions on DFCs.  
To address the issues, the Legislature implemented provisions via SB 660 to add a 
representative of each GMA that overlaps with each RWPG as a voting member of that 
RWPG.  This was the reverse of the arrangement recommended in the Commission staff 
report where RWPG members would have been appointed to GMAs to offer input into 
DFC decisions.  While SB 660 was an attempt to improve planning coordination, the new 
provisions may have missed the mark.  The end result is that the voting members of 
                                                 
223 SENATE INTERIM COMM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 74, at 33. 
224 SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION, TEX. WATER DEV. BD. - SUNSET COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, at 3 
(July 2011).  (The staff report noted the lack of coordination between the Regional Water Planning process 
and the Joint-Regional Groundwater Planning process and specifically called out problems related to the 
composition of the voting members of GMAs relative to RWPGs.). 
225 TEX. WATER CODE §36.108(c). 




GMAs continue to be made up solely of GCDs while the number of GCD representatives 
on RWPGs will likely increase.  The potential unintended consequences may be a 
disproportionate level of GCD representation in RWPG decision-making and the 
continued perception of planning process disconnects owing to the lack of RWPG 
representation in GMAs.   
 With GCDs remaining as the sole voting members in GMA planning decisions, 
there is little opportunity for affected stakeholders to have their say.  The Sunset 
Advisory Commission addressed this in their report commenting that notification of 
GMA meetings was too limited to invite meaningful input and concluded ―stakeholders 
may be unaware of the DFC process and the potential effects of DFCs on their 
groundwater resources.‖227  The Legislature responded via SB 660 by providing 
opportunities for public comment, by requiring more notification of meetings and 
hearings, and by allowing GMAs to appoint nonvoting advisory committees at their 
discretion.  While this increases the opportunity for public input, it falls short of 
providing for adequate stakeholder involvement in DFC decisions.  It is interesting to 
note that recommendations of the staff report, which would have included a RWPG 
representative on GMAs, would have moved the GMAs incrementally closer to what was 
contemplated in 2005 in the failed SB 3 with its proposal for creation of GMA Councils 
(GMACs).  As mentioned, the GMACs not only included RWGP representation but also 
had voting membership dedicated to certain stakeholders.   
                                                 




And perhaps the most egregious example of insufficient representation occurs in 
those areas of the state that are not within the jurisdiction of any GCD (Figure 7).  These 
so-called ―unprotected areas‖ are without GCD coverage and therefore are without 
representation and a vote in the groundwater planning process.  Further, pumping in these 
areas is unregulated and, similarly, groundwater conditions are generally not monitored.  
Both of these factors impact the ability of a GMA to achieve a DFC with any level of 
confidence.228   
3.3.3 Hydrological Disconnects and Local Politics 
On its face, joint-regional planning via aquifer-based GMAs is a commendable 
attempt at reconciling any hydrological disconnects that may occur among the disparate 
GCDs and management approaches.  However, as additional evidence of compromise, 
the joint-regional groundwater planning process created under HB 1763 allowed the 
voting members of GMAs to establish DFCs for subdivisions of a GMA that may be 
based on different ―geographic areas‖ overlying an aquifer provided that use or aquifer 
conditions differ substantially from one area to another.
229 
  This concession had the 
potential to allow local politics to seep back into the decision-making.  In anticipation of 
how this may be interpreted, the TWDB has warned that dividing a GMA into smaller 
and smaller subdivisions using county or GCD boundaries may further complicate the 
                                                 
228 SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, Implementation of House Bill 1763 and Groundwater 
Management in Texas, INTERIM REPORT TO THE 81ST LEGISLATURE, at 5 (2009). 






  Such subdivisions, unless established on a natural basis such as aquifer 
subdivisions/sub-basins or hydrologically connected areas, could have the effect of 
increasing the likelihood that DFCs in adjacent subdivisions may be incompatible, which 
is the situation this process was attempting to resolve.
231 
  
The engrained tendency to regress back into county-based planning has proved to 
be realized in the first round of the process that concluded on September 10, 2010, with 
certain GCDs (counties) submitting DFCs based on objectives in conflict with objectives 
of adjacent GCDs and those DFCs adopted by the GMA. GMA 1 adopted three DFCs for 
the three ―geographic areas‖ that encompassed the 18 counties overlying the Ogallala 
Aquifer in the Texas Panhandle (Figure 10).  The DFCs were:  40% of groundwater 
volume remaining in storage in 50 years (―40/50‖) for Dallam, Sherman, Hartley, and 
Moore County and 50% volume of groundwater remaining in storage in 50 years 
(―50/50‖) in all the remaining counties except for Hemphill County.  A third DFC was 
adopted for Hemphill County to have 80% volume of groundwater remaining in storage 
in 50 years.232  This Hemphill County DFC, which allows greater pumping from 
geographic areas on three sides of the county, was challenged as being unreasonable 
                                                 
230 Petrossian, supra note 109, at 1. 
231 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §356.2(8).  (The only limitation of DFCs established by TWDB rules for 
different geographic areas is that the conditions are physically possible, both individually and collectively.). 
232 Panhandle Regional Planning Commission, Water Planning, 




because of the use of political boundaries but was ultimately upheld and accepted as a 
reasonable DFC.233   
Prior to the TWDB decision to accept county-based GCDs, there was much 
debate over the interpretation of ―geographic area‖ allowing the use of political 
boundaries for establishing DFCs.234  SB 660 later included provisions that further 
reinforced this interpretation and the tendency to resort to county-based planning by 
amending the statute to allow proposed DFCs based on a number of considerations other 
than hydrogeological conditions.235  HB 1755 was filed in the same session to clarify that 
                                                 
233 M. O. Knisely, Litigation Update, INTERNATIONAL TEXAS WATER LAW CONFERENCE, at A-9-10 
(September 15-16, 2011).  (―Mesa Water, L.P. and G&J Ranch, who had invested considerably in 
groundwater rights in the affected area, filed a petition in accordance with the relatively untested petition 
process codified by HB 1763 (citation omitted) contending that the Hemphill County DFC was 
unreasonable.  The petitioners alleged that the DFCs were unreasonable because they were based on the 
boundaries of a political subdivision.  They also alleged that the DFC preserving 80% of groundwater in 
storage would constitute a taking of the groundwater of the overlying landowners by allowing drainage by 
surrounding areas governed by more liberal DFCs.‖). 
234 See Jones, supra note 3, at 7.  (―The term ―political subdivision‖ is defined in both Section 35.001 and 
Section 36.001, but is omitted from Section 36.108(d). In terms of statutory construction, then, a political 
subdivision is not a proper basis for differential desired future conditions. Given the serious lack of 
direction about ―geographic areas‖ in Section 36.108, what has been the experience to date in designating 
desired future conditions? Not surprisingly, groundwater conservation districts have construed the term 
―geographic area‖ to mean that political subdivisions, whether districts as a whole or counties within 
districts, can be the basis for different DFCs. By seizing upon the ―geographic area‖ language, the districts 
continue the pattern of attempting to regulate something less than the entire aquifer over which they lie.‖).  
See also Mace, supra note 81, at 4.  (―The meaning of ―geographic area‖ is not clear and could include a 
number of surficial factors.‖); A. E. Soukhanov, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language, (third edition ed.) (1992).  (Mace goes further to cite Soukhanov who defines ―geographic‖ as 
(1) of or relating to geography or (2) concerning the topography of a Region. The relevant definition for 
―geography‖ is: the physical characteristics, especially the surface features, of an area.)  (Author’s note:  
Importantly, none of these definitions include political considerations.). 
235 §17 of SB 660 (codified as amendments to TEX. WATER CODE §36.108(d)).  (This section of SB 660 
included nine factors for DFC consideration, only one of which was hydrological conditions.  The other 
factors are: aquifer uses, water supply needs, other environmental impacts (e.g. springflow), the impact on 





DFCs were to be based on hydrogeologic conditions, however, it was unsuccessful.236  
The contrasting direction of the successful SB 660, that allows for politically-defined 
―geographic areas‖ and the failed HB 1755 that attempted to reinforce the original intent 
of reconciling the hydrological disconnects is again evidence of the retreat away from the 
logic and importance of fit.  This again reinforced the pattern of holding fast to local 
control despite the recognized logic and attempt to move towards regionalization. 
                                                 
236  82
nd
 Leg., R.S., HB 1755 (hereinafter cited as HB 1755).  (HB 1755 filed by Representative Callegari 
attempted to reinforce the use of aquifers and aquifer subdivisions as the basis for DFCs by deleting the 
option of using ―geographic areas‖ and by defining aquifer subdivisions as: ―a definable part of a 
groundwater reservoir in which the groundwater supply will not be appreciably affected by withdrawing 
water from any other part of the reservoir, as indicated by known geological and hydrological conditions 






Figure 10: GMA 1 with adopted DFCs.  Percentages indicate the volume of 
groundwater to remain in storage in 50 years.   
3.4 AND THE BEAT GOES ON… 
Since the GCD Act in 1949, the need to reconcile the groundwater management 
issues in Texas has become a perennial issue in the Legislature.  These efforts only 
intensified in 1997 when the single-county GCD issue was recognized and was brought 
to front and center.  Despite the exhaustive efforts to find a balance between local 
pressure to maintain county-based control and the recognized importance of fit and 
advantages of regionalization, the issue remains unresolved.  And true to form, it is once 
again front and center as evidenced by the Senate Natural Resource Committee’s Interim 
Charges for the 82
nd




Study and make recommendations on the management of groundwater resources. 
Specifically, consider the following: 
 Consolidation of groundwater conservation districts along major aquifer lines 
in an effort to increase efficiency and enhance responsible groundwater 
management; 
 Effectiveness of single-county and non-contiguous groundwater conservation 
districts; 
The recurrent theme is apparent and begs consideration of a wholesale embrace of 
regionalization.  The directives of the Legislature since the problem was simultaneously 
recognized and allowed to proliferate in 1999 have consistently brought attention to the 
matter, but never before has the need for regionalization been so boldly called out as it 
was in the interim charges.  If the pattern holds, however, the likelihood of such bold 
reform will be slim.   Advancement, if any, will likely be in the form of continued 





Chapter 4: Models for Regional Groundwater Management 
If Texas is to seriously consider ―increasing efficiency and enhancing responsible 
groundwater management‖ as directed by the Lieutenant Governor in the Senate Natural 
Resource Committee’s interim charges for the 82
nd
 Legislative Session described in the 
previous chapter, it will have to recognize the advantages of regionalization.  As 
elaborated elsewhere in this thesis, regionalization is intended to serve as a policy 
proposal that directly addresses this acknowledged necessity by respecting the 
importance of fit and taking advantage of the efficiency that accompanies a larger 
regional-scale management approach.  The concept is not unprecedented.  In fact, there 
are several examples of resource management via regional-scale institutions that have 
been applied by other states and even in Texas that may serve as models for 
regionalization.  This chapter describes several successful examples, followed by a 
discussion of institutional design and management principles that may be gleaned and 
applied for the purpose of improving groundwater management in Texas.  
4.1 STATE MODELS FOR REGIONALIZATION 
The states of Nebraska and Arizona are examples of other states that have 
incorporated region-scale groundwater institutions into their water management regimes.  
They are largely considered successful approaches that may offer valuable insights to 
incorporating regionalization in Texas.  The following section provides a brief summary 





4.1.1 Groundwater Management in Nebraska 
 The State of Nebraska is blessed with an abundance of groundwater supplied from 
the High Plains Aquifer – the nation’s largest underground reservoir. 237  The aquifer 
consists primarily of consolidated and unconsolidated sand and gravel and in most of the 
state the water table is near and in some areas hydraulically connected to the land 
surface.238  Water wells withdrawing groundwater from this prolific aquifer are used to 
support an extensive irrigated agriculture economy.239  Even with this abundant 
groundwater supply, the high demands on the groundwater associated with irrigated 
agriculture have resulted in issues such as overdrafting in the western parts of the state 
and effects on intrastate surface water rights from the Republican River, both issues of 
which are exacerbated by periodic severe droughts.240   
Prior to 1975, groundwater was managed by piecemeal judicial actions, limited 
legislative action, and a somewhat unique variation of the reasonable-use doctrine.241  In 
                                                 
237 M. E. Kelly, Nebraska's Evolving Water Law, Challenges and Opportunities - Part I, THE WATER 
REPORT, at 9  (D. Moon, & D. Light, eds., November 15, 2010).  (The High Plains Aquifer is currently 
estimated to store about three billion acre-feet of water of which Nebraska contains 37% of the land area 
and 65% of the total volume. 
238 R.B. Flay & T. Narasimhan, Centralized versus Decentralized Approaches to Groundwater 
Management in the Western United States: How Hydrologic and Political Forces Shaped Management, at 
3. (2005),  (―Where the stream-valley aquifers overlie the High Plains aquifer, they are connected 
hydraulically to the aquifer and are considered to be part of it.‖). 
239 Kelly, supra note 237, at 11.  (Nebraska contains the most land of any state in the country under 
irrigation accounting for over 80% of the state water withdrawals (excluding hydropower and power plant 
cooling) from 106,000 irrigation wells.) 
240 Id. at 11. 
241 Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 46, at 287.  See also Ashley & Smith, supra note 49, at 9.  (The 
conventional reasonable use doctrine is considered a modified rule of capture that limits water captured to a 
―reasonable‖ use that is appurtenant or limited to use on the overlying tract.).  See also Olson v. City of 




1967, the Nebraska Legislature authorized the creation of rural water districts for the 
purpose of limited regulation of storage, transport, and use of water supplies.  By 1969, 
more than 150 of these small, locally oriented and rather disparate districts had formed.242  
In 1969, the Legislature took the bold step of reorganizing the many small districts into 
23 regional-scale Natural Resources Districts (NRDs) that were oriented generally along 
basin boundaries (Figure 11) and assigned a variety of responsibilities including soil and 
water conservation, erosion control, drainage, rural water supply, recreation, forestry, 
range management, and wildlife habitat.243 
 
Figure 11: Map of the Nebraska Natural Resources Districts.  (Source:  Nebraska 
Department of Natural Resources) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
correlative rights or an entitlement to a ―reasonable portion of the whole‖ when the ―natural underground 
supply is insufficient to all owners.‖). 
242 Ashley & Smith, supra note 49, at 160.   




 In 1975, NRDs were empowered by the Nebraska Groundwater Management Act 
(NGMA) with a range of authorities to manage groundwater.244  Most of the groundwater 
management within the NRDs occurs within the designated groundwater management 
areas245  (not to be confused with Texas GMAs) that are established to address declining 
water levels and/or conjunctive management issues.246  Within these groundwater 
management areas, NRDs must develop management plans defining ―groundwater 
reservoir life goals‖247 and may implement certain controls including establishing total 
permissible withdrawals, mandatory rotation systems, well-spacing requirements, well 
metering requirements, and moratoria on new well drilling if needed.  Although Nebraska 
has vested NRDs with a strong voice in determining groundwater policy, critics of NRDs 
have suggested that there had been a general reluctance or political will to implement this 
authority.248  State legislation passed in 2004 to facilitate compliance with the multi-state 
                                                 
244 Ashley & Smith, supra note 49, at 160.  (In 1975, the Nebraska Ground Water Management Act 
(NGMA) was passed in response to the escalating problems of overdrafting and surface diversions resulting 
from pumping.  The authority of NRD’s is derived primarily from the Act and subsequent amendments.). 
245 NEB. REV. STATUTES §46-673.  (NRDs may designate ―groundwater management areas‖ as control 
areas within NRDs if it was determined ―that there is an inadequate groundwater supply to meet present or 
reasonably foreseeable needs of a beneficial use of such water supply.‖   These areas may also be 
established for the purpose of integrating management of groundwater and surface water.)   
246 Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 46, at 288.  (―About fifty percent of the state is included within 
a special groundwater management area.‖). 
247 NEB. REV. STATUTES §46-709.  (Requires the development of management plans that specify 
―groundwater reservoir life goals‖ defining ―the finite or infinite period of time which a district establishes 
as its goal for maintenance of the supply and quality of water in a groundwater reservoir at the time a 
groundwater management plan is adopted‖.  NRDs must identify these goals for the purpose of determining 
long-term groundwater availability and for directing the management efforts of the NRD.) Author’s note:  
Similarly, Texas GMAs are tasked with establishing ―desired future conditions‖ which are the basis of 
groundwater availability through the MAG determination. 
248 Kelly, supra note 237, at 14.  (Kelly states:  ―…before 2004, most NRDs had not exercised the powers 
provided under the NGMA and subsequent amendments.‖  Kelly reinforces this statement by quoting 
Professor David Aiken who states that as of 2005, only three of the 23 NRDs (Upper Republican, Middle 




Republican River Compact, however, has forced NRDs to be more active by creating 
more responsibility and by compelling NRDs to integrate surface and groundwater 
management through the regulation of groundwater withdrawals that affect surface water 
flows, particularly in the Republican River.249      
Principles and Findings Applicable to Texas Groundwater Management 
Consolidate existing GCDs into GMAs:  GMAs are similar to NRDs in that both are 
regional-scale entities formed along lines dictated by the resource (i.e. river basins for 
NRDs and major aquifers for GMAs).250  If the Texas Legislature were so inclined, it 
could act as the Nebraska Legislature did in 1969 when it reorganized the many small 
scale and disparate rural water districts into the more logically organized and larger scale 
NRD jurisdictions that are in place today.  Texas has incrementally evolved towards a 
system where regional GMAs are in place to coordinate planning efforts.  A similar effort 
by the Texas Legislature could reorganize all GCDs and recast the GMA areas as the 16 
regional groundwater management authorities to provide coordinated, active management 
over the major aquifers in the State (Figure 12).  This would address problems of fit that 
typically occur with politically drawn districts over shared aquifers.   
                                                                                                                                                 
at 163-164.  (―This appears to be largely related to the influence of rural agriculture interests that is so 
strong that some have referred to NRDs as ―irrigators clubs.‖). 
249 Kelly, supra note 237, at 14-19.  (The passing of LB 962 in 2004 LB 962 is considered by many as a 
very progressive and long overdue recognition of the interconnectivity of surface and groundwater 
resources in Nebraska.  It has also been suggested that active management by NRDs would not have 
progressed without the legislative mandate as a driver.).   
250 In terms of groundwater management, it is worth noting that NRDs are based on surface water basins 
and not aquifers.  This does not appear to hinder groundwater management because all NRDs are tasked 





Figure 12: The proposed delineation of regional groundwater management authorities 






Provide GCD authority to GMAs:  A Texas GMA is not an entity on the order of a NRD 
but more of a delineation of major aquifer systems for the purpose of identifying which 
GCDs have to jointly plan.  A GMA has no authority, no representation (outside of 
member GCDs), or funding.  Conversely, NRDs are relatively autonomous multipurpose 
districts that have equivalent powers and purpose of GCDs with the resources 
commensurate with the larger scale area within their jurisdiction.  If current GCDs are 
consolidated into their respective GMAs, these regional institutions could be empowered, 
as are NRDs, to subdivide their respective areas to manage specific areas of decline, sub-
basins within aquifers, or vertically (i.e. hydrostratigraphically) separate aquifers.  The 
larger scale will also minimize the presence of transboundary situations over the minor 
aquifer systems while creating the economies of scale needed to provide sufficient 
funding to facilitate aquifer studies and effective management programs.  
Facilitate Conjunctive Surface and Groundwater Management:  Texas would be well 
served to acknowledge conjunctive management of surface and groundwater in a more 
explicit manner, as has Nebraska.  As it stands currently, the surface and groundwater 
connection is only marginally acknowledged in Texas.251  There is, however, an 
opportunity for Texas to further unify the management of surface water and groundwater 
through the joint regional groundwater planning process by including conjunctive 
                                                 
251 R. Kaiser, Conjunctive Management and Use of Surface Water and Groundwater Resources, at 3 
(2011).   
(TEX. WATER CODE §11.021, makes reference to ―underflow‖ by designating underflow as part of the 
surface water resources that are property of the state).  Ostensibly, this provision would apply to the stored 
water in the river system alluvia and would require diversion of underflow in the accounting of river-basin 




management objectives in the determination of desired future conditions (DFCs).   DFC 
decisions could consider surface water conditions such as preservation of springflow or 
baseflow in river systems, particularly where hydrologically connected aquifers and 
surface waters are present within a GMA.  Facilitating conjunctive management in this 
way would mean that Texas does not have to completely reinvent the current bifurcated 
system by choosing either GMAs or RWPGs as the singular management entity 
comparable to NRDs.  The two can coexist within the existing arrangement where GMAs 
determine available groundwater supplies via the joint groundwater planning process and 
where RWPGs continue as the primary water planning entity responsible for aggregating 
all data on water supplies, demands, and developing future water supply strategies.  
As a practical matter, Nebraska had the foresight to reorganize the many small 
districts back in 1969 when supplies were abundant and problems associated with intense 
groundwater use had not yet emerged.  Moreover, this abundance of supply and rather 
recent implementation of pumping management and restrictions has not been subject to 
the same sort of litigious history, as have GCDs in Texas.  That is, the common law 
related to groundwater management is relatively immature in Nebraska.  Conversely, 
there is a substantial body of common and statutory law in Texas that would render non-
incremental change to its groundwater management approach difficult from both a 




4.1.2 Groundwater Management in Arizona 
 The State of Arizona relies on a mix of surface and groundwater supplies.252  The 
major surface water supplies available253 are dependent upon annual precipitation (both 
rain and snow) which is highly variable and unreliable in a largely desert environment.254 
This variability coupled with the full appropriation of surface water rights have created a 
heavy reliance on the groundwater resources to make up for shortfalls in years when 
surface water is exhausted.255  The dominant water demand in Arizona has long been 
irrigated agriculture, however, the amount of irrigated acreage has been on the decline as 
urbanization encroaches into rural areas.256  The trend is likely to continue with continued 
urbanization and in response to overdrafting of the aquifers and the resulting groundwater 
management measures that have been implemented and new water sources that have been 
developed (further discussion below).  
 Similar to Texas and Nebraska, Arizona’s surface water and groundwater 
resources are allocated and regulated according to separate doctrines.  Surface water was 
                                                 
252 R. P. Maguire, Patching the Holes in the Bucket: Safe Yield and the Future of Water Management in 
Arizona, 49 ARIZ. L. REV., 361, at 363, (2007).  (―Today [2007], groundwater makes up approximately 
40% of the state’s water budget, surface water makes up about 58%, and effluent the remaining 
2%.‖(citation omitted)). 
253 Ashley & Smith, supra note 49, at 188.  (―Major sources of surface water in Arizona include the 
Colorado, Gila, Salt, Aqua Fria, and Verde Rivers.‖). 
254 Maguire, supra note 252, at 363.  (―Climate models and dendrohydrology (tree ring) studies suggest the 
possibility of the recurrence of mega-droughts that may be exacerbated by climate change making these 
surface sources even more unreliable.‖).   
255 Ashley & Smith, supra note 49, at 188.   
256 Ashley & Smith, supra note 49, at 190.  (The percentage of groundwater use for irrigated agriculture 




allocated from the outset on the basis of prior appropriation257 while groundwater 
allocation evolved through case law into the doctrine of Absolute Ownership tempered by 
the Reasonable Use doctrine.258  Little progress was made to address the overdrafting 
problem that had developed as a result of the limited groundwater management afforded 
under this doctrine until the Arizona Legislature passed the Arizona Groundwater 
Management Act (AGMA) in 1980.  The AGMA was intended to ―…provide a 
framework for the comprehensive management and regulation of the withdrawal, 
transportation, use, conservation, and conveyance of rights to use groundwater in this 
state.‖259  The AGMA, which received much acclaim for its innovative approach to 
groundwater management, 260 addressed three primary goals: 1) control severe overdraft 
in many parts of the state, 2) provide a means to allocate the state’s limited groundwater 
                                                 
257 J. L. Sax, B.H. Thompson, J. D. Leshy, & R. H. Abrams, Legal Control of Water Resources - Case 
Materials (Fourth Edition ed.), at 417 (2006).  (The Prior Appropriation Doctrine is characterized as ―first 
in time, first in right‖ meaning that water rights that were put to use (perfected) earlier in time have priority 
over later rights.). 
258 Ashley & Smith, supra note 49, at 191. (Absolute ownership (similar to the Rule of Capture) was 
adopted as common law for groundwater in 1904 by the Arizona Territorial Supreme Court in their ruling 
in Howard v. Perrin.  This was not considered imprudent given the few competing demands for 
groundwater at the time.  The issue was again revisited in 1952 when, for a brief time, the Arizona 
Supreme Court overturned absolute ownership, established groundwater as property of the state, and 
adopted prior appropriation as common law doctrine in their ruling in Bristor v. Cheatham (Bristor I).  That 
decision was reheard and overturned the following year in Bristor II in response to ―big pumpers‖ concerns 
over the effect of limiting groundwater on their investment.  The product of this decision was the adoption 
of absolute ownership tempered by reasonable use as the common law doctrine.).   
259 ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. §45-401(B). 
260 Maguire, supra note 252, at 361.  (―in 1986, the Ford Foundation even recognized the [A]GMA as one 
of the ten most innovative programs in state and local government.‖).  See also S. Olson, Arizona Water 
Management Issues, THE WATER REPORT, at 11  (D. Moon, & D. Light, eds., October 15, 2009).  (―Olsen 
quotes Bruce Babbit as stating: ―The progress Arizona has made toward effective management of its water 




resources, and 3) augment Arizona’s groundwater through water supply development.261  
This would be accomplished by establishing the Arizona Department of Water Resources 
(DWR) as well as regional groundwater management institutions to freeze the growth of 
irrigation in ―Irrigation Non-Expansion Areas‖ and to address severe overdraft in ―Active 
Management Areas‖ (AMAs).   
 The AMAs were established with the most comprehensive management 
provisions because of the magnitude of regional overdrafting in the areas.  Importantly, 
these AMAs were created using boundaries based on the hydrogeography of the 
groundwater basins (Figure 13) giving proper consideration to the importance of fit.262  
Each of the AMAs is further divided into sub-basins to reflect the unique hydrological 
conditions of each AMA (Figure 14).263  Four of the five AMAs that have been created 
under the AGMA (the Phoenix, Prescott, Tucson, and the Santa Cruz AMAs) have been 
established with management goals on the basis of safe-yield264 in an effort to ensure 
sustainable water supplies in the urban and urbanizing areas.265   
                                                 
261 Arizona Department of Water Resources (hereinafter cited as ADWR), Overview of the Arizona 
Groundwater Management Code, at 1, www.azwater.gov/asdwr/watermanagement (last visited June 15, 
2012). 
 
262 Maguire, supra note 252, at 367.   
263 ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. §45-411.  (Statute created initial AMAs with sub-basins within each AMA).   
264 ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. §45-561.  (Code defined ―safe yield‖ as ―a goal that attempts to achieve and 
thereafter maintain a long-term balance between the annual amount of natural and artificial recharge in the 
AMA.‖). 
265 S. Olson, Arizona Water Management Issues, THE WATER REPORT, at 11  (D. Moon, & D. Light, eds., 






Figure 13: Arizona's Active Management Areas (AMAs). (Source:  Arizona 
Department of Water Resources) 
The key provisions applicable to AMA management as summarized by the 
Arizona DWR include: 
 Establishment of a program of groundwater rights and permits including 
permitting exemptions for certain grandfathered rights and exempt wells.266  
 Prohibition of irrigation of new agricultural lands within an AMA.267 
                                                 
266 ADWR, supra note 261, at 2.  (grandfathered and exempt wells are primarily wells in use before the 
AGMA and wells incapable of producing more than 35 gallons per minute). 




 A requirement of AMAs to establish management plans to meet the conservation 
goals of each of the five designated management periods.268 
 A requirement of AMAs to require each new development within an AMA to 
demonstrate a 100-year assured water supply (AWS) for new growth.269   
 A requirement to meter water pumped from all large wells and report annual 
withdrawals. 
These provisions governing AMAs coupled with the safe-yield goals have been 
successful in shifting existing demand away from irrigation and future demand towards 
renewable and more innovative water supplies and management strategies.  Some of 
these strategies include effluent reuse, long distance surface water diversions (i.e. the 
Central Arizona and Salt River Projects), groundwater replenishment and storage, 
demand management measures, and water rights retirement incentives.270  AMAs are 
funded by fees assessed by the Arizona DWR and are managed by an area director271 
                                                 
268 Id. at 4.  (The AGMA requires the Arizona DWR to set mandatory conservation goals for municipal, 
industrial, and agricultural users that are increasingly more stringent over time.  The scheduled increase in 
conservation and the concomitant reduction in groundwater dependence are implemented via measures 
outlined in management plans adopted by each AMA for five generally decade-long management periods 
beginning in 1980 and ending in 2025.). 
269 Olson, supra note 265, at 13-14.  (An AWS must demonstrate sufficient water of adequate quality that 
will be physically, legally, and continuously available to satisfy the needs of the proposed use for at least 
100 years.). 
270 Olson, supra note 265, at 13-14.  (The AWS rule has spawned the creation of institutions such as the 
Central Arizona Groundwater Replenishment District and the Arizona Water Banking Authority that 
provide mechanisms that allow members and participants to contribute to funding water supply and 
replenishment projects as a way of demonstrating AWS.). 
271 ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. §45-419.  (Duties of area director include: 1) assist the Arizona DWR 
director in the development and implementation of the management plan for the active management area 





with direction from Groundwater Users Advisory Councils appointed by the Governor to 
give area groundwater users a voice in the AMA’s management and policy decisions.272   
                                                 
272 ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. §45-420. (Code establishes a Groundwater Users Advisory Council 
(GUAC) in each active management area consisting of five members. Members of the council are 
appointed by the governor to represent the users of groundwater in the active management area and on the 
basis of their knowledge of, interest in and experience with problems relating to the development, use and 
conservation of water.  Duties of the GUAC include: 1) make recommendations on groundwater 
management plans, programs, and policies; 2) provide comment on the groundwater withdrawal fees and 
the expenditure of funds; and 3) manifest and record its official actions by motion, resolution or other 





Figure 14: Map of Pinal County AMA.  The AMA provides an example of the 
subdivision of AMAs into the sub-basins based on the unique hydrological 






Principles and Findings Applicable to Texas Groundwater Management 
Consolidate Existing GCDs in Designated PGMAs:  Although there are some similarities 
between Arizona AMAs and Texas GCDs, Arizona’s use of AMAs may better resemble 
the Priority Groundwater Management Areas (PGMAs) of Texas with one important 
exception noted below.  Like Arizona, Texas is tasked under the PGMA program to 
identify areas that are experiencing or expected to experience groundwater problems.  
These areas are designated as PGMAs for the purpose of initiating the creation of GCDs.  
Like AMAs, PGMAs are also regional in scale and generally delineated based on the 
hydrogeography of the aquifer that it overlies (Figure 1).  However, instead of creating 
smaller GCDs to infill the PGMA (Figure 6), Texas could follow the Arizona example by 
using these areas as the basis for creating similar regional-scale management entities and 
consolidating the existing GCDs within the PGMA into a single management entity.   
If applied in Texas, a reevaluation of all of the major aquifers, including areas in 
existing GCDs, would be needed to assess areas in need of ―active management.‖  As 
mentioned, current PGMAs were designated to initiate GCD creation.  As such, areas 
within GCD jurisdictions are not considered for PGMA designation.  A reevaluation 
could take into account current and projected aquifer conditions and the efficacy of the 
existing GCDs and recommend consolidation where the limitations of small-scale GCDs 
restrict effective management.  To provide maximum management logic and flexibility, 
the regionalized management areas could also be further subdivided into sub-basins 




subdivisions to areas based on hydrogeography would avoid a reversion back to 
politically oriented alliances and the hydrological disconnects currently allowed by the 
DFC process in ―geographic areas.‖   
These new regional-scale entities would be a logical step based on 1) a confirmed 
critical groundwater management need within a common aquifer, 2) the conformity with 
the hydrogeography of the aquifer in need of management, and 3) the economies of scale 
afforded and funding generated by larger scale entities.  
Mandated Safe-Yield Planning Goals:  In terms of planning, Arizona’s AMAs are like 
both Nebraska NRDs and Texas GMAs in that they are tasked with setting long-term 
planning goals that are to dictate the outcomes as to how groundwater is to be managed.  
In comparison, the ―desired future conditions‖ and ―groundwater reservoir life goals‖ of 
Texas and Nebraska, respectively, are similar in that they are policies that may be 
variable and based on the priorities and value judgments of the policy makers.  
Conversely, the majority of AMAs specify very prescriptive ―safe-yield‖ goals that are 
established by statute.  Without a statutory driver, there can be a tendency for planning 
goals established at the local level (e.g. DFCs set by GCDs in a GMA) to be set to 
accommodate the status quo and continue to benefit those that stand to gain from 
overdrafting.  For certain aquifers in Texas (e.g., the Ogallala/High Plains Aquifer) 
conditions may realistically preclude a safe-yield planning goal.273  For other aquifers, the 
                                                 
273  PANHANDLE WATER PLANNING AREA (REGION A), REGIONAL WATER PLAN FOR THE PANHANDLE 
WATER PLANNING AREA, at 1-20 (2010).  (Greater amounts of water have been pumped from the Ogallala 
(High Plains) Aquifer in the Texas Panhandle for irrigated agriculture than has been recharged resulting in 




Arizona model of mandating phased-in measures to achieve a long term safe-yield goal 
over time may be necessary to compel very difficult decisions that are necessary to 
preserve water availability for not just the current but future generations.   
In Arizona, the safe-yield goals and requirements for 100-year ―assured water 
supplies‖ have also created the impetus for innovated water management strategies that 
might not have developed otherwise.  The groundwater basin-delineated AMAs allow for 
accounting of the new withdrawals and replenishment projects within the same AMA 
while also providing administrative convenience and efficiency.  Such sophisticated 
management strategies would only be further complicated with multiple entities and 
incongruent jurisdictions.  
Local Autonomy with State Funding Assistance:  AMAs are administered and funded at 
the state level by the Arizona DWR.  Conversely, GCDs are a more autonomous form of 
local control with locally elected or appointed boards of directors and GCD-dedicated 
general managers, staff, and operating budgets.  The GCD autonomy can be limiting 
because of the often-inadequate funding mechanisms available whereas the AMAs are 
equipped with the authority and resources of the state.  Although a shift towards state 
administration of GCDs is unlikely, Texas could assist with funding for certain GCDs 
with inadequate operating budgets.  The additional funding would facilitate more 
effective management while allowing GCDs to preserve their autonomy.     
                                                                                                                                                 
therefore dictates a realistic goal of managed aquifer depletion rather than safe-yield.) See also Pierce, 




Opportunity For Meaningful Stakeholder Input:  AMAs are administered by the Arizona 
DWR with input provided by an advisory group comprised of governor-appointed 
members representing the groundwater users.  Most GCDs are made up of elected or 
locally-appointed directors which, ostensibly, provide a voice and opportunity for 
representation of their constituents in decision making.  GCD representatives are then 
responsible for representing their GCDs in GMA deliberations and decisions.  The joint-
groundwater planning process could stand to benefit from adopting the Arizona model by 
also allowing input by an appointed stakeholders group to ensure that all groundwater-
user interests are considered in DFC decisions.  With SB 660, advisory groups may be 
created but creation and use of such groups is discretionary.  If Texas were to upscale to 
aquifer-scale management entities, such an entity could improve the opportunity for 
stakeholder input by requiring the appointment of similar advisory groups with the 
influence of a governor appointee to guide policy and operations.  Alternatively, an 
appointed member could be allocated to each county to be appointed by the county 
commissioners courts as a way to maintain county-level involvement and facilitate 
political buy-in. 
4.2 TEXAS MODELS FOR REGIONALIZATION  
The previous section looked to other states that were similarly situated and 
offered principles that could be used as models to regionalize and improve the 
effectiveness of groundwater management in Texas.  When looking for such models, one 




institutions.  The following section provides a brief summary of Texas River Authorities 
and the Edwards Aquifer Authority as multi-county resource-fitted models of 
regionalization.    
4.2.1 River Authorities 
The Conservation Amendment to the Texas Constitution (Article 16, Chapter 59), 
passed in 1917, enabled the creation of a plethora of water-related political subdivisions 
tasked with charges ranging from resource protection to supporting land development.274  
River Authorities (RAs), which started being created soon after the Conservation 
Amendment was passed, 275 are well-established surface water management institutions 
that are the largest in scale and perhaps the most prominent of these abundant special law 
districts.  Although RAs are well established, the term has no special meaning or general-
purpose definition in statute.276  Likewise, there are no general law provisions unique to 
RAs.277  RAs function with differing authority established by enabling legislation unique 
to each district.  Generally speaking, RAs are authorized to sell water and allocate water 
                                                 
274   L. Dougal, K. L. Petersen, Jr., & C. Quinn, Drinking Water Supply Issues: Water Utilities - CCNs and 
Rates, ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER RESOURCES, at 675 (M. K. Sahs, ed., 2009). (―Texas has many types 
of districts. The most common ones that provide retail water service to residential customers include 
municipal utility districts (MUDs), water control and improvement districts (WCIDs), fresh water supply 
districts (FWSDs), special utility districts (SUDs), and river authorities...‖). 
275 M. C. Rochelle, B. B. Castleberry, & M. M. Smith, Meeting Water Supply Needs: Planning, Permitting, 
and Implementation, ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER RESOURCES, at 37 (M. K. Sahs, ed., 2009).  See also G. 
Jarvis, Historical Development of Texas Surface Water Law: Background of the Appropriation and 
Permitting System and Management of Surface Water Resources, ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER 
RESOURCES, at 102 (M. K. Sahs, ed., 2009).  (creation dates for the first RAs:  Brazos River Authority 
(1929); Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority (1933); the Lower Colorado River Authority (1934); Sabine 
River Authority (1949); Trinity River Authority (1955).).   
276 A. Stepherson, Water Districts, ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER RESOURCES, at 150 (M. K. Sahs, ed., 
2009).  (Stepherson quoting David B. Brooks, County and Special District Law, §46.26 (West Texas 
Practice Series, Vol. 35), [hereinafter Brooks] - ―Although the Texas Water Code defines river authorities 
for specific statutory purposes not relevant to this discussion, it contains no general-purpose definition.‖). 




resources, and are responsible for flood control, soil conservation, and water quality.278  
They may also develop navigation, generate hydroelectric power, and recreational 
facilities.279  RAs generally lack taxing authority but may issue bonds backed by utility 
service revenue and receive loans and grants from the federal and county governments 
for funding.280  A governor-appointed Board of Directors, which directs RA operations 
and policy, is made up of a number director positions generally commensurate with the 
area served.281  Similar to GCDs, the missions of RAs are resource management oriented 
with an emphasis on ―conserving, storing, controlling, preserving, utilizing and 
distributing the waters of their respective areas for the benefit of its residents.‖282 And 
importantly, RAs are generally multi-county in size283 configured with sufficient areal 
extent to encompass the entire river basins for which they were established to manage 
(Figure 15).284   
                                                 
278 Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission [hereinafter cited as TNRCC]. A HANDBOOK FOR 
BOARD MEMBERS OF WATER DISTRICTS IN TEXAS (RG 238), at 60 (1996). 
279 Id. at 60. 
280 Id. at 60. 
281 SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, INTERIM REPORT TO THE 81ST LEGISLATURE - TEXAS 
RIVER AUTHORITIES, at Appendix B (2009).  (The number of directors ranges from 9 to as many as 29 
directors at the Angelina & Neches River Authorities.).  
282 The Lower Neches River Valley Authority, Introduction, http://www.lnva.dst.tx.us/about/intro.htm (last 
visited August 21, 2012). 
283 Stepherson, supra note 276, at 150. (―These entities [RA’s] usually encompass a larger geographic area 
and have powers tailored to the particular purposes they are intended to serve.‖). 
284 TNRCC, supra note 278 at 60.  (―The RA encompasses entire river basins and reaches into many 





Figure 15: Map of Texas River Authorities (RAs).  Shape and scale of RAs illustrates 
precedent for Texas water resource management entities configured 




The first RA, the Brazos River Authority (BRA), was established in 1929 as a 
public agency of the state of Texas and was configured to encompass the entire Brazos 
River basin285 including some 42,000 square miles (one sixth of the area of the state) and 
all or parts of 65 counties (Figure 16).286  The Act establishing the BRA was considered a 
pioneering step in the history of water resource management in the United States marking 
the first time that management of the water resources of an entire river basin were 
entrusted to a single public agency for that purpose.287   The BRA is governed by 21 
governor-appointed directors and is entirely self-funded by revenues generated and not 
by taxes.  The BRA and RAs in general, as one of the state’s most mature type of 
resource management institution, represent a well-established model of a compromise 
between centralized and local governance with sufficient areal extent to be self-funding, 
well resourced, and effective in achieving resource management goals.  With the creation 
of the BRA, Texas was at the forefront of resource governance by establishing such a 
relevant institutional model.  However, this logic was since lost or dismissed when GCDs 
began to downsize in favor of hydrologically disconnected single-county entities.288   
                                                 
285 SPECIAL DISTRICTS LOCAL LAWS CODE  §8502.003.  (―Territory. The territory of the authority 
comprises the watershed of the Brazos River, as determined by rule of the Texas Water Development 
Board, except the portions lying within Freestone, Leon, and Madison counties.‖). 
286 K.E. Hendrickson, THE WATERS OF THE BRAZOS: A HISTORY OF THE BRAZOS RIVER BASIN AUTHORITY, 
1929-1979, (1981). 
287 Id. 
288 Although the majority of all RAs are configured along or approximate to basin boundaries, some are 
configured along county lines.  These include: the Upper Colorado River Authority, the Central Colorado 
River Authority, the Upper Guadalupe River Authority, the Lavaca-Navidad River Authority, and the Palo 




Principles and Findings Applicable to Texas Groundwater Management 
Texas would be well served to take steps towards applying the design principles 
of RAs towards groundwater management institutions.  The pertinent findings and 
principles applicable to this goal are almost self-evident and include: 
 RAs are water resource management institutions as are GCDs with very similar 
mission statements; therefore, RA design principles are germane to GCD design. 
 Although surface water and groundwater are governed by different doctrines, 
management institutions are in place for both (GCDs and RAs) and there is no 
compelling reason why regionalization would not be equally applicable.   
 Texas clearly recognized the importance of fit with the initial configuration of the 
RAs along basins’ boundaries (e.g. Brazos River Authority).  The same logic 
should also be recognized with GCDs.  With the delineation of the GMAs, Texas 
has a framework in place to move towards aquifer-based institutions.   
 The longevity and maturity of RAs are a testament to the effectiveness of regional 
scale resource management entities with sufficient areal extent to encompass the 
resource.    
 The scale and areal extent of RAs are a ready made model within the same state 
for how the economies of scale can provide for self supporting agencies that need 
not rely on tax dollars while providing for effective resource management.  
 RAs are an example of regionalization in practice that serves as an effective 





Figure 16: Map of the Brazos River Authority (BRA).  BRA was created to manage the 
Brazos River and was scaled and configured to encompass the entire Brazos 
River basin.  
4.2.2 The Edwards Aquifer Authority 
As introduced in Chapter I, invocation of the authority under the Endangered 
Species Act has had a recent history of compelling unprecedented action relevant to 
groundwater management in Texas.  The most far-reaching, but not the only example of 




Antonio segment of the Edwards Aquifer and the ensuing events leading up to the 
creation of the most comprehensive and effective groundwater management entity in the 
state – the Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA).  Although the product of some nudging 
from the federal government, the EAA serves as the best and most applicable example of 
regionalization of groundwater management in Texas. 
 The San Antonio segment of the Edwards Aquifer
289
 in South Central Texas is the 
primary regional water supply satisfying water demands that are generally dominated by 
agricultural irrigation in the western portions and by municipal supply in the eastern 
portions including the region around the City of San Antonio - an urban area with a 
population of approximately 1.7 million people (Figure 17).290  It provides the source 
water for the Comal and San Marcos Rivers and supports habitat for several endangered 
species at Comal and San Marcos Springs – respectively the first and second largest 
spring complexes in Texas.291  These springs provide firm-yield base flows for several 
rivers on which downstream users depend for municipal, industrial, and agricultural 
supplies.  Given this diversity, the people who live in the region have extremely divergent 
interests in the way the aquifer is managed.  Prior to the creation of the EAA, population 
growth, industrial development and agricultural expansion had increased the demand for 
                                                 
289 Edwards Aquifer Authority, Hydrogeology of the Edwards Aquifer (2012),  
http://www.edwardsaquifer.org/display_science_research_m.php?pg=geology (last visited October 7, 
2012).  (The San Antonio segment of the Balcones Fault Zone Edwards Aquifer (―SA Edwards‖) is a 
Cretaceous age karst aquifer system located in south central Texas that spans approximately 180 miles from 
Kinney County in the west to Hays County to the northeast and provides the primary water supply for all or 
parts of eight counties.).   
290 D. A. Frownfelter & D. C. Trejo, The Rule of Capture and Edwards Aquifer Adjudication, THE WATER 
REPORT, at 1 (D. Light, & D. Moon, eds., March 15, 2004.). 




water and exacerbated the political tensions between the urban and rural sectors which 
complicated management of the aquifer.292  The increasing demands on the aquifer 
coupled with recurrent extreme droughts worked to diminish flows from the springs to 
critical levels that threatened the endangered species that relied on springflow for habitat.   
 
Figure 17: Map of the San Antonio Segment of the Edwards Aquifer and the 
boundaries of the Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA).  (Source: EAA) 
  
The Edwards Underground Water District (EUWD) was created in 1959 in 
response to droughts and growing demand to manage the aquifer in the region; however, 
the unique situation presented by the many competing demands quickly outgrew the 
                                                 
292 R. Kaiser & L. M. Phillips, Dividing the Waters: Water Marketing as a Conflict Resolution Strategy in 




capacity of the then conventional GCD and its limited authority.293  The building stress 
on the aquifer and the endangered species that were dependent on springflow led to the 
filing of a lawsuit by the Sierra Club alleging that the U.S. Secretary of the Interior and 
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service had allowed takings of endangered species by 
not preserving the minimum water level in the Edwards Aquifer that was necessary to 
sustain flow at Comal Springs and San Marcos Springs and therefore sustain sufficient 
habitat to protect the species.294  In January 1993, the presiding judge, Lucius D. Bunton 
III, ruled in favor of the Sierra Club and gave the Texas Legislature until the end of the 
then-current legislative session, May 31, 1993, to adopt a management plant to limit 
pumpage or face federal regulation of the Edwards Aquifer.295  In the face of federal 
intervention, the Texas Legislature passed SB 1477, creating the EAA, one day before the 
judge’s deadline.296  As further evidence that the Legislature took the judges direction 
seriously, SB 1477 formally replaced the rule of capture with a historic use permit system 
and empowered this regional ―super-district‖ with powers, funding, and aquifer-wide 
                                                 
293 Johnson, supra note 112, at 1282.  (―The EUWD… is broadly authorized to conserve, protect, and 
increase recharge of and prevent the waste and pollution of the underground water but regulatory powers 
needed to implement these goals have not been conferred upon it….‖). 
294 Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 WL 151353, (W.D. Tex. Feb.1, 1993). (When 
springflows decreased to a point that harms the endangered and threatened species, this constituted ―take‖ 
under Ch. 9 of the ESA.). 
295 Kaiser, supra note 46, at 413.  See also T.H. Votteler, Raiders of the Lost Aquifer? Or, the Beginning of 
the End to Fifty Years of Conflict over the Texas Edwards Aquifer. 15 TUL. ENVTL. L. J., 257, at 276 
(Summer 2002).  (Votteler citing Finding 196, Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Sierra 
Club v. Lujan (May 26, 1993):  “The next session of the Texas Legislature offers the last chance for 
adoption of an adequate state plan before the „blunt axes‟ of Federal intervention have to be dropped.”). 




jurisdiction sufficient to not only fend off federal intervention but to also effectively 
manage the resource.297  
The EAA was created by the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act (EAA Act)298 in 
1993 to replace and expand the EUWD jurisdictional area to include all or parts of eight 
counties – an area that encompasses 8,800 square miles299 including portions of the 
contributing zone and the majority of the recharge zone and the confined freshwater 
zones of the San Antonio segment of the Edwards Aquifer (Figure 17).300  The EAA is 
governed by a board of directors composed of 15 elected directors representing single-
                                                 
297 Id. at 423. (―The Legislature created a planning and regulatory institution with sweeping powers to 
mange, conserve and protect the aquifer‖).  See also Frownfelter, supra note 290, at 5. (―The [Edwards 
Aquifer Authority] Act granted groundwater management powers far exceeding the authority of 
conventional Chapter 36 GCDs.‖).  See Also F. O. Boadu, B. M. McCarl, & D. Gillig, An Empirical 
Investigation of Institutional Change in Groundwater Management in Texas: The Edwards Aquifer Case. 
47(1) NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL, 117, at 126-127 (2007). (―First, the [EAA] Act set up the [EAA], a 
new institution to manage water withdrawals from the aquifer.  Second, while the Act did not extinguish 
the rights of existing landowners, it subjected water withdrawals from the aquifer to a permitting scheme 
similar to the rules governing surface water.  Third, to protect against the adverse effects of droughts and to 
remedy the adverse environmental impacts of excessive withdrawals from the aquifer, the Act placed 
pumping limits on water withdrawals, mandated minimum springflows to protect endangered species, and 
laid the foundation for water marketing.  Reading these provisions together leads to the conclusion that SB 
1477 effectively ended the institutional arrangement - the rule of capture as applied to the aquifer - and 
replaced it with a permit system that promoted water marketing (citations omitted).‖).  
298 Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 626, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, amended by Act of May 16, 
1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 524, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3280; Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 261, 
1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2505; Act of May 6, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 163, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 634; Act 
of May 25, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1192, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2696; Act of May 28, 2001, 77th Leg., 
R.S., ch. 966, §§ 2.60-.62 and 6.01-.05, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2021-2022, 2075-2076; Act of May 
25, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1192, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2696; Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 
1112, § 6.01(4), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 3188, 3193; Act of May 23, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 510, 2007 
Tex. Gen. Laws 900; Act of May 28, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1351, §§ 2.01-2.12, 2007 Tex. Gen Laws 
4612, 4627-4634; Act of May 28, 2007, 80th Leg. R.S., ch. 1430, §§ 12.01-12.12, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 
5848, 5901-5909; Act of May 21, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1080, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 2818 [hereinafter 
cited as “EAA Act”]. 
299 The Edwards Aquifer Authority, The Authority: Mission, 
www.edwardsaquifer.org/display_authority_m.php?pg=mission (last visited July 15, 2012). 
300 EAA Act §1.02(a).  (―A conservation and reclamation district, to be known as the Edwards Aquifer 





member precincts and two nonvoting directors appointed to represent Medina and Uvalde 
County and an advisory committee.301  Funds to support EAA operations are generated 
not by taxes302 but by the assessment of aquifer management fees, administrative fees, 
and bonds plus additional funding from grants and loans if needed.303  The EAA Act also 
provided for creation of the South Central Texas Water Advisory Committee (SCTWAC) 
as a 20-member nonvoting advisory body made up of appointed members representing 
downstream water rights and issues with a statutory duty to assist the EAA with 
development and implementation of the demand management plan.304  The SCTWAC is 
funded with aquifer management fees and is empowered with certain authority to provide 
some oversight over EAA operations.305  The EAA represented a bold response by the 
Texas Legislature to create a district that was empowered with statutory authorities that 
                                                 
301 EAA Act §§1.09 and 1.091. (The original Act established a Board of Directors with directors that were 
all to be appointed largely by the Commissioners Courts of Bexar, Comal, Hays, Medina, and Uvalde 
counties.  The Act was amended in 1995 by the Legislature (See Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., § 2, 
ch. 261, 1995 Tex. Gen. Law 2505, 2516) to replace the appointed directors with elected directors in 
response to allegations of violations of the Voting Rights Act).  See Also D.A. Frownfelter, Edwards 
Aquifer Authority, ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER RESOURCES, at 325 (M. K. Sahs, ed., 2009).  (―…the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) refused to give pre-clearance to the EAA Act under section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act because the board of directors of the Edwards Underground Water District (the predecessor 
agency to the Authority) was an elected board, and the board of directors (board) of the Authority was to be 
an appointed board.  The DOJ was concerned about the regressive impact on the voting rights of minorities 
in the region of going from an elected board to an appointed board.‖). 
302 EAA Act 1.28(a).  (The EAA is prohibited from assessing ad valorem property taxes to fund 
operations.).  
303 See EAA Act §§1.29(b), 1.29(e), 1.11(d)(4), 1.24(b). 
304 See EAA Act §1.10(a), § 1.10(i)(1)&(2). 
305 See EAA Act § 1.10(h).  (The SCTWAC is required by statute to file a report every even-numbered 
year assessing the ―effect on downstream water rights of the management of the aquifer.‖).  See EAA Act 
§1.10(f).  (The SCTWAC may request reconsideration of any EAA Board action that may be ―prejudicial 
to downstream to water interests‖.  If the action is left to stand, the SWTWAC may appeal to the TCEQ to 
make a recommendation on the contested matter).  See Also EAA Act §3.01.  (Oversight of the EAA is also 
provided by a Legislative oversight committee tasked with regularly reviewing and holding the EAA 




were beyond other more conventional GCDs306 – powers that were initially received as 
an affront to area landowners and property rights advocates but have since been 
embraced307 and validated by the courts.308  Provisions of the EAA Act and rules unique 
to the EAA and not generally available to conventional GCDs include: 
 Recognition of the hydrological interrelationship between surface and 
groundwater and the benefit to the welfare of the state offered by conjunctive 
management measures that reflect this relationship.309 
 Authority to regulate activities affecting recharge water quality in a ―water quality 
buffer‖ that extends 5 miles beyond EAA boundaries.310 
                                                 
306 D.A. Frownfelter, Edwards Aquifer Authority, ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER RESOURCES, at 339 (M. 
K. Sahs, ed., 2009).  (EAA authority stems from TEX. WATER CODE Ch. 36 and the EAA Act.  Ch. 36, 
which is the basic law applicable to all GCDs, is used to ―fill in the gaps‖ where the Act is silent.  
However, in the event of a conflict, the EAA Act prevails.)  See Also EAA Act, § 1.08(a). 
307 F. O. Boadu, B. M. McCarl, & D. Gillig, An Empirical Investigation of Institutional Change in 
Groundwater Management in Texas: The Edwards Aquifer Case. 47(1) NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL, 
117, at 133 (2007).  (―This is a fundamental shift in position from 1993 when the Authority legislation was 
being discussed: "farmers would support a drought plan to limit pumping, but they opposed a permanent 
cap on pumping and marketing provisions for buying and selling water rights." As stated by the president 
of the Uvalde County Water Conservation Association, "You start buying water rights up and you are 
going to kill the economy."  Today landowners are fully in support of water marketing and are even 
threatening legal action to remove a requirement in SB 1477 that is intended to prevent stripping land of all 
water rights.). 
308 Frownfelter, supra not 306, at 326.  (―…litigation ensued to preclude the EAA Act from taking effect. 
On November 27, 1995, the district court declared the EAA Act to be unconstitutional and enjoined the 
State from administering and enforcing the Act. Medina County Underground Water Conservation District 
v. Barshop, No. 95-08-13471-CV (38th Dist. Ct., Medina County, Tex. 1995). It was not until June 28, 
1996, that the Texas Supreme Court in Barshop reversed the trial court’s decision, dissolved its injunction, 
and found the EAA Act to be facially constitutional.‖). 
309 EAA Act, §1.06(a). (―The legislature finds that the water in the unique underground system of water-
bearing formations known as the Edwards-Balcones Fault Zone Aquifer has a hydrologic interrelationship 
to the Guadalupe, San Antonio, San Marcos, Comal, Frio, and Nueces river basins, is the primary source of 
water for the residents of the region, and is vital to the general economy and welfare of this state.  The 
legislature finds that it is necessary, appropriate, and a benefit to the welfare of this state to provide for the 
management of the aquifer through the application of management mechanisms consistent with our legal 




 Authority to issue transferable permits that allow market-drivers to facilitate 
voluntary reallocation of permitted pumping rights.311  
 Establishment of a firm cap on annual permitted pumpage.312 
 Specified duty and authority to interrupt or temporarily curtail aggregate 
permitted pumpage to accomplish the aquifer management goals (i.e. protection 
of endangered species and downstream uses).313 
 Establishment of sub-basins or ―pools‖314 (Uvalde and San Antonio pools) that 
may be managed differently to reflect unique hydrogeologic conditions.315   
                                                                                                                                                 
310  See Also EAA Act § 1.08(c) (This provision provides authority to apply pollution control regulations 
into an area that extends 5 miles beyond the EAA boundaries.).  See EAA Rules Ch. 713 (Water Quality), 
Subchapters E, F, and G.  (Rules specify provisions regulating activities that may affect aquifer water 
quality including spill reporting, hazardous substances, and storage tanks.).  
311 EAA Act §§ 1.14, 1.22, 1.34.  (These sections do not explicitly establish or endorse a water market but 
allows for one by establishing exclusive rights to pumping via permits, by fixing the total amount to be 
authorized by permits, and by allowing those permit to be transferable.  Section 1.34(c) of the Act includes 
limitations on transfers of 50% of irrigation rights but with an option to sell a portion of the reserved 
amount that was conserved.).  See Also Boadu, supra note 307, at 127.  (concluding that the provisions of 
the EAA Act effectively created and promoted water marketing through permit transfers.).  See Also 
Votteler, supra note 295 at 316.  (Votteler concludes that the EAA Act’s permitting requirements and fixed 
cap on permits created a quantifiable property right with exclusivity – characteristics that are fundamental 
to the existence of a free-market on water rights). 
312 EAA Act, §§ 1.14(b)-(c).  (Prior to amendment, these provisions required annual pumping to be limited 
to 450,000 acre-feet by December 31, 2007.  The cap was to be further reduced to 400,000 acre-feet/year 
thereafter unless drought conditions required more sever restrictions.).  See Act of May 28, 2007, 80th 
Leg., R.S., ch. 1351, §§ 2.02, 2.09, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 4596, 4612, 4619.  (The cap was later increased 
by the legislature to 572,000 acre-feet/year, which was the sum of confirmed regular permits during the 
historic use period.).   
313 EAA Act, §§1.14 (a)(f)&(h).  (These provisions work together to ensure adequate spring flows for the 
benefit of the threatened and endangered species dependent on the Edwards Aquifer).   
314 Frownfelter, supra not 306, 328-329.  (―A pool is a region within the Aquifer where a unique set of 
hydrogeologic conditions exist relative to other areas of the Aquifer.  These unique conditions include 
isolated water levels, spring flow responses to changes in storage, and unique water quality conditions 
dependent on (Edwards] Aquifer stresses.‖). 
315 EAA Act §§ 1.14(a)&1.19.  (These sections recognize the San Antonio and Uvalde ―pools‖ as 
hydrologically unique segments of the aquifer.  This subdivision allows for customized management 
approaches based on conditions unique to each pool.  Examples of the rules specific to the pools include: 




 Authority to discriminate between discretionary and nondiscretionary types of 
beneficial use and to assign preference to water-use types for the purpose of 
determining critical period curtailments.316 
 A more restrictive definition of exempt wells that limits the volume of unmanaged 
pumpage from wells exempt from permitting.317 
 Prohibition on any exportation of Aquifer groundwater out of EAA area.318  
 Authority to assess administrative penalties for enforcement of EAA rules.319 
The discrepancy between the powers of the EAA and conventional GCDs 
illustrates the will of the Legislature to create an entity that was empowered with 
authorities and responsibilities that are tailor fit to address the specific management 
challenges of a region.  The discrepancies are also telling and could be interpreted as an 
implicit admission, by the Legislature, of the limited authority of all other GCDs and the 
challenges posed by those limits in providing effective groundwater management.   
                                                                                                                                                 
require drought-triggered pumping curtailments specific to each pool and the Cibolo Creek transfer rules 
(See Rule 711.329) which limit inter-pool transfer of pumping rights.)  
316 EAA Act §§ 1.26(a)(1)&(4).  Personal communication with Rick Illgner, Government Affairs Officer, 
EAA, (July 20, 2012).  (The EAA has chosen not to exercise this authority in favor of deeper across-the-
board curtailments specified for a Class V Stage Drought declaration in the Edwards Aquifer Recovery 
Implementation Plan) (Conversely, TEX. WATER CODE §36 .001(9) stipulates that all other GCDs subject to 
TEX. WATER CODE, CH. 36 must manage all uses designated as ―use for a beneficial purpose‖ equally.).  
317 EAA Act §§ 1.33(c).   (This provision further limits the eligibility for exempt well status by requiring 
permits for wells within or serving subdivisions requiring platting that might otherwise be considered 
exempt in accordance with criteria specified for most other GCDs (See TEX. WATER CODE §36.117(b)).).  
This provides for more effective and equitable groundwater management by reducing the total volume of 
pumpage that is not subject to measurement or drought management.)    
318 EAA Act, §1.34(a).  (This provision explicitly limits the use of water withdrawn from the Aquifer to be 
being used within the boundaries of the authority.  Conversely, SB 2 (codified as amendments to TEX. 
WATER CODE §36.122(c)-(e)) modified the statute to prevent a GCD from adopting rules that would limit 
groundwater exportation.).  See Ch. 1, §1.2. at 25. 
319 EAA Act § 1.37(a).  (This provision authorizes the assessment of administrative penalties, which is 
similar to enforcement authority available to other state agencies.  Conversely, GCDs must file suit in civil 




Principles and Findings Applicable to Texas Groundwater Management 
As the sole regional-scale groundwater management entity in Texas, the EAA is 
the most obvious and applicable institutional model with principles that could be applied 
in other regions of Texas with increasingly challenging water management issues.  The 
most pertinent findings and principles include: 
 The Legislature has the capacity and political will to create a regional aquifer-
scale groundwater management entity that is empowered with authority and 
responsibilities unique to the management objectives.   
 An existing entity with limited authority and effectiveness can be dissolved and 
replaced with a more functional entity when resource management objectives 
warrant, as illustrated by the dissolution of the former EUWD and the creation 
and expansion of the EAA. 
 In recognition of the importance of fit, the new EAA jurisdiction was expanded to 
be configured using both aquifer boundaries and administrative boundaries 
(where available for convenience) to encompass the majority of the San Antonio 
segment of the Edwards Aquifer (See figure 17).  
 The area of the expanded EAA jurisdiction is of sufficient scale and areal extent 
to provide the benefits of the economies of scale including sufficient funding to 
be effective and self-supportive from sources other than taxes.     
 A regional groundwater management authority such as the EAA can be governed 




group (e.g. the SCTWAC) with a prescribed and meaningful role.  If applied to 
other regional entities in Texas, the two bodies could offer a combination of 
representation with elected directors representing areas (e.g. precincts or counties) 
and appointed advisory group members representing specified water interests (e.g. 
irrigated agriculture, municipal water utilities, power generation, etc.). 
 A regional groundwater management authority can be empowered to recognize 
the relationship between groundwater and surface water in a region (where 
applicable) and manage accordingly to holistically integrate water management 
objectives.   
 Consistent with the local control mantra of ―one size does not fit all,‖ a regional 
aquifer-scale groundwater management authority can be empowered with 
authorities and responsibilities that reflect the area-specific management 
challenges which may include subdivision into sub-basins (e.g. Uvalde and San 
Antonio pools) and zones (e.g. recharge and artesian zones) with customized 
groundwater management strategies reflecting unique hydrogeologic conditions.   
 The circumstances of the EAA area provide the requisite factors needed for water 
marketing via a cap and trade system as a management strategy.320  These factors 
include: 1) a firm cap on total available permits (572,000 acre-feet/year) which 
establishes exclusivity, 2) quantified water rights for each permit holder and 3) 
                                                 
320 Market-based water management strategies can be an effective tool for voluntary reallocation of water 
rights when the appropriate conditions are in place (i.e. sufficient market size, limiting trade to within 





permits transferable via a free-market system within the confines of the EAA’s 
boundaries.  
The EAA example proves that with the proper motivation (i.e., federal or state 
intervention), the local populace in an area who hold on so tightly to local control will 
generally learn to accept multi-county regional control such as the EAA as a preferred 
alternative.  As the population and the demand for water for all beneficial uses continue 
to grow in Texas and the available water supplies become more scarce, the state’s 
groundwater water management issues will continue to become increasingly more 
complex.  This competition and complexity may provide the impetus equivalent to the 
threatened federal intervention in the EAA that would warrant the creation of regional 
groundwater management institutions that could be modeled after the prototype regional 
GCD - the EAA.  The EAA along with the other models of regionalized water 
management described above may also offer a glimpse that reveals the future needed 
direction for groundwater management in Texas.  That is, regional-scale aquifer-wide 
groundwater management institutions with sufficient authority and funding to efficiently 








Chapter 5:  Findings, Policy Options, and Recommendations 
This chapter is the concluding one that builds on the context developed in the 
preceding chapters by providing findings that represent the key points supporting this 
thesis (findings are referenced to the thesis chapters, sections, and page numbers 
providing further detail).  These findings form the foundation for criteria that are 
proposed as key factors to be satisfied in the implementation of regionalization as policy 
for the improvement of groundwater management in Texas.  The chapter will conclude 
with a set of policy options that represent iterations of regionalization and an analysis of 
those options with consideration given to the stated policy criteria.     
5.1 FINDINGS 
1) Groundwater is generally considered a common-pool resource meaning that it is 
subtractible and has low excludability (Ch. 2 at 35). 
2) Management of groundwater, as a common-pool resource, involves unique 
technical challenges associated with characterizing complex hydrological and 
hydrogeological systems and institutional challenges associated with influential 
legal, political, and cultural factors (Ch. 2 at 35). 
3) To effectively address the technical and institutional challenges, groundwater 
management entities must be designed congruent with hydrogeographical 
boundaries in recognition of the importance of fit and must be appropriately 
scaled to minimize hydrological disconnects and provide sufficient funds, 




accommodate all affected actors to the maximum extent practicable (Ch. 2, §2.1 
at 37, §2.2 at 50). 
4) Groundwater management in Texas has evolved from limited management under 
the Rule of Capture towards a stated preference for a decentralized institutional 
system of local management through GCDs (Ch. 1, §1.1 at 2). 
5) The preference for local control in Texas was initially the product of compromise 
that responded to the need for groundwater management, particularly in the Texas 
Panhandle, and was sensitive to private property rights issues and the local 
aversion to outsider interference – strong sentiments that remain in place today 
(Ch. 1, §1.2 at 18). 
6) The strong preference for local autonomy coupled with path dependency has 
resulted in a precedent of creating GCDs that are configured along county 
boundaries and are generally single-county in scale.  Of the 98 GCDs established 
in Texas to date, 57 (58%) encompass the area of a single county or less and the 
large majority are configured along county lines (Ch. 1, §1.2.2 at 27). 
7) The 2012 State Water Plan projects increasing water demands, decreasing water 
supplies, and increasing pressure on the groundwater resources of Texas (Ch. 2 at 
36, Ch. 3, §3.1 at 60). 
8) The increased pressure on Texas groundwater resources coupled with the 




with decentralization including hydrological disconnects, insufficient funding, 
lack of resilience, and myopic local politics (Ch., §2.1.1 at 37, §2.2.1 at 52). 
9) Centralized groundwater management via a state agency such as the TCEQ, 
which has been offered as a response to the challenges of decentralization, would 
also involve challenges, including lack of management flexibility responsive to 
local conditions and, more importantly, local stakeholder opposition (Ch. 2, 
§2.2.1 at 50, §2.2.1 at 56). 
10) Regionalization is offered in this thesis as a policy proposal for an institutional 
arrangement and scale of groundwater governance that provides a compromise 
between centralization and decentralization and that provides a balance that 
benefits from the advantages of both scales of governance satisfying the 
institutional design requirements described in Finding No. 3 (Ch. 3, §3.1 at 60). 
11) Recognizing the inherent challenges of decentralization, there has been a 
persistent effort by Texas policy makers to shift towards regionalized 
groundwater management, however, strong opposition in favor of the deeply 
embedded system of local control has produced a compromised solution in the 
form of the joint-regional groundwater planning via aquifer-defined Groundwater 
Management Areas (Figure 12) (Ch. 3, §3.2 at 62). 
12) The 16 Groundwater Management Areas, which are configured to provide for 
areas most suitable for groundwater management and generally encompass the 




regionalization of groundwater management with areas that are appropriately 
scaled to satisfy the institutional design criteria described in Finding No. 3 (Ch. 3, 
§3.2.1 at 64, §3.2.4 at 70). 
13) The current joint-regional groundwater planning process falls short of achieving 
regional groundwater management by not providing sufficient stakeholder 
involvement in planning decisions and most notably, by allowing individual 
GCDs to regress back into county-based planning rather than aquifer-based 
planning (Ch. 3, §3.3 at 81).  Further, the most recent legislative amendments to 
the groundwater planning process have produced a set of unfunded planning 
mandates that are overly complicated, overly burdensome to GCDs with limited 
resources, and most likely unworkable (Ch. 3, §3.2.5 at 77). 
14) The states of Nebraska and Arizona utilized successful regional water 
management institutions that offer principles that could be applied in Texas (Ch. 
4, §4.1 at 92).  
15) Texas currently has resource-delineated regional-scale water management 
institutions that manage surface water basins via River Authorities and, even more 
aptly, that manage an aquifer, the San Antonio segment of the Edwards Aquifer, 
via the Edwards Aquifer Authority (Ch. 4, §4.2 at 110).   
16) Texas River Authorities, as one of the State’s most mature type of management 
institutions, and the Edwards Aquifer Authority, as the lone existing example of a 




compromise between centralized and local governance that provide sufficient 
areal extent to be self-funding, well resourced, and effective in achieving resource 
management goals (Ch. 4, §4.2.1 at 111, §4.2.2 at 116).   
17) Principles and characteristics common in the other state models and the Texas 
models of regionalization that could be implemented to improve Texas 
groundwater management include: small-district consolidation, conjunctive 
surface and groundwater management, provision of necessary authority and 
funding, opportunity for meaningful stakeholder representation, and management 
flexibility responsive to local conditions (Ch. 4, §4.1.1 at 96, §4.1.2 at 107, §4.2.1 
at 115, §4.2.2 at 125). 
18) The creation of the Edwards Aquifer Authority provides evidence of the 
necessary political will, when properly motivated, to implement regionalization to 
improve groundwater management in Texas (Ch. 4, §4.2.2 at 125).  
19) While the EAA was motivated by extraordinary circumstances at the time, the 
projected pressures on groundwater, developing legal issues, and planning process 
complexity and unfunded mandates, could provide the equivalent motivation for 
the creation of similar regional groundwater management institutions to be 
implemented for the major aquifers systems in the remainder of the state (Ch. 4, 





5.2 POLICY CRITERIA  
On the basis of the above findings, Texas should consider a new paradigm for 
water management utilizing regional groundwater management institutions as the optimal 
scale of governance that provides for a balance between centralized and decentralized 
groundwater management.  In order to be efficient, equitable, resilient, and effective, 
these institutions should be designed in accordance with the following criteria:  
1. Congruence with hydrogeographical boundaries. 
Institutions should be configured to encompass entire hydrologically connected 
aquifer systems to the maximum extent practicable, to facilitate effective groundwater 
management, allocation, and planning by minimizing hydrological disconnects and 
transboundary aquifers.  This criterion may be satisfied by drawing institution boundaries 
that are congruent with the hydrogeographical boundaries of major freshwater aquifer 
systems.  Political and administrative boundaries (counties, precincts, roads, parcels) may 
also be used for administrative convenience when those boundaries generally closely 
approximate the hydro-geographical boundaries provided that the resulting area 
encompasses the entire major aquifer system.  Similarly, sub-basins within major-aquifer 
systems created in response to management needs specific to the sub-basin should also be 
delineated congruent with hydrogeographical boundaries.   
2. Sufficient areal extent. 
Institutions should be configured to contain sufficient area to:  




 provide operational efficiency through the economies of scale that allow for the 
elimination of duplicative overhead functions of multiple small entities,  
 generate sufficient revenues through conventional funding mechanisms (Criterion 
No. 3), and 
 discourage myopic management decisions influenced by the self-interests of 
hegemonic minorities.   
Satisfaction of this criterion may be determined by establishing a jurisdictional area that 
satisfies Criterion No. 1 and that provides sufficient area for tax generation or that 
contain enough permitted wells for sufficient revenue from water use fees.  The area 
needed to generate revenue through the conventional funding mechanisms (i.e. ad 
valorem taxes and water use fees) may be waived as a consideration provided that 
Criterion No. 1 is satisfied and other funding mechanisms not dependent on taxing area 
and permitted wells provides sufficient funding (See Criterion No. 3).  Sufficient area 
that encompasses the larger major aquifer systems will likely not be congruent with 
boundaries of minor vertically stacked aquifers at depth; however, the larger regional-
scale areas will serve to reduce the occurrence of transboundary situations over minor 
aquifers.  Any occurrence of transboundary conflicts over minor aquifer systems will 
require coordination between the adjacent entities.  Finally, discouraging myopic 
management decisions can generally be achieved by the dilution of any hegemonic 
dominance that will occur with an increase in area and scale that includes other affected 




3. Sufficient funding and resources.  
Institutions need to be enabled with funding mechanisms to provide sufficient 
revenue to effectively and efficiently perform the statutory duties of preserving, 
conserving, and protecting the groundwater resources of the state.  The standard for the 
appropriate amount of funding should be based on the resources available to the sole 
example of regional groundwater management in Texas – the Edwards Aquifer Authority 
(EAA).  Using its 2012 annual operating budget, the EAA was funded at a per area rate 
of approximately $4.19/acre of jurisdictional area (see Appendix 2).  This standard is 
contingent on the entity having the sufficient areal extent described in Criterion No. 2, 
which assumes the efficiency of operations associated with economies of scale.  This 
criterion may be satisfied by authorizing institutions to generate revenues using an 
appropriate combination of both ad valorem taxes and water use fees that are sufficient to 
elevate annual operating budgets to the minimum standard.  Both mechanisms can be 
justified as fees sufficient to cover the cost of service with permitted users directly 
benefiting from the management of the resource they rely upon and other taxpayers 
benefiting indirectly from the economy that is supported and the surface water sources 
that are positively affected.  
4. Political feasibility.   
If a shift from county-based local control to aquifer-based regionalization is to be 
politically feasible, institutions need to be designed to consider both the local government 




local level.  Consideration of these factors is necessary to maintain and continue a local 
role in decision-making and policy setting in order to obtain political buy-in.  This 
criterion may be satisfied by allowing county commissioners to make appointments to the 
governing body (board of directors) to represent county interests.  The board of directors 
could be configured to be made up of county appointed-directors with the number of 
representatives allocated on the basis of county area or groundwater dependency.  
Alternatively, if directors are to be elected rather than appointed, the director precincts 
could be configured to reflect county boundaries.  Additionally, such arrangement should 
be coupled with an effective education and outreach campaign to communicate the needs 
and benefits of regionalized groundwater management to facilitate political buy-in of the 
affected constituents.   
5. Equitable representation for all aquifer dependents.   
Institutions should provide mechanisms for those that are affected by groundwater 
management and policy decisions to provide meaningful input into those decisions in 
order to 1) benefit from local knowledge, 2) provide for ―collective choice arrangements‖ 
and 3) obtain the ―consent of the governed.‖  This criterion may be satisfied by creating 
advisory bodies with positions designated to defined interests and expertise and could be 
custom configured on the basis of the local economy, dominant water use types, 
environmental interests, and other pertinent factors.  This body may also be empowered 




other defined mechanism for oversight or appeal of a decision in order to ensure that 
input is meaningful and influential in guiding operations and policy.  
6. Sufficient authority.   
Institutions should be empowered with the necessary authority to establish and 
enforce rules necessary to effectively perform the statutory duties of preserving, 
conserving, and protecting the groundwater resources of the state.  This criterion may be 
satisfied by empowering institutions with authority on par with other state agencies or, 
more specifically, the EAA.  As described in Chapter 4, the EAA has substantial 
authority beyond conventional GCDs including the ability to enforce rule violations 
through the assessment of administrative penalties and to prioritize water use types for 
extreme drought management.  Satisfaction of other criteria including Criterion Nos. 3, 4, 
& 5 will also serve to provide the resources and political will to develop the necessary 
regulations, enforce those regulations, and provide opportunity for hearing and due 
process in response to enforcement actions.      
7. Conjunctive use management goals.   
Institutions should be designed to facilitate holistic water management by 
reconciling the disconnect that has resulted from the bifurcation of surface and 
groundwater law in Texas.  Using principles from the Nebraska and the EAA models, this 
criterion may be satisfied by requiring that institutions establish and develop policies and 
rules to achieve management goals that recognize and address the effects of groundwater 




resources where applicable.  In accordance with Criterion No. 9 related to regulatory 
flexibility, these goals should be developed to address the very specific 
surface/groundwater relationships in a given area.  Such goals are currently required in 
GCD management plans; however, there is no real oversight of the effectiveness of the 
goals or the implementation of action to achieve those goals.   
8. Long-term sustainability management goals.   
Institutions should be designed to manage groundwater resources to achieved 
long-term sustainability goals that stretch the resource availability to beyond the lifespan 
of the current generation.  This criteria may be satisfied by requiring management goals 
and water management strategies similar to those of the Arizona Active Management 
Areas which require the assurance of 100 years of water supply – a planning goal that 
extends planning beyond current generations and compels consideration of the water 
needs of future generations.  Where aquifer recharge conditions practically preclude such 
safe-yield goals (such as in the Ogallala Aquifer in the Texas Panhandle), developing and 
implementing policies and strategies that work in concert to also satisfy Criterion No. 7 
could serve to facilitate satisfaction of this goal.  That is, the implementation of integrated 
water supply plans utilizing all available water sources, shifting to less intensive water 
demands, demand reduction achieved through drought management and conservation, 
and other innovative water management strategies such as water banking, aquifer storage 





9. Regulatory autonomy and flexibility.   
Consistent with the mantra of ―one size does not fit all,‖ institutions should be 
empowered to be autonomous enough to have the regulatory flexibility to establish 
policies, management objectives, rules, and groundwater management strategies that are 
responsive to the hydrogeologic conditions, dominant water use types, area economy, 
environmental interests, and other pertinent factors unique to the management area.  The 
satisfaction of this criterion is enabled by satisfaction of all of the above criteria, 
particularly Criteria Nos. 1, 2, 3, & 6.  That is, major aquifer-oriented institutions with 
sufficient area, funding, and authority can be flexible and nimble enough to be 
subdivided and designed with customized management schemes that work in concert and 
that are responsive to variable hydrologic conditions and water demands within the 
management area.  Such institutions can be effective in prioritizing issues, identifying 
critical features of most prominent problems and developing specific management 
strategies to address those problems.   
5.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
The pros and cons of the two extreme groundwater management approaches of 
decentralized local control (status quo) and centralized state control were discussed in 
sufficient detail in Chapter 2.  In short, the analysis established the challenges and 
shortcomings of the current decentralized system that have been observed in practice.  
State control, as the often-invoked alternative to local control, was established to be 




control and the disparate geo-political factors and hydrologic conditions in Texas, it 
would seem a reasonable assumption that any type of centrally controlled regulatory 
policy would not be politically feasible nor flexible enough to be effective.  For these 
reasons, centralization is not discussed further to narrow the focus on the policy proposal 
of aquifer-scale regionalization that was offered in Chapter 3 as the optimal scale of 
governance for groundwater management in Texas. 
The following policy recommendations proposed for consideration represent 
different degrees of regionalization ranging from continuing the recent progress through a 
small step that would incrementally modify the existing groundwater planning process to 
a larger stride that would replace the many existing small-scale GCDs with Groundwater 
Management Authorities configured in accordance with the existing framework of 
Groundwater Management Areas.   
5.3.1 Incremental Modifications to the Existing GCD System 
This policy option would represent the next incremental step in the shift towards 
regionalization by maintaining the current process of GCD representation within the 
existing GMA framework but with modifications to address the challenges associated 
with decentralization described in Chapter 2 and the shortcomings of the current joint 
regional planning process described in Chapter 3.  To reiterate, the current decentralized 
system of small-scale GCDs suffers from challenges associated with limited funding, 
myopic local politics and self-interests, and hydrological disconnects (Finding No. 8).  




relatively immature process is challenged by limited stakeholder representation, GCD 
dominance and myopic policy decisions, growing process complexity, decreasing state 
technical support, and unfunded mandates on the backs of resource-poor GCDs (Finding 
No. 13).  The following are offered as suggested modifications that work towards 
addressing these challenges and towards governance that satisfies the policy criteria that 
require the most attention.   
GCD Funding 
Limited funding for existing GCDs is a problem that can largely be attributed to 
the lack of sufficient areal extent.  Retaining the existing small-scale GCD structure will 
obviously not resolve the sufficient area criteria, however, funding challenges could be 
addressed by empowering existing GCDs with the appropriate funding mechanisms 
needed to generate sufficient revenue required for effective resource management 
(Criterion No. 3).321  Where funding in existing GCDs is insufficient, the current funding 
authority of each GCD, which is either tax based or fee based but rarely both, should be 
expanded to include both funding mechanisms at the rate necessary to make up for any 
deficit below the standards.  Where these conventional funding mechanisms may fall 
short due to resistance to taxing or insufficient water use fees, the funding gap may need 
to be filled by raising the statutory cap on water use fees or with state financial assistance 
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or through arrangements with local municipalities and other political subdivisions to 
subsidize individual GCD operating budgets.   
GCD Authority  
GCDs should be empowered with authority on par with the EAA (Criterion No. 
6).  This will require legislation to amend Texas Water Code Chapter 36 to lift all GCDs 
and specific amendments to the enabling legislation of individual GCDs to provide 
certain authority to address management challenges unique to each region.  
Groundwater Management Area Councils (GMACs)   
GMACs should be established for each GMA as designed in Senator Armbrister’s 
introduced version of SB 3 filed in 2005.322  GMACs, as envisioned in SB 3, should be 
established and empowered as governing bodies with specified authorities, duties, 
funding, and resources to achieve the stated policy goal of ensuring consistent 
management of shared major aquifer systems by the GCDs located in each GMA 
(Criterion No. 1).  GMACs would be empowered with the authority to adopt DFCs, 
approve member GCD management plans, and verify consistency in management 
objectives (Criteria Nos. 6 & 8).  The TWDB would continue to be responsible for 
processing the GMAC’s DFC decisions, deriving MAG estimates, and allocating MAG 
estimates to the GCDs to serve as a tool in permitting decisions.  The GMAC would be 
made up of the presiding officer of each member GCD, members representing each 
                                                 




RWPG in the GMA, plus additional members to be appointed by the TWDB representing 
the affected stakeholders with stakeholder positions designed to represent the water needs 
specific to each GMA including surface water interests (Criteria Nos. 5 & 7).  Planning 
duties would be facilitated with technical assistance and funding provided by the TWDB 
(Criterion No. 3).   
Clearly Define Role of GMACs and GCDs  
The relationship, authorities, and duties of GMACs should be clearly defined such 
that GMACs ensure regional consistency of groundwater management while GCDs 
remain autonomous to create and enforce rules and manage individual jurisdictions 
within the context of the bigger regional management goals (Criterion 2 & 9).  GMACs 
will ensure consistency by exercising authority to review and approve GCD management 
plans on the basis of consistency of management objectives and shall perform an annual 
review of the measures implemented and progress made by member GCDs towards 
achievement of those objectives.  Instead of being burdened with the increasingly 
complicated and unfunded planning mandates of the current groundwater planning 
process as recently modified by SB 660,323 GCDs would be responsible for providing a 
representative to the GMAC, development of management plans, development of rules 
and policies that implement those plans once approved by the GMAC, and enforcement 
of those rules and policies within their own jurisdictional areas.   
                                                 




Hydrologically-based GMA Sub-basins 
Using the sub-basins of Arizona’s AMAs324 as a model program and the failed 
HB 1755325 filed by Representative Callegari in 2011 as model legislation, GMACs 
should be allowed to delineate sub-basins within the GMAs where specific conditions 
warrant unique management goals (Criterion 9).  When considering DFCs within the 
GMA, the GMACs may adopt unique DFCs for subdivisions of the GMA, provided that 
those sub-basins are delineated on the basis of known hydrological and geological 
conditions rather than political boundaries (i.e., county or GCD boundaries).  The term 
―geographic areas‖ currently used to define areas within GMAs326 that may have 
different DFCs should be replaced with the term ―sub-basins‖ which shall be defined as 
proposed in HB 1755 as:  
―a definable part of a groundwater reservoir in which the groundwater supply will 
not be appreciably affected by withdrawing water from any other part of the 
reservoir, as indicated by known geological and hydrological conditions and 
relationships and on foreseeable economic development at the time the 
subdivision is designated or altered.‖327 
Overall Feasibility 
In terms of overall feasibility, this policy option represents the smallest 
incremental step towards regionalization, which is consistent, historically, with the pace 
of the gradual evolution of groundwater management in Texas.  Moreover, it will at least 
partially satisfy most of the policy criteria (Table 3) and therefore will address some of 
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the most critical challenges associated with the current decentralized system provided 
that all of the recommended reforms are implemented and adopted.  This option does, 
however, fall short of satisfying the key criterion of providing sufficient area extent.  The 
lack of sufficient areal extent, which is a challenge inherent to small-scale GCDs, will 
continue to limit operational efficiency and foster tendencies for myopic management.   
 
Criteria Satisfied Partially 
Satisfied 
Unsatisfied 
1. Hydrogeographical Boundaries  X  
2. Sufficient Areal Extent   X 
3. Funding X   
4. Politically Feasible  X  
5. Representation  X  
6. Authority X   
7. Conjunctive Use  X  
8. Sustainability Goals  X  
9. Regulatory Flexibility X   
Table 2.  Policy Criteria Scorecard: Incremental Modifications to Existing GCD System 
The most notable shortcoming of this policy option involves the assumption that 
the recommended reforms will be adopted and/or effectively implemented.  
Implementation of the recommended reforms will rely largely on new legislation that 




and 3) authorize new or increased taxes and/or financial and technical assistance from 
state and local agencies - all of which must occur in a political climate where there is a 
push to downsize government, agency budgets are being cut, and the notion of new or 
higher taxes is a political nonstarter.  While these challenges are substantial, they are not 
insurmountable and may be plausible if policy makers can rise above local politics by 
considering the state’s water management needs from a state and regional perspective.  
5.3.2 Groundwater Management Authorities 
This policy option would represent a wholesale implementation of regionalization 
by using the existing framework of Groundwater Management Areas (GM Areas) as the 
basis for 16 new regional scale Groundwater Management Authorities (GM Authorities) 
(Figure 18).  This policy would involve dissolution of existing GCDs and the promotion 
of the former GM Areas, which were originally areas delineated to provide ―the area 
most suitable for the management of groundwater resources,‖ into regional groundwater 
management institutions (Criteria Nos. 1 & 2).  The GM Authorities would be 
autonomous political subdivisions charged with the responsibility of providing for ―the 
conservation, preservation, protection, recharging, and prevention of waste of 
groundwater, and of groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions, and to control 
subsidence caused by withdrawal of water from those groundwater reservoirs or their 
subdivisions.‖  To satisfy the established policy criteria and provide for effective 
groundwater management, the following are offered as key provisions that are 






Figure 18: The proposed delineation of regional GM Authorities using GM Area and 
major aquifer boundaries.  
Funding 
Using the EAA and the Texas River Authorities as models, GM Authorities 
would be funded initially using solely water use fees to avoid having to assess taxes 
provided that water use fees alone would be sufficient to raise revenue to the minimum 
standards (Criteria Nos. 3 and 4).  The water use fees should be considered the primary 




can be generated within the existing statutory cap.  Any tendency to ―over permit‖ for the 
purpose of generating revenue through fees would be mitigated by the stakeholder-driven 
process to determine the DFCs and the resulting MAG estimates that would be required 
to be considered in permitting decisions (further discussion in planning section below).  If 
water use fee revenue at the statutory rate is insufficient, the cap could either be raised to 
the necessary level or tax-based funding could be authorized at a lower rate that would be 
minimally felt but sufficient to elevate the total funding to the minimum standards.  
Where these conventional funding mechanisms may fall short due to resistance to taxing 
or insufficient water use fee rates, the funding gap may need to be filled with state 
financial assistance or through arrangements with local municipalities and other political 
subdivisions to subsidize individual GCD operating budgets.   
Authority 
Using the EAA as a model, GM Authorities would be empowered by the 
legislature through enabling legislation specific to each GM Authority with sufficient 
authority to establish and enforce rules that addresses the very specific management 
issues of the region (Criterion Nos. 6).  This would include the autonomy and flexibility 
to customize the management approach including the subdivision of the area into 
management zones that are responsive to variable hydrologic conditions and water 
demands within the management area (Criterion Nos. 9).  These management zones 
would allow management of specific areas of decline, sub-basins within aquifers, other 




Authority.  Similar to the Brazos River Authority, the GM Authorities would be 
empowered to:  
 
―…exercise all the rights and powers of an independent governmental agency, a 
municipality, and a body politic and corporate to formulate plans deemed 
essential to its operation and for its administration ...‖328 
 
Although relatively autonomous, GM Authority operations would ultimately be 
subject to oversight by the legislature and could also be subject to the state’s sunset 
review process, similar to other state agencies, to ensure that operations are consistent 
with the stated missions.  GM Authorities with sufficient authority and autonomy and 
minimal legislative oversight could be flexible enough to incorporate any combination of 
management and allocation instruments (e.g. historic use, correlative rights, prior 
appropriation), to best suit the aquifer conditions, uses, and politics of the region.   
Governing and Advisory Bodies 
GM Authorities would be governed by a board of directors (Board) made up of 
directors that could either be appointed or elected.  The preferred option would be a 
Board made up of a combination of directors appointed by county governments or 
municipalities and directors appointed by the TWDB to represent the pertinent 
stakeholder interests in each area.  This use of directors appointed by local governments 
is based on the original EAA enabling legislation (SB 1477) and would serve to maintain 
the link to county-level governance and the local knowledge base and smooth the 
transition from county-scale GCDs to regional GM Authorities (Criterion No. 4).  
Director positions representing local governments would be allocated to each 
                                                 




county/municipality on the basis of groundwater supplies and demands projected in state 
water plan for the water user groups in those areas.  When combined with directors 
representing specified stakeholder interests, the governing body makeup serves to ensure 
that all aquifer dependents are provided with equitable representation in groundwater 
management and policy decisions (Criterion No. 5).  
The next option in terms of preference would be elected directors representing 
single-member precincts and is based on the current make up of directors at the EAA.  
This would be the fallback position in the event that there are any legal issues related to 
replacing the elected Boards of dissolved GCDs with appointed officials.    Using the 
Texas RWPGs membership as a model,329 this option would need to be coupled with an 
advisory body made up of members representing: 1) pertinent stakeholder interests in the 
area (including surface water interests (Criterion No. 7), appointees of local governments, 
and each RWPG with area in the GM Authority.  Similar to the EAA, the advisory 
group’s role could be made to be meaningful by allowing nonvoting membership on the 
Board and by also providing an outlet for the advisory group to appeal any Board 
decisions (Criterion No. 5). 
Planning 
With this policy option, the GM Authorities would serve as the de facto planners 
for their respective major and minor aquifers systems in accordance with the existing 
groundwater planning process.  As the research and management authority for each 
region, the GM Authorities would be tasked with determining groundwater availability 
by setting the DFCs for all of the relevant aquifers in their area.  The current process 
involves coordination between the GM Area planning groups, GCDs, the TWDB, and 
                                                 




finally the RWPGs.  Use of GM Authorities as regional groundwater planners streamlines 
the process by removing a level of government (GCDs) and the overly burdensome 
complexity that has developed in order to compel collaboration among GCDs within the 
GM Areas.  Further, planning at this larger scale rather than GCD scale would 
considerably reduce the occurrence of transboundary aquifer situations within the major, 
minor, and vertically stacked aquifer systems (Criteria Nos. 1 & 2). Continued 
coordination among adjacent GM Authorities over shared minor aquifers would be less 
cumbersome as there would be fewer entities to coordinate with.  This option would also 
serve to include the so-called ―white areas‖ in Texas where groundwater use is currently 
unmanaged and where there is no representation in the planning process (Criterion No. 
5).  With most future outlooks projecting an increased reliance, either directly or 
indirectly, on groundwater across the state for public water supply, agriculture, power 
generation, industry, and environmental services, it will become imperative that 
groundwater is managed and groundwater interests are represented in all parts of Texas.    
The TWDB would continue to provide state level objectivity and technical 
guidance by being responsible for processing the DFC decisions, deriving MAG 
estimates, and allocating MAG volumes to the aquifer sub-basins determined by the GM 
Authorities.  The TWDB would, however, be significantly unburdened by allowing the 
GM Authorities to utilize their own funding, resources, and technical expertise to develop 
the DFCs before being submitted to the TWDB for a MAG determination.   And by 
utilizing governing and advisory bodies in deliberating and setting DFCs as 
recommended above, surface water and other stakeholder interests would be sufficiently 
considered in DFC decisions which would further unburden the TWDB by reducing the 




In terms of management goals, conjunctive management can be facilitated by 
consideration of the effects of proposed DFCs on downstream interests and 
interconnected surface waters where applicable (Criterion No. 7).  As mentioned, this is 
accomplished by providing a voice to those representing those interests through Board 
membership and advisory groups.  The DFC planning period would continue to mirror 
the RWPG planning period of 50 years.  While not extending as far out as the 100-year 
planning goals of the Arizona model, the 50-year planning window will generally extend 
beyond the lifespan of most policymakers, which partially satisfies the recommended 
timeframes of Criterion 8. 
Overall Feasibility 
As soon as the TWDB was assigned the task of delineating GM Areas that 
provided ―the area most suitable for the management of the groundwater resources using 
boundaries that coincide with aquifer boundaries where feasible,‖330 the logic of the scale 
and fit, at first glance, became quite obvious.  This policy option advances that logic by 
empowering the areas as regional groundwater management authorities and completes, 
rather than makes progress towards, the ongoing transition to regionalization.   This 
option satisfies the majority of the policy criteria with one notable exception (Table 4).  
As stated in the discussion on the modifications of the current GCD system, there is 
currently an undeniable resistance, politically, to the notion of more layers of government 
and new and higher taxes. In terms of political feasibility, this criterion was graded as 
partially satisfied in a positive sense on the basis of the factors associated with this option 
                                                 




that are responsive to this resistance.  More specifically, these factors are related to the 
ability of the proposed GM Authorities to:  
 be self-funded and more efficient without a reliance on tax-based funding,  
 streamline groundwater management by eliminating duplicate functions,  
 unify the many disparate and sometimes inconsistent rules and management 
approaches that evolved among individual GCDs, and  
 eliminate the need for the extraordinary planning process complexity that has 
evolved to accommodate GCD-scale groundwater governance.    
Criteria Satisfied Partially 
Satisfied 
Unsatisfied 
1. Hydrogeographical Boundaries X   
2. Sufficient Areal Extent X   
3. Funding X   
4. Politically Feasible  X  
5. Representation X   
6. Authority X   
7. Conjunctive Use X   
8. Sustainability Goals  X  
9. Regulatory Flexibility X   





Conversely, the factors preventing a grade of full satisfaction for political 
feasibility are formidable.  Similar to the modifications to the status quo option, 
dissolution of GCDs and replacement with GM Authorities would be entirely dependent 
on action by the Legislature.  The prospect of such reforms by a Legislature that has 
established and time and again reaffirmed its preference and commitment to a 
decentralized system of local control would involve extraordinary complexity and 
political controversy.  Local control has become a mantra that is deeply embedded and 
some would argue sacrosanct.  And while such a process would be difficult, the notion is 
not unprecedented.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Nebraska and EAA models for 
regionalization demonstrate similar situations where resource management challenges 
provided sufficient motivation to galvanize enough political will to make non-
incremental changes to the resource management approach.  Both the Nebraska 
Legislature and, in the case of the EAA, the Texas Legislature, implemented sweeping 
groundwater governance reform by dissolving and replacing many small-scale districts 
with larger scale Authorities.  Given the increased pressures on groundwater and the 
mounting water resource management challenges in Texas, such bold reform may be 





5.3.3 Other Policy Options 
The detailed discussion above focused on the two policy options that reflect the 
extreme ranges of regionalization.  That is, the incremental step of maintaining but 
modifying the current GCD system and wholesale implementation of regionalization by 
dissolving GCDs and replacing with regional GM Authorities using the existing GM 
Area framework.  While not discussed in equivalent detail, iterations representing 
variations or regionalization within this range should also be considered.  Other policy 
options to be considered may include: 
Use of Existing GCD and County Boundaries to Delineate GM Authorities 
 This option is a slightly different version of the creation of GM Authorities by 
GCD dissolution using GM Area boundaries. It would involve consolidation of existing 
GCDs into the GM Areas in which the majority of the GCD jurisdictional area is located.  
The same logic would apply to inclusion of counties that have a majority of area in a 
given GM Area where there is no GCD.  The consolidated GCDs would become a single 
GMA with all of the authority, funding, and governing/advisory bodies described for the 
GM Authority options discussed above.   The new GM Authorities would have 
boundaries reflecting the boundaries of the consolidated GCDs and counties as an 




Consolidation of GCDs in PGMAs 
 As described in Chapter 4 in the discussion of the Arizona model, this option 
would involve using PGMAs as the basis for creating similar regional-scale management 
entities and consolidating the existing GCDs within the PGMA into a single management 
entity.  This option would involve a reevaluation of all of the major aquifers, including 
areas in existing GCDs, to assess areas in need of ―active management.‖  The 
reevaluation would take into account current and projected aquifer conditions and the 
efficacy of the existing GCDs and recommend consolidation where the limitations of 
small-scale GCDs limit effective management. 
The purpose of this thesis was to offer regionalization as a viable policy approach 
that could and should be considered to improve groundwater management in Texas.  The 
version that provides the ―right fit‖ in terms of satisfying the suggested policy criteria 
may actually be some combination of the different concepts represented by these various 
iterations of regionalized groundwater management. 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Groundwater management in Texas is considered by many to be a lawless system 
of passive non-management under the common law doctrine of the rule of capture.  
Although Texas has consistently upheld the rule of capture, the doctrine has slowly been 
modified in areas where local control has been established via GCDs.  This established 
preference for local control through GCDs, however, was the product of political 




strong sentiment that remains in place today.  The formation of GCDs that initially 
emerged slowly and then more prolifically in response to judicial provocation and 
desultory legislative action, merged on to a path where small single-county-scale GCDs 
became the precedent.  The small-scale county-based GCD system that is now 
predominant and firmly entrenched is accompanied by a series of significant challenges 
including issues associated with hydrological disconnects, insufficient funding, lack of 
resilience, and myopic local politics.   
With the occurrence of persistent and recurrent periods of extreme drought, a 
burgeoning population, and projected shortfalls in water supplies, there has been a 
heightened awareness of the limits of the groundwater resources in Texas and the limited 
ability of underfunded small-scale GCDs to manage effectively.  The persistent response 
has been a slow evolution towards some form of larger scale management.  Although a 
full conversion away from local control towards centralization via state control is not 
likely to be politically feasible, it would also be limited in recognizing the wide diversity 
of climate conditions, water use patterns, growth projections, and aquifer characteristics 
that exist across the state.  Regionalization is offered as a policy proposal for an 
institutional arrangement and scale of groundwater governance that provides a 
compromise between centralization and decentralization using institutions that are: 1) 
designed congruent with hydrogeographical boundaries in recognition of the importance 




sufficient funds, authority, and resources to effectively manage the resource and 
equitably accommodate all affected actors to the maximum extent practicable.   
The merits and logic of regionalized groundwater management have been 
recognized as demonstrated by the actions of the Legislature establishing the joint-
regional planning process within aquifer-based GMAs using GCD representatives as the 
de facto regional groundwater planners.  However, the new unfunded mandates for which 
the already underfunded GCDs are now responsible and the extraordinary planning 
process complexity that has developed in order to accommodate those holding fast to 
local control may prove to be unworkable.  This realization compels consideration of 
management through regional authorities designed using the ready-made framework of 
GMAs and principles gleaned from successful models of regionalization from other states 
and within Texas.  Such regional Authorities, if provided with sufficient resources and 
authority would respect the logic of fit and scale and be equipped to address the current 
and future groundwater management challenges in Texas.   
In order to address the issues with the current institutional design, policy makers 
will be faced with a choice of either: 1) providing more authority and resources, likely 
through new or higher taxes and fees, to confront the challenges and complexity of small-
scale GCD-oriented local control, or 2) make the politically charged decision to take 
advantage of the logic and efficiencies of regionalization by replacing existing small-




or delay in implementing significant reform along these lines will only prolong and 






Appendix 1: Frequently Used Acronyms (FUA). 
 
AGMA Arizona Groundwater Management Act 
AMA Active Management Areas 
AWS 100-year Assured Water Supply 
BRA Brazos River Authority 
DWR Arizona Department of Water Resources 
EAA Edwards Aquifer Authority 
EUWD Edwards Underground Water District 
ESA Endangered Species Act 
GCD Groundwater Conservation Districts 
GCD Act The Groundwater Conservation District Act of 1949 
GMA Groundwater Management Area 
GM Area Groundwater Management Area 
GM Authority Groundwater Management Authority 
GMAC Groundwater Management Area Council 
DFC Desired Future Condition 
HB  House Bill 
MAG Managed (Modeled) Available Groundwater 
NGMA Nebraska Groundwater Management Act 
NRD Natural Resource Districts 
PGMA Priority Groundwater Management Area 
RA River Authority 
RWPG Regional Water Planning Group 
SB Senate Bill 
SCTWAC South Central Texas Water Advisory Committee 
TWC Texas Water Code 
TWDB Texas Water Development Board 






























Anderson County UWCD 1987 1  30,408  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Bandera County RA & GWD 1989 1  508,578  Tax N/A 0.018 ND ND ND ND 
Barton Springs/Edwards Aquifer CD 1987 3  157,811  Fee $0.17, $0.46, 
$1/a-f  (ag), 
$0.31(t) 
N/A 9 2 $1,700,000 $10.77 
Bee GCD 2001 1  557,743  Tax N/A ND 0 1 $92,430 $0.17 
Blanco-Pedernales GCD 2001 1  455,568  Tax N/A 0.030 3   $256,000 $0.56 
Bluebonnet GCD 2002 3  1,770,085  Fee $0.035(t), 
$0.135 
N/A 2 1 $237,800 $0.13 
Brazoria County GCD 2005 1  948,055  Fee No Data NA ND ND ND ND 
Brazos Valley GCD 2002 2  927,909  Fee $0.425, 
$0.25/a-f (ag) 
NA ND ND ND ND 
Brewster County GCD 2001 1  3,949,372  Fee, CC N/A NA ND ND ND ND 
Brush Country GCD 2009 2  1,724,287  Tax ND ND 1 1 $301,000 $0.17 
Central Texas GCD 2005 1  649,762  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Clear Fork GCD 2002 1  575,198  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Clearwater UWCD 1999 1  692,656  Tax N/A 0.004 2 1 $862,866 $1.25 
Coastal Bend GCD 2001 2  698,908  Tax N/A $0.02  2 1 $230,000 $0.33 
Coastal Plains GCD 2001 1  885,537  Tax N/A $0.02  2 1 $220,000 $0.25 
Coke County UWCD 1986 1  592,340  Tax N/A $0.01254  ND ND ND ND 
Colorado County GCD 2007 1  620,936  Tax N/A $0.03  2 0 $275,000 $0.44 
Corpus Christi ASRCD 2005 2  331,356  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Cow Creek GCD 2002 1  420,112  Both $10/a-f, $1/a-f 
(ag) 
$0.005  3 0 $347,635 $0.83 
Crockett County GCD 1991 1  1,788,346  Tax N/A $0.0176  1 1 $214,500 $0.12 
Culberson County GCD 1998 1  1,103,135  Tax N/A $0.0688  ND ND ND ND 
Duval County GCD 2009 1  1,148,669  Tax N/A ND 1 0 $375,249 $0.33 
Edwards Aquifer Authority 1996 7  3,297,158  Fee $47/a-f, $2/a-f 
(ag) 
N/A 79 1 $13,800,000 $4.19 
Evergreen UWCD 1965 4  2,495,010  Tax N/A $0.017  4 1 $700,000 $0.28 
Fayette County GCD 2001 1  612,061  Tax N/A $0.01  2 0 $245,000 $0.40 



























Garza County UWCD 1996 1  572,632  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Gateway GCD 2003 5  2,540,661  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Glasscock GCD 1981 2  635,703  Tax N/A $0.034806  1 1 $70,000 $0.11 
Goliad County GCD 2001 1  548,961  Tax N/A Up to $0.02 1 1 $72,000 $0.13 
Gonzales County UWCD 1994 2  653,879  Tax N/A $0.0139  3 0 $220,000 $0.34 
Guadalupe County GCD 1999 1  277,424  Fee ND ND 0 1 $55,000 $0.20 
Hays Trinity GCD 2003 1  238,006  Fees, 
grants 
None N/A 2 0 $125,000 $0.53 
Headwaters UWCD 1991 1  705,853  Tax N/A $0.01  3   $439,000 $0.62 
Hemphill County UWCD 1997 1  585,672  Tax N/A $0.015  3 0 $452,762 $0.77 
Hickory UWCD No. 1 1982 6  1,668,924  Tax N/A $0.037  ND ND ND ND 
High Plains UWCD No.1 1951 15  6,931,616  Tax N/A $0.00754  23 0 $2,015,000 $0.29 
Hill Country UWCD 1987 1  676,497  Tax N/A $0.0089  2 0 $245,671 $0.36 
Hudspeth County UWCD No. 1 1957 1  572,268  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Irion County WCD 1985 2  703,013  Tax N/A $0.0444  1 1 $129,345 $0.18 
Jeff Davis County UWCD 1993 2  1,453,733  CC N/A N/A 1 0 $49,721 $0.03 
Kenedy County GCD 2004 7  1,886,156  Tax N/A $0.05  ND ND ND ND 
Kimble County GCD 2002 1  776,402  Tax N/A $0.002  1 1 $54,085 $0.07 
Kinney County GCD 2002 1  869,574  Both ND ND 2 1 vol. $204,794 $0.24 
Lavaca County GCD 2009 1  619,821  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Lipan-Kickapoo WCD 1987 3  1,918,471  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Live Oak UWCD 1989 1  689,630  Tax N/A $0.00847  0 1 $45,750 $0.07 
Llano Estacado UWCD 1998 1  958,452  Tax N/A $0.00952  ND ND ND ND 
Lone Star GCD 2001 1  686,687  Fee $0.06  N/A 8 0-1 $2,070,000 $3.01 
Lone Wolf GCD 2002 1  584,309  Tax N/A Up to $0.03 1 2 $217,000 $0.37 
Lost Pines GCD 2002 2  974,480  Fee $0.135  N/A 2 1 $657,000 $0.67 
Lower Trinity GCD 2006 2  1,108,587  Fee $0.5  N/A 1 1 $93,000 $0.08 
McMullen GCD 2001 1  741,594  Tax ND ND 0 1 $29,825 $0.04 
Medina County GCD 1991 1  854,852  Tax N/A $0.004  2 0 $200,000 $0.23 
Menard County UWCD 1999 1  497,475  Tax N/A $0.0775  0 3 $80,000 $0.16 
Mesa UWCD 1990 1  575,352  Tax N/A $0.0189  2 1 (Contr.) $204,000 $0.35 



























Mid-East Texas GCD 2002 1  1,558,680  Fee ND ND 1 0 $153,570 $0.10 
Middle Pecos GCD 2002 1  3,035,506  Tax ND ND 2 1 $330,000 $0.11 
Middle Trinity GCD 2002 2  2,612,486  Tax ND ND 4 0 $940,000 $0.36 
Neches & Trinity Valleys GCD 2001 3  1,938,503  Fee $0.025,  
$.0375(t) 
N/A 2 1 $180,000 $0.09 
North Plains GCD 1955 8  4,516,237  Tax N/A $0.019209  14 3 $1,900,000 $0.42 
North Texas GCD 2009 3  1,751,060  Fee $0.1, $1/a-f 
(ag) 
ND 1 2 $478,597 $0.27 
Northern Trinity GCD 2007 1  573,188  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Panhandle GCD 1956 7  4,083,435  Both ND $1.44  10 2 $1,300,000 $0.32 
Panola County GCD 2007 1  523,342  Tax N/A ND 3 0 $300,000 $0.57 
Pecan Valley GCD 2001 1  580,922  Tax N/A $0.015  2 0 $235,000 $0.40 
Permian Basin UWCD 1985 2  1,130,135  Tax N/A $0.02  3 0 $505,488 $0.45 
Pineywoods GCD 2001 2  1,176,958  Fee $.01, $.05(t) N/A 2 0 $158,000 $0.13 
Plateau UWC and Supply District 1974 1  833,750  Tax N/A $0.0548  1 0 $125,000 $0.15 
Plum Creek CD 1993 3  219,766  Tax N/A $.020, 
$.0175(fc) 
4 0 $2,214,040 $10.07 
Post Oak Savannah GCD 2002 2  1,083,351  Fee $0.02, $.06(t) N/A 3 0 $1,500,000 $1.38 
Prairielands GCD 2009 4  1,823,958  Fee ND ND 3 1 $1,200,000 $0.66 
Presidio County UWCD 1999 1  2,458,788  CC N/A N/A ND ND ND ND 
Real-Edwards C and R District 1959 2  1,800,731  Tax N/A $0.02  2 1 $193,000 $0.11 
Red River GCD 2009 3  1,199,952  Fee ND ND 0 2 $250,000 $0.21 
Red Sands GCD 2002 1  19,961  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Refugio GCD 2001 1  515,095  Tax ND ND 1 2 $542,592 $1.05 
Rolling Plains GCD 1999 3  1,702,363  Tax N/A $0.0287  1.4 0 $145,000 $0.09 
Rusk County GCD 2004 1  598,512  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
San Patricio County GCD 2007 1  452,523  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Sandy Land UWCD 1989 1  509,830  Tax N/A $0.01336  7 2 $858,000 $1.68 
Santa Rita UWCD 1989 1  687,990  Tax N/A $0.03007  ND ND ND ND 
Saratoga UWCD 1989 1  454,849  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
South Plains UWCD 1992 2  578,491  Tax N/A $.025 2 1 $290,000 $0.50 
Southeast Texas GCD 2004 4  2,384,949  Fee $0.007, 
$0.0035(t)  



























Southern Trinity GCD 2009 1  676,803  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Starr County GCD 2007 1  788,660  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Sterling County UWCD 1987 2  596,566  Tax N/A $0.03717  1 1 $140,190 $0.23 
Sutton County UWCD 1986 1  926,790  Tax N/A $0.0362  3 0 $270,000 $0.29 
Texana GCD 2001 1  546,990  Both ND ND 0 1 $130,000 $0.24 
Trinity Glen Rose GCD 2002 3  198,915  Fee ND ND 0 3 $220,000 $1.11 
Upper Trinity GCD 2007 4  2,049,590  Fee ND ND 6 0 $1,700,000 $0.83 
Uvalde County UWCD 1993 1  997,180  Tax N/A $0.02  ND ND ND ND 
Victoria County GCD 2005 1  567,293  Tax N/A $0.01  2 0 $499,000 $0.88 
Wes-Tex GCD 2002 1  582,327  ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Wintergarden GCD 1998 3  2,632,924  Tax N/A $0.04  ND ND ND ND 
           
 






Appendix 3: Significant Events Affecting Texas Groundwater Management.   
 
Year Legislation/Litigation/Event Significance 
1843 Acton v. Blundell  Established English common law cited as basis for Rule of 
Capture finding in East 
1861 Frazier v. Brown (Ohio)  Ohio Supreme Court case cited as basis for Rule of Capture 
finding in East 
1904 Houston and Texas Central 
Railroad Co. v. East  
 Established the Rule of Capture as groundwater management 
doctrine 
1913 House Bill 37  Surface water and ―underflow‖ declared waters of the state 
 Created Board of Water Engineers 
 First regulations applied to artesian wells 
1917 Article 16, Ch. 59 Conservation 
Amendment 
 Authorized legislature to pass laws to preserve and conserve the 
state’s natural resources 
1929 Brazos River Authority created  First River Authority created under the Conservation 
Amendment 
 Set precedent for regional basin-oriented water management 
agencies 
1934 Tx Board of Water Engineers 
Report 
 Called for declaring groundwater as water of state to be 
regulated similar to surface water 
1937, 1941, 
& 1947 
Texas Legislative Sessions  Bill filed in each session to place groundwater under control of 
the state 
1949 The Groundwater District Act of 
1949 
 Created process for establishing GCDs by petition 
 GCDs created within areas designated as ―underground 
reservoirs‖ 
 Initial indicator of state preference for local control 
1951 High Plains UWCD No. 1 created  First GCD created under GCD Act process 
1959 The Edwards Underground Water 
District created 
 1st attempt to manage the San Antonio segment of the 
Edwards Aquifer 
 District not equipped to manage complex area water 
management issues 
1978 Friendswood Development Co. v. 
Smith Southwest Industries 
 Modified Rule of Capture adding subsidence caused by 
pumping as an additional exception to the rule.   
1985 House Bill 2   ―Underground reservoirs‖ changed to ―management areas‖ 
 Areas established by Texas Water Commission (TCEQ) 
 Established incentives for GCD creation 
 Boundaries of GCDs ―coterminous‖ with management areas 
 Critical areas program 
1989 Senate Bill 1212   ―Management Areas‖ changed to ―Underground Management 
Areas‖ 
 Repealed ―coterminous‖ boundary requirement for legislatively 
created GCDs 
 Established process for determining need for GCD within 
designated areas 
 GCD creation optional 
 Failure to create GCD prohibited the use of TWDB funds 
1993 Sierra Club v. Lujan  Federal judge directed Texas legislature to implement measures 













Senate Bill 1477 
 
 
 Bill passed creating the Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA) to 
replace the EUWD 
 The EAA was first aquifer-scale GCD empowered with 
sufficient funding and authority to manage the aquifer 
1995 Quixx v. Panhandle Groundwater 
Conservation District No. 3, 
 Found that rules to prevent water exports were beyond GCD  
1995 House Bill 2294  ―Underground Management Areas‖ changed to ―Groundwater 
Management Areas‖ (GMAs) 
 Established Ch. 35 of the TWC to direct the creation of GMAs 
 Provided discretionary authority to TCEQ to delineate GMA 
boundaries for areas most suitable for groundwater management 
1996 Medina County Underground 
Water Conservation District v. 
Barshop 
 Confirmed that the EAA Act was facially constitutional 
1997 Senate Bill 1  Established regional ―bottoms up‖ state water planning 
 GCDs designated as ―preferred‖ method of groundwater 
management 
 Guidelines for and certification of GCD management plans 
 Oversight of implementation of GCD management plans by the 
TCEQ 
 Established PGMA identification and designation process 
 Assigned ―junior‖ priority date to interbasin surface water 
transfers 
1999 Sipriano v. Great Springs Water of 
America, Inc. 
 Challenged Rule of Capture 
 Conservation Amendment and SB1 cited as reason to take no 
action 
 Emphasized legislative responsibility to manage groundwater 
under Conservation Amendment 
1999 76
th Legislative Session  Legislation filed to create 44 new GCDs 
 Senator Brown expresses concern over single-county GCDs 
 SB 1911 passed creating 13 new GCDs and setting county-scale 
precedent 
2000 House Natural Resources 
Committee Interim Charges 
 Committee directed to study effectiveness of GCDs and consider 
the feasibility of aquifer-based management 
 Committee report concluded that GCDs should be created along 
aquifer boundaries rather than political. 
2001 Senate Bill 2  Increased GCD well regulation authority 
 Addressed transport of groundwater out of GCDs 
 Directed TWDB to create GMAs 
 Established foundation for voluntary joint groundwater planning 
2004 Senate Select Committee on Water 
Policy 
 Committee issues interim charges to study the ability of single-
county GCDs to manage regional groundwater resources 
 Committee provided recommendations for SB 3 
2005 Senate Bill 3  Set policy goal to ensure consistent management of groundwater 
in shared GMA 
 Proposed creation of GMA Councils with authority and funding 






Year Legislation/Litigation/Event Significance 
 Was foundation for HB 1763 












 Established mandatory joint groundwater planning in GMAs 
 Regionalized groundwater availability decisions (DFCs and 
MAGs) 
 Defined permitting caps 
2009 HB 3335  Bill filed to require that GCDs created in PGMAs include two or 
more contiguous counties.  Bill did not pass. 
2011 Senate Bill 332  Recognized groundwater as real property owned by the 
landowner 
 Reaffirmed a GCDs authority to well drilling, pumping, and 
transport of groundwater 
 Requires GCDs to consider groundwater ownership and all 
groundwater uses and needs in rulemaking 
2011 SB 660 (TWDB Sunset Bill)  Added GMA representative to each RWPG 
 ―Modeled Available Groundwater‖ changed ―Managed 
Available Groundwater‖ 
 Shifted emphasis from MAGs to DFCs 
 Provided more opportunity for public and stakeholder input 
 Substantially increased process complexity and responsibility of 
GCD representatives to GMAs 
2012 Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day  Affirmed EAA’s decision to limit permit 
 Found that landownership includes a constitutionally 
compensable interest in groundwater in place  
 Remanded case to lower court to determine if decision was a 
compensable taking 
2012 Senate Natural Resources 
Committee Interim Charges 
 Committee charged with considering: 1) the consolidation of 
GCDs along major aquifer lines and 2) the effectiveness of 
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